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1. Introduction
Transfer prices are one of the central topics of controlling and business administration.1 The 
history of transfer pricing literature goes back more than a century to the analysis of 
Schmalenbach in 1903.2 Although transfer prices have multiple functions and serve a variety 
of different purposes, traditional research mainly focused on internal coordination (e.g. 
Hirshleifer, 1956; Coenenberg, 1973; Winter, 1986, Wagenhofer, 1995; Göx, 1999). In the 
standard setting of analytical literature3 the transfer price can be seen "as a device for 
coordinating the plans and actions of individual decisions makers in decentralized 
organizations" (Göx & Schiller, 2007, p.673). While a higher transfer price increases the 
selling divisions profit, it decreases the profit of the buying unit. At the same time, the amount 
of units internally traded (and therefore sold on the final market) are affected by the transfer 
price in a decentralized organization, thereby also determining overall firm profit. If the two 
divisions involved are further located in different countries under different tax regimes, tax 
considerations play an additional important role. Shifting profits from the business unit 
operating in the country having higher tax rates to the unit located in the country with lower 
taxation raises overall firm after-tax profit. Thus, it becomes clear that a single transfer price 
cannot completely fulfill multiple objectives at once (Hummel, 2010, p.44), since multiple 
conflicts between the different functions of a transfer price can arise: for example, in case of 
excess capacity of a business unit, a transfer price of 0 could be reasonable in terms of the 
coordination function. However, when it comes to profit allocation, this would lead to severe 
distortions (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2008, p.579f.). In addition, a transfer price of 0 would not 
be tax compliant. Consequently, more recent analytical literature on transfer pricing suggests 
that a single transfer price cannot optimally achieve internal (coordination) and external (tax 
compliance and tax burden minimization) objectives simultaneously (Baldenius, Melumad, & 
Reichelstein, 2004; Choe & Hyde, 2007; Hyde & Choe, 2005; Smith, 2002). This finding has 
also found its way into management accounting textbooks (e.g., Horngren, Datar, & Rajan, 
2015, pp. 883-884; Kaplan & Atkinson, 2014, pp. 454, 463-464; Zimmermann, 2013, pp. 186, 
191-198). As a solution, researchers suggest the use of multiple transfer prices for different
1 See Göx and Schiller (2007) for a more detailed literature review on economic transfer pricing. 
2 Since the post-doctoral thesis of Schmalenbach is not available, we refer to an article containing the most 
important statements published in 1908/1909. For the Anglo literature, the starting point goes back to Hirshleifer 
(1956). 
3 We refer to the standard setting with two divisions in a decentralized organization: a producing unit, 
selling (all) its products to the buying unit, which finally sells them on the final product market.
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purposes, in particular, one set of books for tax compliance/tax optimization and another set 
of books for internal management purposes (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe & Hyde, 2007). 
However, this proposition does not seem to have found much acceptance in practice. 
Consultants emphasize that the use of one set of books may be helpful to signal tax authorities 
that the transfer pricing system is not driven by a tax optimization strategy (Ernst & Young, 
2001, 2003). Even analytical researchers acknowledge that multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
in practice, use one set of books, “both for simplicity and in order to avoid the possibility that 
multiple transfer prices become evidence in any disputes with the tax authorities” (Baldenius 
et al., 2004, p. 592). Therefore, research still seems to be challenged suggesting practicable 
solutions. Meanwhile, the ongoing globalization caused an increasing volume of trade to 
remain inside MNEs and therefore out of the reach of market forces. In the early 1990s, 
already 60 percent of international trade took place within MNEs (European commission, 
2001, p. 23). More recent estimates suggest that this portion has further increased to 80 
percent (UNCTAD, 2013, p.135), emphasizing the practical relevance of transfer pricing 
nowadays. Such development increases the importance of tax considerations when it comes to 
the pricing of within-firm transactions. MNEs with cross-border internal transactions have 
realized the huge tax savings potential arising from profit-shifting using inappropriate transfer 
prices for tangible or intangible services or goods, a strategically chosen financing strategy or 
hybrid mismatch arrangements. National governments reacted to this behavior by installing 
regulations for transfer prices, often following the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (first 
established in 1979). Transfer prices are subject to these national tax regulations determining 
the applicability of transfer pricing methods in certain situations. The “arm’s length principle” 
claims that the amount charged by a related party to another must be the same as if the parties 
were not related. Therefore, an arm's-length price for a product or a service should reflect a 
price on the open market or simply what an unrelated party would charge for it. 
Consequently, transfer prices need to be compliant with this regulation in order to avoid 
penalty payments. Over the last decade, the tax strategies of some of the biggest firms of the 
world (e.g. Amazon, Apple, Google, Starbucks) attracted huge media attention. For example, 
the guardian titles in an article released in November 2016 "Google pays €47m in tax in 
Ireland on €22bn sales revenue" (Guardian, 2016). The OECD itself reacted with a 15 action 
plan called Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS). BEPS refers to "tax avoidance strategies 
that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax 
locations" (OECD, 2017). Multiple actions of the BEPS package address transfer pricing, but 
some new topics like the digital economy are included, too. Simultaneously to the increased 
2
public attention, tax avoidance also attracted more and more interest of researchers in recent 
years.4 Several studies investigate determinants, consequences or the magnitude of tax 
avoidance in different research settings. Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), we define 
tax avoidance broadly as "the reduction of explicit taxes" (p.137).5 A particular interesting 
research question within the research field of tax avoidance is its relationship with corporate 
sustainability performance.6 Recently, academic research on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) has dramatically increased (Huang & Watson, 2015).7 The broad definition of the 
United Nations, stating that sustainable development "seeks to meet the needs and aspirations 
of the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the future” (United Nations, 
1987, part 1, chapter 1, paragraph 49) suggests that sustainable firms consider both short and 
long-term externalities. Understanding CSR as corporate “actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001, p.117) manifests a firm’s responsibility towards society. According to 
Stiglitz & Siu (2016, p.1), "the first responsibility of any corporation is paying your fair share 
of taxes". Therefore, paying taxes and CSR are related topics. However, the relationship 
between firms’ sustainability performance and tax avoidance behavior remains ambiguous, 
both theoretically and empirically. Davis et al. (2016) provide large-sample evidence for a 
positive relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate tax 
avoidance, thereby supporting traditional economic theories. On the other hand, Lanis and 
Richardson (2015) and Hoi et al. (2013) provide evidence for a negative relationship which 
supports the applicability of political theories and the corporate culture perspective. 
Against this background, the three essays of this cumulative dissertation address different 
research questions within the given background. In the first article "Funktionen und Methoden 
der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung" we look at the relevance of different functions (internal and 
external) and methods within transfer pricing of Swiss MNEs. The aim of the paper is to 
provide a descriptive overview of actual transfer pricing systems in practice, contrasting them 
with analytical literature. Survey results of 53 Swiss MNEs indicate several interesting 
findings: Overall, firms seem to be very satisfied with their transfer pricing system, although 
4 See Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for a more detailed literature review of tax research and tax avoidance in 
accounting. 
5 Therefore, we do not to distinguish between tax-compliant and non-compliant tax avoidance. 
6 See Huang and Watson (2015) for a more detailed literature review of corporate social responsibility research 
in accounting. 
7 Carroll (2016) provides an overview of the frameworks that are typically discussed in the context of CSR and 
concludes that the differences between the concepts of CSR and sustainability are negligible. 
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the large majority relies on one set of books only. With respect to the different functions of 
transfer prices, tax compliance and tax optimization are the most predominant ones. 
Regarding internal functions solely, divisional profit determination is the most important one, 
while the traditional coordination function seems to be rather unimportant. Conflicts between 
different functions of transfer prices can be observed in practice; the most prevalent conflict 
exists between internal profit determination and tax optimization. With regard to transfer 
pricing methods, cost-plus methods are still the predominant ones. The most interesting 
finding is that firms seem to integrate the transfer pricing system into their management 
control system, for example by referring to tax-compliant transfer prices when it comes to 
budgeting or the performance-evaluation of business unit managers. According to analytical 
literature, this should cause severe problems when using a single set of books.  
Following this finding, the second essay "Can the Integration of a Tax Compliant Transfer 
Pricing System into the Management Control System Be Successful? Yes, It Can!" 
investigates the perceived success of firms integrating a single tax-compliant transfer price 
into the management control system. As already pointed out, traditional analytical transfer 
pricing literature suggests that there exists a conflict between tax compliance (or tax burden 
optimization) and internal coordination in decentralized organizations and recommends the 
use of two sets of books (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe & Hyde, 2007; Hyde & Choe, 2005). 
We use survey data from 38 tax-compliant Swiss MNEs with cross-border internal 
transactions and one set of books. Applying partial least squares (PLS) analysis, results 
suggest that the integration of a tax compliant transfer pricing system into the management 
control system is perceived to be successful, in particular when the transfer pricing system is 
transparent and can be revised in the case of fundamental management control problems. This 
finding contradicts analytical literature. Corroborating these findings, we also find affirmative 
testimonies from interview data of three MNEs. Overall, our results are consistent with 
survey-based findings reporting that firms predominantly use the same transfer price for both 
tax compliance and management control purposes.  
The third article "Sustainability Performance and Tax Avoidance – Disentangling the Effects 
from Operational and Management Sustainability Performance" investigates the relationship 
between firms’ sustainability performance and tax avoidance behavior. Since this relation 
remained ambiguous in literature so far, both theoretically and empirically, we follow Trumpp 
et al. (2015) and differentiate between an operational and a management sustainability 
performance. We argue that this distinction might be a reasonable explanation for the 
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confounding effects of prior literature. Using a sample of 4'449 (respectively 4'427) firm-year 
observations of U.S. MNEs, we find that management sustainability performance is positively 
related to corporate tax avoidance, while operational sustainability performance and tax 
avoidance are negatively associated. This finding is robust for the social and the 
environmental dimension solely, too. Our reasoning of disentangling management and 
operational sustainability performance might provide an explanation for the inconsistent 
findings of prior studies on the relationship between sustainability performance and tax 
avoidance. 
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 Funktionen und Methoden der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
2.1. Funktionen und Methoden der 
Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
Prof. Dr. Dieter Pfaff ist seit 1994 Ordinarius für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der 
Universität Zürich und Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Accounting, insbesondere 
Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling. 2011 bis 2014 leitete er zudem als
Direktor das Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Zürich. Davor war 
er an der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main tätig. Er ist 
Mitherausgeber der Zeitschrift «Die Unternehmung», Mitglied des Editorial Board 
der «Management Accounting Research», Verwaltungsratsmitglied und Präsident 
des Beirats der Controller Akademie AG, Zürich, sowie Vizepräsident von veb.ch, 
des grössten Schweizer Verbands in Rechnungslegung und Controlling. Dieter 
Pfaff ist Autor und Mitherausgeber mehrerer Fachbücher sowie zahlreicher 
Beiträge in nationalen und internationalen Fachzeitschriften. 
Dr. Katrin Hummel ist Oberassistentin und Habilitandin am Lehrstuhl für 
Accounting, insbesondere Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling, der 
Universität Zürich. Zuvor war sie als Controllerin bei einem Konzern im 
Anlagenbau für das Controlling von internationalen Grossprojekten 
verantwortlich. Von 2005 bis 2008 arbeitete Katrin Hummel als wissenschaftliche 
Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl Controlling der Universität Stuttgart. Katrin Hummel ist 
Autorin verschiedener Beiträge zu den Themen Verrechnungspreisgestaltung, 
Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung und Responsible Management Education. 
Benedikt Bisig arbeitet als Assistent (Teilzeit) am Lehrstuhl für Accounting, 
insbesondere Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling, der Universität Zürich. 
Nebenbei arbeitet er als Commercial Manager in einer Handelsfirma, welche 
Rohstoffe der Düngemittelproduktion vermarktet. Benedikt Bisigs 
Forschungsgebiet liegt im Bereich der Verrechnungspreise.
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Dieser Artikel ist veröffentlicht unter Pfaff, D./Hummel, K./Bisig, B., Funktionen und Methoden der 
Verrechnungspreisgestaltung, in: Meyer, C./Pfaff, D. (Hrsg.): Finanz- und Rechnungswesen Jahrbuch 
2015, Zürich, S. 389-416, 2015.
 Funktionen und Methoden der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
2.1.1. Einführung 
Zu den wichtigsten und meist diskutierten Instrumenten dezentraler Steuerung von Organisationen 
gehören die Verrechnungs- oder Transferpreise. Der Grund dafür ist, dass Verrechnungspreise das 
Ergebnis der am internen Lieferungs- oder Leistungsaustausch beteiligten Profit Center in der Regel 
massgeblich beeinflussen und dabei systemimmanente Interessenkonflikte bestehen: «Während die 
liefernde oder leistende Einheit einen hohen Verrechnungspreis präferiert, stellt sich die Lage für den 
abnehmenden Bereich genau entgegengesetzt dar. Bei steuerüberschreitenden Verrechnungspreisen 
treten hierzu noch die Partikularinteressen der Fisci sowie der Zollbehörden der betroffenen Länder.» 1  
In dieser Situation gibt es weder wissenschaftlich eindeutig präferierte, noch einfache praktische 
Lösungen. Dies gilt vor allem deshalb, weil aus der Kooperation der verbundenen Unternehmen in der 
Regel Synergien entstehen, die über den Verrechnungspreis alloziiert werden (müssen). Synergien 
lassen sich aber nur willkürlich aufteilen. Unternehmen versuchen, das Problem pragmatisch zu lösen, 
indem sie einerseits den Verrechnungspreis so wählen, dass sie sich innerhalb der national oder 
international steuerlich vorgegebenen Verrechnungspreisrichtlinien bewegen, andererseits aber stets das 
Gesamtoptimum des Unternehmens im Auge behalten. Die Umsetzung dieses Grundsatzes ist schwierig, 
da das lokale Management in einem permanenten Zielkonflikt zwischen Bereichs- und 
Gruppeninteressen steht. Dass das Bereichsinteresse dennoch häufig im Vordergrund steht, hat damit zu 
tun, dass Bereichsergebnisse in der Berichterstattung häufig zu einseitig herausgestellt werden und 
zudem gruppenkonformes Verhalten zu wenig honoriert wird.2 «Bereichsegoismen können aber ein 
Unternehmen – je nach Grössenordnung – Ergebnisse in Millionenhöhe kosten, eben in Höhe der 
Deckungsbeiträge, die man an Dritte verschenkt (bei Zukauf statt Eigenbezug) oder erst gar nicht 
realisiert, weil man auf ein angeblich unrentables Geschäft im Verbund verzichtet.»3 
Vor diesem Hintergrund kommt der Ausgestaltung des Verrechnungspreises eine zentrale Rolle zu. Der 
oberste Grundsatz von Verrechnungspreissystemen – zumindest aus steuerlichen Erwägungen heraus – 
ist nach wie vor der Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz: Verrechnungspreise sollen wie am Markt, also wie 
gegenüber Dritten gebildet werden («dealing at arm’s length»):4 In der klassischen Verbundbeziehung 
zwischen einer Produktions- und einer Vertriebsgesellschaft z.B. bedeutet der Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz, 
dass man der Konzernvertriebsgesellschaft dieselben Konditionen einräumt, wie man dies gegenüber 
einem unabhängigen Dritten getan hätte.5 Gemäss den OECD-Verrechnungspreisrichtlinien von 1995 
galt bezüglich der Anwendung und Umsetzung des Fremdvergleichsgrundsatzes eine strenge Hierarchie 
der Verrechnungspreismethoden: So war die Preisvergleichsmethode die bevorzugte Methode, und die 
Kostenaufschlagsmethode sowie die Wiederverkaufspreismethode sollten den gewinnorientierten 
Methoden vorgezogen werden. Letztere sollten nur in Ausnahmefälle angewandt werden.6  
1 Pfaff/Stefani (2006), S. 517. 
2 Vgl. Peters/Pfaff (2008/2011), S. 132. 
3 Peters/Pfaff (2008/2011), S. 132. 
4 Vgl. OECD (2011a), S. 33 ff. 
5 Vgl. Peters/Pfaff (2008/2011), S. 132. 
6 Vgl. OECD (1995/96/97), Tz. 2.49 und 3.49; Wolff (2010), S. 3. 
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Mit der Neufassung der Verrechnungspreisgrundsätze 2010 wurde die bisherige Hierarchie aufgehoben. 
Neu soll die Auswahl der Verrechnungspreismethode immer darauf abzielen, «für jeden Fall die am 
besten geeignete Methode zu finden.»7 Nur in Situationen, in denen sich Methoden als gleich zuverlässig 
erweisen, wird weiterhin der Preisvergleichsmethode gegenüber den anderen Standardmethoden und 
den Standardmethoden gegenüber den Gewinnmethoden Vorrang eingeräumt.8 Es kann deshalb 
vermutet werden, dass in den letzten Jahren Gewinnmethoden wie die Gewinnaufteilungsmethode und 
die Nettomargenmethode an Bedeutung gewonnen haben. Dies kann man insbesondere dann erwarten, 
wenn die Transaktion durch den Einsatz wichtiger immaterieller Wirtschaftsgüter geprägt ist oder 
«aufgrund der hohen Verflechtung ihrer Abläufe einzigartig ist.»9 
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es das Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags, die Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
Schweizer Konzerne zu beleuchten. In der Schweiz gibt es zwar keine spezifischen Regelungen zur 
Gestaltung und Dokumentation von Verrechnungspreisen; allerdings wird auf die 
Verrechnungspreisrichtlinie der OECD als international gültiger Rahmen verwiesen.10 Zudem müssen 
sich Schweizer Konzerne wegen ihrer starken Exportorientierung und Auslandsverbundenheit der 
internationalen Regulierung beugen. Pfaff und Stefani stellen für Schweizer Unternehmen bereits für das 
Jahr 2005 fest, dass OECD-richtlinienkonforme Verrechnungspreise die Beziehungen zwischen rechtlich 
selbständigen Einheiten dominieren.11 
Im Einzelnen stellen sich folgende Fragen, die auch die Gliederung des Beitrags bestimmen: 
1. Welche Funktionen dominieren aus praktischer Sicht die Verrechnungspreisgestaltung? Welche 
Rolle spielen insbesondere die Erfüllung steuerrechtlicher Regelungen und die 
Steueroptimierung im Vergleich zu den internen Funktionen der Erfolgsermittlung und Steuerung 
von Entscheidungen (Koordinationsfunktion)? 
2. Welche Bedeutung haben die von der OECD empfohlenen Methoden für die in der Schweiz 
befragten Unternehmen? Sind die geschäftsvorfallbezogenen Gewinnmethoden überhaupt 
signifikant vertreten oder dominieren nach wie vor die geschäftsvorfallbezogenen 
Standardmethoden? Gibt es Unterschiede bei der Wahl der Verrechnungspreismethode 
zwischen den jeweiligen Wertschöpfungsstufen? Wie werden zentrale Dienstleistungen 
verrechnet? 
3. Wie zufrieden sind Unternehmen mit ihrem Verrechnungspreissystem und welche Rolle spielen 
dabei Konflikte zwischen den Verrechnungspreiszwecken sowie die Integration des 
Verrechnungspreissystems in das Management Control System des Unternehmens? 
Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen erfolgt auf der Grundlage einer empirischen Erhebung der 
Verrechnungspreisgestaltung in der Unternehmenspraxis; die Befragung wurde 2012 vom Lehrstuhl für 
Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling der Universität Zürich vorgenommen. Die letzte ausführliche 
                                                
7 OECD (2011b), S. 65. 
8  Vgl. OECD (2011b), S. 66. 
9 Vgl. Wolff (2010), S. 4. 
10 Vgl. Kreisschreiben Nr. 4 (Besteuerung von Dienstleistungsgesellschaften) der Eidgenössischen Steuerverwaltung ESTV 
vom 19. März 2004; Kreisschreiben Nr. 9 (Nachweis des geschäftsmässig begründeten Aufwandes bei Ausland-Ausland-
Geschäften) der ESTV vom 22. Juni 2005. 
11 Vgl. Pfaff/Stefani (2007), S. 212. 
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Bestandsaufnahme für die Schweiz – vom selben Lehrstuhl durchgeführt – datiert aus dem Jahr 2005 
und fällt in eine Zeit, in der es noch die zuvor beschriebene starke Hierarchie der 
Verrechnungspreismethoden gab.12 Auch wenn die in 2005 und 2012 gestellten Fragen nicht völlig 
deckungsgleich sind, lassen sich interessante Aufschlüsse über die Entwicklung der 
Verrechnungspreissysteme gewinnen. 
2.1.2. Untersuchungssample 
Die jüngste, vom Lehrstuhl für Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling durchgeführte Untersuchung 
basiert auf einer Grundgesamtheit von 158 Unternehmen, die zum 15. Juli 2012 an der Schweizer Börse 
SIX primärkotiert waren und nicht der Banken-, Versicherungs- oder Immobilienbranche angehörten. Die 
Finanzdienstleistungsbranche wird typischerweise in solchen Untersuchungen ausgeschlossen, da sie 
sich wegen ihrer geschäftsspezifischen Merkmale fundamental vom Rest des Untersuchungssamples 
unterscheidet.13  
Im Zeitraum zwischen Juli und September 2012 wurden die Unternehmen der ausgewählten 
Grundgesamtheit zunächst telefonisch kontaktiert und die entsprechenden 
Verrechnungspreisverantwortlichen innerhalb des Unternehmens ermittelt.14 Sechs Wochen später 
wurden Unternehmen, die einer Teilnahme zugestimmt aber noch nicht geantwortet hatten, erneut zum 
Ausfüllen des Online-Fragebogens eingeladen. Dieses Vorgehen ergab eine Gesamtheit von 68 
ausgefüllten Fragebögen, was einer Rücklaufquote von 43 Prozent entspricht. 15 Fragebögen mussten 
allerdings eliminiert werden, da sie in hohem Mass Lücken aufwiesen. Somit liegt der vorliegenden 
Untersuchung eine Gesamtheit von maximal 53 Fragebögen zugrunde, was einer effektiven (und 
aussagekräftigen) Rücklaufquote von 34 Prozent entspricht.15 In der Untersuchung von 2005 lag die 
Rücklaufquote bei ebenfalls erfreulichen 37 Prozent.16  
Bei 83 Prozent aller teilnehmenden Unternehmen handelt es sich um die Konzernobergesellschaft, bei 9 
Prozent um eine Tochtergesellschaft. Die restlichen 8 Prozent bilden Obergesellschaften einer 
Zwischenholding, Divisionen einer Rechtseinheit oder Sonstiges. Die durchschnittliche Mitarbeiteranzahl 
für das Geschäftsjahr 2011 reicht bei einem Durchschnitt von 7'656 Mitarbeiter von 15 bis 123'686. Der 
durchschnittliche Nettoumsatz (inklusive Innenumsatz) für die Geschäftsperiode 2011 beträgt 3.019 Mrd. 
CHF, wobei eine grosse Streuung zwischen 18 Mio. CHF und 52 Mrd. CHF beobachtbar ist. Die 
Gesamtheit der vorliegenden Fragebögen bildet sowohl hinsichtlich des Umsatzes und der 
Mitarbeiterzahl als auch anderer wichtiger Merkmale in etwa die Struktur der angeschriebenen 
Grundgesamtheit ab, so dass zumindest kein Hinweis auf eine eingeschränkte Repräsentativität der 
Umfrage besteht. 
                                                
12 Vgl. Pfaff/Stefani (2006). Zur Schweizer Verrechnungspreispraxis vgl. auch Weilenmann (1989). 
13 Entsprechendes gilt für die Untersuchung von 2005; vgl. Pfaff/Stefani (2007), S. 204. 
14 Jede Bezeichnung der Person, des Status oder der Funktion in der vorliegenden Arbeit gilt in gleicher Weise für Männer 
und Frauen. 
15 Die Grundgesamtheit kann je nach Untersuchung in Form der Stichprobengrösse von den genannten 53 abweichen. 
16 Vgl. Pfaff/Stefani (2006), S. 518; Pfaff/Stefani (2007), S. 204. 
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Abbildung 1 veranschaulicht die Branchenzugehörigkeit der Grundgesamtheit der 53 Unternehmen. Am 
stärksten vertreten ist der Maschinen- und Anlagenbau, dem knapp ein Viertel der Unternehmen 
angehören. Es folgen «Pharma/Biotechnologie/Medizinaltechnologie» (15 Prozent) und «Handel und 
Transport» (ebenfalls 15 Prozent, wobei der Löwenanteil mit 11 Prozent auf Handelsunternehmen 
entfällt). Des Weiteren befinden sich die Branchen «Baugewerbe/Rohstoffe/Chemie», 
«Konsumgüterindustrie», «Energieversorgung», «Elektronik», «Telekommunikation» und «Sonstiges» 
unter den Antwortenden. Nicht vertreten sind «IT/Software» und «Automobil». Vergleicht man die 
Branchenverteilung mit der Untersuchung 2005 ergibt sich ein ähnliches Bild bei leicht angepasster 
Branchenkategorisierung.17 
 
Abbildung.1: Untersuchungssample nach Branchenzugehörigkeit 
Zur Illustration des Masses an internationaler Verflechtung wird der Anteil des im Ausland 
erwirtschafteten Umsatzes (inkl. Innenumsatz) betrachtet. Mit durchschnittlich 66 Prozent liegt dieser sehr 
hoch und liefert ein deutliches Indiz für die internationale Orientierung von Schweizer Unternehmen. So 
geben 92 Prozent der Unternehmen an, dass grenzüberschreitender interner Leistungsaustausch 
vorliegt. Dieser hohe Anteil akzentuiert die Bedeutung von steuerlichen Aspekten bei der 
Verrechnungspreisgestaltung von Schweizer Unternehmen. Bei 75 Prozent aller Unternehmen findet 
interner Leistungsaustausch zwischen unterschiedlichen Steuersubjekten innerhalb der Landesgrenzen 
statt. Nur 35 Prozent aller befragten Unternehmen geben an, dass Leistungsaustausch innerhalb 
desselben steuerpflichtigen Unternehmens vorkommt.  
Abbildung 2 veranschaulicht die Zuständigkeiten bei der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung. Mit einem 
durchschnittlichen Wert von 4.9 (auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7) ist die zentrale Controllingabteilung bei der 
                                                
17 Vgl. Pfaff/Stefani (2007), S. 205. 
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Ausgestaltung der Verrechnungspreise am stärksten eingebunden, gefolgt von der zentralen 
Steuerabteilung (4.6), der Geschäftsleitung (4.4) und anderen Abteilungen (4.1). In den meisten Fällen 
werden unterschiedliche Abteilungen in den Entscheidungsprozess eingebunden. Ein Muster an häufig 
auftretenden Kombinationen lässt sich allerdings nicht erkennen. Bemerkenswert ist also, dass trotz der 
starken (und zunehmenden) Bedeutung der steuerlichen Compliance (vgl. Abbildung 4) der 
Controllingabteilung – zumindest im Durchschnitt aller Unternehmen – nach wie vor die grösste Rolle 
zukommt. 
 
Abbildung 2: Zuständigkeiten bei der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
2.1.3. Funktionen der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
Generell unterscheidet man zwischen internen und externen Funktionen von Verrechnungspreisen. 
Während interne Funktionen vor allem der Erfüllung von unternehmensinternen Zwecken wie 
beispielsweise der Erfolgsermittlung einzelner Profit Center sowie der dezentralen Steuerung 
(Koordination) dienen, bilden externe Funktionen die Informationsgrundlage für aussenstehende 
Stakeholder (z.B. Steuer- und Regulierungsbehörden).18  
Abbildung 3 veranschaulicht die Bedeutung verschiedener interner Funktionen der 
Verrechnungspreisgestaltung.19 Die grösste Bedeutung kommt dabei der Erfolgsermittlung einzelner 
Profit Center mit einem durchschnittlichen Wert von 4.1 (auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7) zu, dicht gefolgt von 
der Transparenz unternehmerischer Prozesse und Entscheidungen (4.0) sowie der Vereinfachung der 
Planung (3.9). Die klassische und in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur oft diskutierte Funktion der 
Koordination und Beeinflussung der Entscheidungsfindung ist für die Unternehmen des 
Untersuchungssamples nur von relativ geringer Bedeutung.20 
                                                
18 Vgl. ausführlicher Pfaff/Hummel 2014, S. 593 f. 
19 Der ursprünglich ausgehändigte Fragebogen basiert auf einer siebenstufigen Likertskala (1=trifft nicht zu, 7=trifft voll zu). 
Zur besseren Veranschaulichung wurden die sieben Antwortkategorien zu fünf zusammengefasst: 1=keine Bedeutung, 
2+3=geringe Bedeutung, 4=mittlere Bedeutung, 5+6=grosse Bedeutung, 7=sehr grosse Bedeutung. 
20 Vgl. bereits Schmalenbach (1909), Hirshleifer (1956) sowie Ronen/McKinney (1970) als die grundlegenden Beiträge zur 
Koordinationsfunktion sowie Pfaff/Pfeiffer (2004) zu einem systematischen Überblick. 
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Abbildung 3: Bedeutung interner Funktionen der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung21 
Bereits 2005 war die Erfolgsermittlung mit einem mittleren Wert von 3.54 (gemessen auf einer Skala von 
1 «keine Bedeutung» bis 5 «sehr grosse Bedeutung») die wichtigste Funktion, gefolgt von der 
Koordinationsfunktion mit 2.9. Allerdings bezogen sich die damals gemessenen Werte nur auf den Fall 
des Lieferungs- oder Leistungsaustauschs innerhalb eines Steuersubjekts, bei der die Steuerproblematik 
grundsätzlich zu vernachlässigen ist. Umso bemerkenswerter ist die relativ hohe Bedeutung der 
Funktionen Erfolgsermittlung und Transparenz in der aktuellen Umfrage einzuschätzen.  
Abbildung 4 zeigt die Wichtigkeit externer Funktionen der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung. Der steuerlichen 
Compliance (Erfüllung steuerrechtlicher Regelungen) wird mit einer durchschnittlichen Bewertung von 5.6 
die grösste Bedeutung sämtlicher Funktionen (interner wie externer) beigemessen. Diese Beobachtung 
spiegelt die Komplexität steuerrechtlicher Regelungen sowie die Entschlossenheit ausländischer Fisci bei 
der Durchsetzung ihrer Verrechnungspreisrichtlinien wider. Unternehmen erachten es als oberste 
Priorität, dass ihre Verrechnungspreise von den betroffenen Steuerbehörden akzeptiert werden. Dies 
deckt sich mit den Ergebnissen von Hummel für Unternehmen mit Sitz in Deutschland.22 
Die zweitgrösste Bedeutung der externen Funktionen wird mit einem Durchschnittswert von 4.5 der 
Optimierung der gesamten Konzernsteuerlast beigemessen. Dies verdeutlicht, dass Konzerne innerhalb 
der Grenzen internationaler Verrechnungspreisstandards und -richtlinien nach wie vor versuchen, die 
Steuerbelastung der verbundenen Unternehmen zu optimieren. Auch in der Umfrage 2005 zeigte sich die 
Optimierung der Konzernsteuerlast als wichtige Funktion, auch wenn die Ergebnisse nicht unmittelbar 
vergleichbar sind, da die steuerliche Compliance als Antwortalternative gefehlt hatte. Weitere externe 
Funktionen wie die handelsrechtliche Bestandsbewertung, die Segmentberichterstattung oder die 
Preisbestimmung auf Absatzmärkten sind von vergleichsweise geringer Bedeutung. 
                                                
21 Pfaff/Hummel (2014), S. 593. 
22 Vgl. Hummel (2010), S. 159. 
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Abbildung. 4: Bedeutung externer Funktionen der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung23 
Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass steuerliche Überlegungen die 
Verrechnungspreisgestaltung der befragten Schweizer Unternehmen dominieren. Dabei liegt das 
Hauptaugenmerk auf der steuerlichen Compliance und weniger auf der Optimierung der 
Konzernsteuerlast, was im Einklang mit empirischen Befunden zur zunehmenden Bedeutung des Tax 
Risk Managements bei international tätigen Unternehmen steht. Einer Befragung von Ernst & Young 
zufolge gewichten global agierende Öl- und Gasunternehmen das Tax Risk Management im Jahre 2013 
deutlich stärker als in den Jahren 2010 und 2007; damit einhergehend sinken Bestrebungen zur 
Steueroptimierung bei diesen Unternehmen.24 
2.1.4. Methoden der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
2.1.4.1. Unterscheidung nach der Art der Transaktionsbeziehung 
Massstab für die steuerliche Angemessenheit der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung ist international der 
Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz, der sich auf «die wirtschaftlich relevanten Eigenschaften der zu 
vergleichenden Umstände» bezieht.25 Vergleichbarkeit heisst, «dass keiner der Unterschiede (soweit 
vorhanden) zwischen den zu vergleichenden Umständen die untersuchte Bedingung der Methode (z.B. 
Preis oder Spanne) wesentlich beeinflussen kann oder dass hinreichend genaue Berichtigungen erfolgen 
können, um die Auswirkung dieser Unterschiede zu beseitigen.»26 Darauf gestützt beschreibt die 
Verrechnungspreisrichtlinie der OECD eine Reihe von Methoden, «die verwendet werden können, um 
festzustellen, ob die in den kaufmännischen oder finanziellen Beziehungen zwischen verbundenen 
                                                
23 Pfaff/Hummel (2014), S. 594. 
24 Vgl. Ernst & Young (2013). 
25 OECD (2011a), S. 45. 
26 OECD (2011a), S. 45; zu ausführlichen Leitlinien zur Durchführung von Vergleichbarkeitsanalysen siehe OECD (2011c). 
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Unternehmen festgelegten Bedingungen mit dem Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz vereinbar sind.»27 Ziel der 
Richtlinie ist es, dass die für die Umstände des Einzelfalls am besten geeignete Methode ausgewählt 
wird.28 Dabei erweist sich eine Unterscheidung nach der Art der Lieferungs- und Leistungsbeziehungen 
als sinnvoll. Im Fragebogen wurden vereinfachend folgende drei grundlegende Typen von 
Geschäftsvorfällen unterschieden:  
! Transaktionen zwischen Produktionsgesellschaften,  
! Transaktionen zwischen Produktions- und Vertriebsgesellschaft sowie 
! Erbringung zentraler Dienstleistungen.  
Als Methoden zur internen Lieferungs- und Leistungsverrechnung lassen sich – zunächst unabhängig von 
der Art des Geschäftsvorfalls – die von der OECD vorgeschlagenen Standardmethoden (Preisvergleichs-, 
Wiederverkaufspreis- sowie Kostenaufschlagsmethode) und Gewinnmethoden (Nettomargen- sowie 
Gewinnaufteilungsmethode) unterscheiden. Im Folgenden werden die genannten Methoden kurz 
erläutert. Nicht auf dem Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz beruhende Ansätze wie namentlich die globale 
formelhafte Aufteilung des Gewinns werden von der OECD (bislang) vehement abgelehnt29 und bleiben 
in der Analyse unberücksichtigt. 
Gemäss OECD-Verrechnungspreisrichtlinien 2010 vergleicht die Preisvergleichsmethode «den bei einem 
konzerninternen Geschäftsvorfall verrechneten Waren- oder Dienstleistungspreis mit jenem, der bei 
einem vergleichbaren Geschäftsvorfall zwischen unabhängigen Unternehmen unter vergleichbaren 
Verhältnissen verrechnet wird.»30 Die Preisvergleichsmethode wird dann als besonders geeignete 
Methode angenommen, wenn «ein unabhängiges Unternehmen dasselbe Produkt verkauft, das auch 
zwischen zwei verbundenen Unternehmen verkauft wird.»31 Preisanpassungen sind erforderlich, wenn 
sich z.B. die Lieferbedingungen hinsichtlich Transport und Versicherung unterscheiden.32 
Die Wiederverkaufspreismethode «geht von dem Preis aus, zu dem ein Produkt, das von einem 
verbundenen Unternehmen gekauft worden ist, an ein unabhängiges Unternehmen weiterveräußert 
wird.»33 Dieser um eine angemessene Bruttomarge (Handelsspanne) sowie um Drittkosten, die mit dem 
Kauf in Zusammenhang stehen (z.B. Transport- und Zollkosten), berichtigte Preis ergibt den 
Verrechnungspreis für den konzerninternen Verkauf. Die Bruttomarge umfasst die Vertriebs- und 
sonstigen betrieblichen Kosten, die der Wiederverkäufer (des gruppenintern bezogenen Produkts) zu 
decken hat, sowie den unter Berücksichtigung der wahrgenommenen Funktionen zu erzielenden 
angemessenen Gewinn.34 Die Wiederverkaufspreismethode eignet sich vor allem dann, wenn die 
                                                
27 OECD (2011b), S. 65. 
28 Vgl. OECD (2011b), S. 65 ff. 
29 Vgl. OECD (2011a), S. 39-44. 
30 OECD (2011b), S. 70. 
31 OECD (2011b), S. 71. 
32 Vgl. OECD (2011b), S. 72. 
33 OECD (2011b), S. 72. 
34 Vgl. OECD (2011b), S. 72 f. 
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empfangende Division das gelieferte Produkt direkt an Dritte weiterverkauft. Häufig handelt es sich dabei 
um Transfers zwischen einer Produktions- und einer Vertriebsgesellschaft.35 
Bei der Kostenaufschlagsmethode wird der Verrechnungspreis (Fremdvergleichspreis) bestimmt, indem 
auf die Kosten des liefernden (oder leistenden) Bereichs ein angemessener (betriebs- oder 
branchenüblicher) Kostenzuschlag erhoben wird, der einen den wahrgenommenen Funktionen und 
Marktbedingungen entsprechenden Gewinn gewährleisten soll.36 Gemäss OECD dürfte die Methode 
dann besonders zweckmässig sein, «wenn zwischen verbundenen Unternehmen Halbfabrikate verkauft 
werden, wenn verbundene Unternehmen Verträge über die Nutzung gemeinsamer Einrichtungen bzw. 
langfristige Abnahme- und Liefervereinbarungen abschließen oder wenn es beim konzerninternen 
Geschäftsvorfall um die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen geht.»37 
Die Funktionsweise der transaktionsbezogenen Nettomargenmethode ist ähnlich wie die der beiden 
zuvor genannten Methoden. Untersucht wird der Nettogewinn, den ein verbundenes Unternehmen aus 
einem konzerninternen Geschäft erzielt, «in Relation zu einer geeigneten Grundlage (z.B. Kosten, 
Umsatz, Kapital).»38 Dabei entscheidend ist die Wahl geeigneter Vergleichsunternehmen (Funktion, 
Risikostruktur etc.). Ob Vergleichbarkeit vorliegt, soll anhand einer Funktionsanalyse der 
Geschäftsvorfälle zwischen den verbundenen Unternehmen sowie zwischen unabhängigen Dritten 
geprüft werden.39 Die Nettomargenmethode gilt als unzuverlässig, «wenn jede Partei wertvolle, 
einzigartige Beiträge leistet.»40 In diesem Fall wird auf die Gewinnaufteilungsmethode verwiesen. 
Die Gewinnaufteilung wird danach bestimmt, was unabhängige Unternehmen bei einem gegebenen 
Geschäftsvorfall erwartet hätten. Dabei wird zunächst der aus dem Geschäftsvorfall (der 
Geschäftsbeziehung) erwirtschaftete Gesamtgewinn ermittelt und dieser dann nach wirtschaftlich 
angemessenen Kriterien aufgeteilt; die Aufteilung soll dem nahekommen, «was bei einem zwischen 
fremden Dritten vereinbarten Geschäftsvorfall erwartet worden wäre.»41 Vorteile der Methode werden vor 
allem dann gesehen, wenn  
! Transaktionen hochintegrierte Tätigkeiten umfassen (wie z.B. den weltweiten Handel mit 
Finanzinstrumenten zwischen verbundenen Unternehmen) oder 
! die verbundenen Unternehmen einzigartige und wertvolle Beiträge zum gemeinsamen Geschäft 
leisten.42  
2.1.4.2. Verrechnungspreisgestaltung zwischen Produktionsgesellschaften 
Bei Transaktionen zwischen Produktionsgesellschaften wird typischerweise ein Zwischen- oder 
Halbfabrikat zur Weiterverarbeitung oder Modifizierung an ein verbundenes Unternehmen verkauft. Das 
                                                
35 Vgl. OECD (2011b), S. 73. 
36 Vgl. OECD (2011b), S. 78 f. 
37 OECD (2011b), S. 79. 
38 OECD (2011b), S. 86. 
39 Vgl. OECD (2011b), S. 87. 
40 OECD (2011b), S. 87. 
41 OECD (2011b), S. 105. 
42 Vgl. OECD (2011b), S. 105. 
19
 Funktionen und Methoden der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
gelieferte Produkt wird nach Erhalt also nicht direkt abgesetzt, sondern fliesst in den Produktionsprozess 
des empfangenden Unternehmens ein.  
Abbildung 5 verdeutlicht, welcher Anteil der Lieferungen zwischen Produktionsgesellschaften (bzw. 
zwischen Produktions- und konzerninternen Distributionsgesellschaften) mit der jeweiligen 
Verrechnungspreismethode bewertet wird.43 Varianten der Kostenaufschlagsmethode werden 
durchschnittlich für 43 Prozent aller Transfers zwischen Produktionsgesellschaften verwendet, wobei die 
befragten Unternehmen erwartungsgemäss deutlich öfter einen Aufschlag auf die vollen als auf die 
variablen Kosten vornehmen. Daneben kommt die Wiederverkaufspreismethode am häufigsten zur 
Anwendung. Im Durchschnitt werden 18 Prozent der transferierten Zwischen- oder Halbfabrikate anhand 
dieser Methode bewertet, während Vergleiche mit Marktpreisen (Preisvergleichsmethode) bei rund 12 
Prozent der erzielten Umsätze angestellt werden. Ebenfalls nennenswert ist die (transaktionsbezogene) 
Nettomargenmethode, welche bei nahezu 9 Prozent aller Transaktionen Anwendung findet. Die 
(geschäftsvorfallbezogene) Gewinnaufteilungsmethode, aber auch weitere gewinnorientierte Methoden – 
wie der globale Gewinnvergleich sowie die globale Gewinnaufteilung – sind für die befragten 
Unternehmen praktisch bedeutungslos. 
 
Abbildung 5: Methoden der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung zwischen Produktionsgesellschaften (bzw. 
zwischen Produktions- und konzerninternen Distributionsgesellschaften) 
Insgesamt bestätigt sich die Empfehlung der OECD, dass bei Verbundbeziehungen zwischen 
Produktionsgesellschaften die Kostenaufschlagsmethode am zuverlässigsten sein dürfte. Addiert man die 
Unternehmen, die rein zu variablen oder vollen Kosten ohne Aufschlag abrechnen, hinzu (in der Grafik 
unter «Andere Methoden» subsummiert), bestimmt gut die Hälfte der befragten Unternehmen den 
Verrechnungspreis kostenorientiert. Gleichzeitig zeigt sich, dass aber auch andere von der OECD 
vorgeschlagene Methoden – insbesondere die Preisvergleichs- und Wiederverkaufspreismethode – 
Anwendung finden.  
                                                
43 In Fällen, in denen die Summe sämtlicher deklarierter Anteile eines Unternehmens nicht 100 Prozent entsprach, wurden die 
Angaben unter Beibehaltung der relativen Anteile reskaliert, so dass die Summe 100 Prozent ergibt. 
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Ein Vergleich zu den Umfrageergebnissen 2005 findet geschäftsfallübergreifend am Ende von Kapitel 4 
statt; die damalige Umfrage hatte noch nicht nach Geschäftsvorfällen getrennt. 
2.1.4.3. Verrechnungspreisgestaltung zwischen Produktions- und 
Vertriebsgesellschaften 
Transaktionen zwischen Produktions- (bzw. Distributions-) und Vertriebsgesellschaften liegen vor, wenn 
die liefernde Gesellschaft ein zum Verkauf fertiges Produkt an den Vertrieb liefert, das dieser in der Folge 
an unabhängige Dritte absetzt. Abbildung 6 veranschaulicht die Bedeutung der verschiedenen 
Verrechnungspreismethoden für diesen Geschäfts(vor)fall. Im Vergleich zur Lieferung zwischen 
Produktionsgesellschaften gewinnt nun die von der OECD für diesen Typ empfohlene 
Wiederverkaufspreismethode mit rund einem Drittel aller Transaktionen stark an Bedeutung. Dennoch 
stellt die Kostenaufschlagsmethode immer noch die am häufigsten eingesetzte 
Verrechnungspreismethode dar: Auch zwischen Produktions- und Vertriebsgesellschaften werden noch 
knapp 36 Prozent aller Transfers mittels Kostenaufschlagsmethode bewertet. Die 
Preisvergleichsmethode sowie die transaktionsbezogene Nettomargenmethode kommen mit knapp 10 
Prozent etwa gleich stark wie im ersten Fall zum Einsatz. Alle anderen Methoden sind eher unbedeutend. 
 
Abbildung 6: Methoden der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung zwischen Produktions- (bzw. Distributions-) und 
Vertriebsgesellschaften 
2.1.4.4. Verrechnungspreisgestaltung für zentrale Dienstleistungen  
Konzerne stellen ihren verbundenen Unternehmen typischerweise eine Reihe von Dienstleistungen zur 
Verfügung. Dazu gehören administrative und kaufmännische Dienstleistungen (inklusive Management-, 
Koordinations- und Kontrollfunktionen) ebenso wie Finanzdienstleistungen und Dienstleistungen aus dem 
Forschungs- und Dienstleistungsbereich. Die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen kann auch mit der 
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Übertragung von Waren oder immateriellen Wirtschaftsgütern verbunden sein.44 Bei der Analyse der 
Verrechnungspreise muss geprüft werden, ob 
! die konzerninterne Dienstleistung überhaupt erbracht worden ist und  
! der Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz eingehalten wird.45  
Als fremdvergleichskonforme Verrechnungspreismethoden werden von der OECD namentlich die 
Preisvergleichsmethode sowie die Kostenaufschlagsmethode erachtet: «Die Preisvergleichsmethode wird 
wahrscheinlich die zweckmäßigste Methode sein, wenn eine vergleichbare Dienstleistung zwischen 
unabhängigen Unternehmen auf dem Markt des Empfängers erbracht wird oder vom verbundenen 
Unternehmen, das die Dienstleistungen unter vergleichbaren Verhältnissen für ein unabhängiges 
Unternehmen erbringt. Dies trifft beispielsweise dann zu, wenn Dienstleistungen im Bereich des 
Rechnungswesens und der Revision sowie juristische Dienstleistungen oder Computerdienstleistungen 
erbracht werden, vorausgesetzt die konzerninternen Geschäftsvorfälle und die Fremdgeschäftsvorfälle 
sind vergleichbar. Die Kostenaufschlagsmethode ist in Ermangelung einer Preisvergleichsmethode 
wahrscheinlich dann die zweckmäßigste Methode, wenn die Art der Tätigkeit, der Kapitaleinsatz und die 
übernommenen Risiken mit denjenigen von unabhängigen Unternehmen vergleichbar sind.» 46 
Abbildung 7 zeigt, dass die Preisvergleichsmethode nur bei etwa 8 Prozent der befragten Unternehmen 
zum Einsatz kommt. Offensichtlich sind die konzernintern erbrachten Dienstleistungen derart individuell, 
dass ein Preisvergleich unzweckmässig wäre. Auch die Wiederverkaufspreismethode kommt mit 2.8 
Prozent sehr selten zum Einsatz.  
 
Abbildung 7: Methoden der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung für zentrale Dienstleistungen 
Wenig überraschend dominieren daher kostenorientierte Verrechnungspreise. Rund 38 Prozent (bzw. 14 
Prozent) der intern erbrachten Dienstleistungen werden durch einen Aufschlag auf die vollen (bzw. 
                                                
44 Vgl. OECD (2011d), S. 233 f. 
45 Vgl. OECD (2011d), S. 234 f. 
46 OECD (2011d), S. 243 f. 
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variablen) Kosten verrechnet, zudem 15 Prozent (bzw. 2 Prozent) zu vollen (bzw. variablen) Kosten ohne 
Aufschlag. Des Weiteren werden durchschnittlich 7 Prozent der Dienstleistungen mittels Kostenumlage 
nach dem Pool-Konzept verrechnet. Insgesamt werden somit durchschnittlich 76 Prozent der zentral 
erbrachten Dienstleistungen kostenbasiert verrechnet. Es kann vermutet werden, dass kostenorientierte 
Verrechnungspreismethoden für konzerninterne Dienstleistungen einfacher anwendbar und 
dokumentierbar sind. Alle anderen Methoden, namentlich die Gewinnaufteilungsmethode sowie die 
transaktionsbezogene Nettomargenmethode, aber auch die Preisvergleichsmethode spielen bei der 
Verrechnung konzerninterner Dienstleistungen eine untergeordnete Rolle. 
2.1.4.5. Vergleich mit den Umfrageergebnissen 200547  
Einschränkend muss zunächst festgestellt werden, dass die Ergebnisse 2012 und 2005 nicht unmittelbar 
miteinander vergleichbar sind, da im Fragebogen 2005 die Art der Transaktionsbeziehung noch keine 
Rolle spielte und die Methoden unterschiedlich gegliedert wurden. Bringt man aber die Daten 2012 und 
2005 auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner, lassen sich zumindest die folgenden wichtigen Aussagen treffen:  
Kosten- und marktpreisorientierte Methoden dominieren nach wie vor die Gestaltung der 
Verrechnungspreise der befragten Unternehmen. Bei den kostenorientierten Methoden liegt die 
Kostenaufschlagsmethode bei Zugrundelegung der vollen Kosten deutlich vorn. Die Verrechnung reiner 
Kosten (ohne Aufschlag) spielt eine untergeordnete Rolle. Dies gilt letztlich auch für alle Formen der 
Gewinnaufteilung sowie für die transaktionsbezogene Nettomargenmethode. Trotz Wegfall der OECD-
Hierarchie der Verrechnungspreismethoden im Jahr 2010 hat sich an der Beliebtheit der 
Standardmethoden offensichtlich wenig geändert. Es kann nur spekuliert werden, dass gerade Kosten 
und Preise die beobachtbar harten Fakten sind, an denen sich Unternehmen bei der Anwendung des 
Fremdvergleichsgrundsatzes vorzugsweise orientieren. 
2.1.5. Besondere Herausforderungen und Zufriedenheit 
der Unternehmen mit ihrer Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
Grundsätzlich können Konflikte zwischen allen in Kapitel 3 genannten Funktionen auftreten. Am 
wenigsten wahrscheinlich sind aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht Konflikte zwischen (interner) 
Erfolgsermittlung und steuerlicher Compliance: Da Verrechnungspreise danach zu beurteilen sind, ob 
sich verbundene Unternehmen wie unabhängige Fremde verhalten, wird eine 
«Gewinnmaximierungsabsicht der verbundenen Unternehmen unterstellt, die sich komplementär zur 
Erfolgsermittlungsfunktion verhält.»48 Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Argumentation wird man sogar eine 
komplementäre Beziehung erwarten können. Diese Erwartung lässt sich empirisch nicht bestätigen. Im 
Mittelwert wird mit 3.6 sogar eine schwach konfliktäre Beziehung gesehen. Abbildung 8 zeigt zudem, 
dass die wahrgenommene Bedeutung stark streut: Sie reicht von der Einschätzung «keine Bedeutung» 
bis hin zu einer sehr grossen Bedeutung. Am stärksten wird mit einem Mittelwert von 4.1 der Konflikt 
zwischen (interner) Erfolgsermittlung und Steueroptimierung wahrgenommen. 
                                                
47 Vgl. Pfaff/Stefani (2007). 
48 Pfaff/Hummel (2014), S. 597. 
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Abbildung 8: Bedeutung von Zielkonflikten zwischen den Funktionen der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung49 
Insgesamt ist festzustellen, dass Zielkonflikte zwischen den Verrechnungspreisfunktionen für die 
befragten Unternehmen offensichtlich keine sehr grosse Herausforderung darstellen (durchschnittliche 
Bewertung von 3.7 auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7). Dieser Befund wird dadurch gestützt, dass Unternehmen 
bei Anwendung der Kostenaufschlagsmethode kaum mit Transparenznachteilen rechnen. In der Literatur 
wird demgegenüber befürchtet, dass die Kostenaufschlagsmethode bei mehrstufiger 
Wertschöpfungskette zu einer Mehrfachbezuschlagung und damit zu einer Verschleierung der 
tatsächlichen Kostenstruktur führen könnte.50 Die Koordinationsfunktion, welche die aus Konzernsicht 
gewinnmaximierenden Entscheidungen im Fokus hat, könnte dann in Konflikt zur steuerlichen 
Compliance stehen, welche insbesondere bei mehrstufiger Wertschöpfungskette die 
Kostenaufschlagsmethode erfordern könnte. Fragt man die Unternehmen konkret nach diesen Gefahren, 
verweisen sie mit einer hohen durchschnittlichen Bewertung in Höhe von 5.2 (auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7) 
darauf, dass in derartigen Situationen auf Informationen des Kostenrechnungssystems zurückgegriffen 
wird.  
Dies deutet darauf hin, dass das Verrechnungspreissystem von den befragten Unternehmen keineswegs 
isoliert gesehen wird, sondern vielmehr in das Management Control System (MCS) integriert ist (vgl. 
Abbildung 9). 
                                                
49 Pfaff/Hummel (2014), S. 598. 
50 Vgl. Pfaff/Hummel (2014), S. 598; Pfaff (2003), S. 37-40. 
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Abbildung 9: Integration von Verrechnungspreissystem und Management Control System 
Diese Integration wird von den Befragungsteilnehmern insgesamt als relativ wichtig bewertet 
(durchschnittliche Bewertung von 4.4 auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7). Wie zu erwarten ist, findet die 
Integration insbesondere im Rahmen der Budgetplanung, aber auch im Hinblick auf die 
Performanceevaluation der Leiter der Verantwortungsbereiche statt. Darüber hinaus fliessen 
Informationen des Kostenrechnungssystems direkt in die Verrechnungspreisgestaltung ein, was im 
Einklang mit der häufigen Verwendung kostenbasierter Verrechnungspreismethoden steht (vgl. 
Abschnitte 4.2 bis 4.4). 
 
Abbildung 10: Zufriedenheit mit dem Verrechnungspreissystem 
Zum Gesamtbild passt die im Durchschnitt hohe Zufriedenheit der befragten Unternehmen mit ihrem 
Verrechnungspreissystem (vgl. Abbildung 10). Während der Gesamtzufriedenheitswert im Durchschnitt 
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bei 4.9 (auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7) liegt, bewerten die Unternehmen sogar mit einem Wert von 5.5 
(ebenfalls auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7) die Erfüllung steuerrechtlicher Regelungen. Diese externe Funktion 
der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung, der die befragten Unternehmen eine sehr hohe Bedeutung beimessen 
(vgl. Abschnitt 3), scheinen die in der Praxis implementierten Verrechnungspreissysteme somit 
weitestgehend zu erfüllen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist auch die sehr positive Bewertung des Kosten-
Nutzen-Verhältnisses der implementierten Verrechnungspreissysteme nicht überraschend: Mit einem 
Wert von 5.3 (ebenfalls auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7) stimmen die Unternehmen zu, dass der Nutzen des 
Verrechnungspreissystems im Grossen und Ganzen die Kosten überwiegt. Am wenigsten zufrieden 
zeigen sich die Unternehmen mit der Anpassungsfähigkeit ihrer Verrechnungspreissysteme im Hinblick 
auf Veränderungen in den Beschaffungs- und Absatzmärkten (durchschnittliche Bewertung von 3.8). 
Weiterführende ökonometrische Methoden zeigen zudem, dass die Zufriedenheit der befragten 
Unternehmen mit der Integration des Verrechnungspreissystems korreliert ist. So steigt die Zufriedenheit 
statistisch signifikant mit der (angegebenen) Stärke der Integration. Zudem zeigt sich, dass die 
Transparenz des Verrechnungspreissystems gegenüber den beteiligten Parteien von grosser Wichtigkeit 
ist und ebenfalls mit der Integration sowie Zufriedenheit zusammenhängt. Einmal mehr scheint sich die 
Weisheit zu bewahrheiten, dass Kommunikation alles ist. 
2.1.6. Thesenförmige Zusammenfassung 
• Verrechnungspreise gehören nach wie vor zu den wichtigsten und meistdiskutierten Instrumenten 
dezentraler Steuerung. Grund dafür ist der systemimmanente Interessenkonflikt zwischen den 
beteiligten Profit Centern; bei grenzüberschreitenden Verrechnungspreisen treten die 
Partikularinteressen der Fisci sowie der Zollbehörden der betroffenen Länder hinzu. 
• In dieser Situation gibt es weder wissenschaftlich eindeutig präferierte, noch einfache praktische 
Lösungen, da die aus der Kooperation der verbundenen Unternehmen entstehenden Synergien 
nur willkürlich aufgeteilt werden können. 
• Trotz dieser schwierigen Ausgangslage sind Schweizer Konzerne mit der Gestaltung ihrer 
Verrechnungspreissysteme im Durchschnitt sehr zufrieden, so die Ergebnisse einer 2012 
durchgeführten Umfrage des Lehrstuhls für Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling der 
Universität Zürich. Befragt wurden 158 Unternehmen, die Mitte Juli 2012 an der Schweizer Börse 
SIX primärkotiert waren. Die Rücklaufquote betrug 34 Prozent. 
• Hinsichtlich der Funktionen gilt, dass steuerliche Überlegungen die Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
der befragten Schweizer Unternehmen dominieren. Dabei liegt das Hauptaugenmerk auf der 
steuerlichen Compliance und weniger auf der Optimierung der Konzernsteuerlast. Zielkonflikte 
zwischen den Verrechnungspreisfunktionen stellen für die befragten Unternehmen offensichtlich 
keine grosse Herausforderung dar. 
• Mit der Neufassung der OECD-Verrechnungspreisgrundsätze 2010 wurde die Dominanz der 
Standardmethoden aufgegeben. Neu soll stets die für jeden Fall am besten geeignete Methode 
gewählt werden. Die daraus abgeleitete Vermutung, dass die Standardmethoden 
(Preisvergleichsmethode, Wiederverkaufspreismethode, Kostenzuschlagsmethode) zu Gunsten 
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der Gewinnmethoden (namentlich die transaktionsbezogene Gewinnaufteilungsmethode sowie 
die transaktionsbezogene Nettomargenmethode) an Bedeutung verlieren, konnte nicht bestätigt 
werden. 
• Unabhängig von der Transaktionsbeziehung (den beteiligten Wertschöpfungsstufen) weist die
Kostenaufschlagsmethode wie bereits 2005 grundsätzlich die höchste Bedeutung auf. Am
stärksten ist diese Dominanz bei der Verrechnung zentraler Dienstleistungen, am schwächsten
bei Transaktionen zwischen Produktions- und Vertriebsgesellschaften eines Konzerns.
• Die Befürchtung, dass die Kostenaufschlagsmethode bei mehrstufiger Wertschöpfungskette zu
einer Mehrfachbezuschlagung und damit zu einer Verschleierung der tatsächlichen
Kostenstruktur führen könnte, wird von den befragten Unternehmen wenig geteilt. Vielmehr wird
in diesen Situationen auf die Informationen des Kostenrechnungssystems zurückgegriffen.
• Mit der Zufriedenheit stark korreliert ist die Integration des Verrechnungspreissystems in das
Management Control System sowie die Transparenz gegenüber den beteiligten Parteien. Einmal
mehr scheint sich die Aussage zu bewahrheiten: «Kommunikation ist alles».
Literatur 
Ernst & Young (2013): Navigating the choppy waters of international tax. 2013 Global Transfer Pricing 
Survey, www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-2013_Global_Transfer_Pricing_Survey/$FILE/
EY-2013-GTP-Survey.pdf. 
Hirshleifer, J. (1956): On the Economics of Transfer Pricing. In: Journal of Business, 29. Jg., S. 172–184. 
Hummel, K. (2010): Gestaltungsparameter und Einflussfaktoren von Verrechnungspreissystemen, 
Baden-Baden. 
OECD (1995/96/97): Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. 
OECD (2011a): Der Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz. In: OECD-Verrechnungspreisrichtlinien für multinationale 
Unternehmen und Steuerverwaltungen 2010, OECD Publishing, S. 33-63. 
OECD (2011b): Verrechnungspreismethoden. In: OECD-Verrechnungspreisrichtlinien für multinationale 
Unternehmen und Steuerverwaltungen 2010, OECD Publishing, S. 65-119. 
OECD (2011c): Vergleichbarkeitsanalyse. In: OECD-Verrechnungspreisrichtlinien für multinationale 
Unternehmen und Steuerverwaltungen 2010, OECD Publishing, S. 121-147. 
OECD (2011d): Besondere Überlegungen zu konzerninternen Dienstleistungen. In: OECD-
Verrechnungspreisrichtlinien für multinationale Unternehmen und Steuerverwaltungen 2010, OECD 
Publishing, S. 233-248. 
Peters, G./Pfaff, D. (2008/2011): Controlling. Wichtige Methoden und Techniken, 2. Aufl., Zürich. 
Pfaff, D. (2003): Methodische Fragen einer internationalen Konzernkostenrechnung. In: Franz, K.-
P./Hieronimus, A. (Hrsg.): Kostenrechnung im international vernetzten Konzern, Düsseldorf und 
Frankfurt, S. 29-46. 
Pfaff, D./Hummel, K. (2014): Funktionen und Zielkonflikte der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung – Ergebnisse 
einer empirischen Erhebung in der Schweiz. In: Dobler, M. et al. (Hrsg.): Rechnungslegung, Prüfung und 
Unternehmensbewertung, Stuttgart, S. 587-604. 
27
 Funktionen und Methoden der Verrechnungspreisgestaltung 
Pfaff, D./Pfeiffer, T. (2004): Verrechnungspreise und ihre formaltheoretische Analyse: Zum State of the 
Art. Ist das Dilemma der pretialen Lenkung wirklich ein Dilemma? In: Die Betriebswirtschaft, 64. Jg., 
S. 296–319. 
Pfaff, D./Stefani, U. (2006): Verrechnungspreise in der Unternehmenspraxis. Eine Bestandsaufnahme zu 
Zwecken und Methoden. In: Controlling, 18. Jg., S. 517-524. 
Pfaff, D./Stefani, U. (2007): Transferpreise in der Schweizer Unternehmenspraxis. Empirische Ergebnisse 
und betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerungsgefahren. In: Meyer, C./Pfaff, D. (Hrsg.): Jahrbuch Finanz- und 
Rechnungswesen 2007, Zürich, S. 199-225. 
Ronen, J./McKinney, G. (1970): Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy. In: Journal of Accounting 
Research, 8. Jg., S. 99–112. 
Weilenmann, Paul (1989): Dezentrale Führung: Leistungsbeurteilung und Verrechnungspreise. In: 
Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 59. Jg., S. 932-956. 
Wolff, U. (2010): OECD: Bekanntgabe der überarbeiteten Verrechnungspreisgrundsätze (Kapitel I-III). In: 
Ernst & Young Tax News, Oktober, S. 3-4. 
 
28
29
2.2. Can the Integration of a Tax Compliant Transfer Pricing System into the 
Management Control System Be Successful? Yes, It Can! 
30
Abstract: This paper examines how the integration of a single-book tax compliant transfer 
pricing system into the management control system is related to the perceived success of that 
transfer pricing system. To identify the relationships, we use results from survey data from 
Swiss multinational firms with cross-border internal transactions. Whereas analytical research 
suggests a decoupling of transfer prices to attain both tax compliance and internal (control) 
purposes, we find that the integration of a tax compliant transfer pricing system into the 
management control system is perceived to be successful in achieving these goals. This is 
particularly true when the transfer pricing system is transparent and can be revised in the case of 
fundamental management control problems. Corroborating these findings, we also find 
affirmative testimonies from interview data from employees within three multinational 
enterprises. Overall, our results are consistent with survey-based findings reporting that firms 
predominantly use the same transfer price for both tax compliance and management control 
purposes. 
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2.2.1. Introduction 
As recent discussions about tax avoidance illustrate (Sikka & Willmott, 2010), transfer pricing 
in multinational enterprises with cross-border internal transactions is the cornerstone of the 
allocation of profits across different tax jurisdictions. To impede tax minimization strategies, 
international guidelines, such as the OECD transfer pricing guideline, govern the determination 
of transfer prices. As a consequence, transfer prices need to be compliant, in principle, with this 
regulation. At the same time, tax compliant transfer prices are usually to some extent integrated 
into the enterprises’ management control systems through their use in the planning and control 
of decentralized responsibility centers and subsidiaries. 
In light of numerous agency problems in firms, it has been determined that a single (tax 
compliant) transfer price cannot simultaneously fulfill both internal (management control) and 
external (tax compliance and tax burden minimization) objectives (Baldenius, Melumad, & 
Reichelstein, 2004; Choe & Hyde, 2007; Hyde & Choe, 2005; Smith, 2002a). This finding has 
also found its way into management accounting textbooks (e.g., Horngren, Datar, & Rajan, 
2015, pp. 883-884; Kaplan & Atkinson, 2014, pp. 454, 463-464; Zimmermann, 2013, pp. 186, 
191-198). In an attempt to provide solutions to these goal conflicts, researchers have repeatedly
called for the use of different transfer prices for different purposes, in particular, for the use of 
one set of books for tax compliance/tax optimization and another for internal management 
purposes (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe & Hyde, 2007).  
Despite this overwhelming consensus among analytical researchers, it is yet not clear that a 
single (tax compliant) transfer price necessarily weakens the success of a transfer pricing system 
with respect to management control purposes. Survey-based findings report that firms 
predominantly use the same transfer price for both internal and external (tax compliance) 
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purposes (Ernst & Young, 2001, 2003, 2005). In addition, consultants emphasize that the use of 
the same transfer price for tax compliance and internal management purposes may be helpful to 
signal that the transfer pricing system is driven by internal control considerations and not by tax 
optimization purposes (Ernst & Young, 2001, 2003). Even analytical researchers acknowledge 
that multinational enterprises, in practice, use one set of books, “both for simplicity and in order 
to avoid the possibility that multiple transfer prices become evidence in any disputes with the 
tax authorities” (Baldenius et al., 2004, p. 592). 
For these reasons, the advantages of decoupled over integrated tax compliant transfer prices are 
questionable. Furthermore, transfer pricing and management control systems are highly complex 
and dynamic instead of exogenously given and static (which are common assumptions in 
analytical modeling). In particular, responsibility centers are often able to initiate revisions of 
the transfer pricing system if fundamental problems occur and deviate from internal transfer 
pricing rules in some exceptional cases (Cools, Emmanuel, & Jorissen, 2008). However, to 
initiate such revisions, transparency is needed, and management must truly comprehend the 
nature of the system and the rationale behind the rules. Furthermore, responsibility center 
managers must understand the effect of their actions on the company as a whole to avoid taking 
actions that could harm the company.  
Against this backdrop, the interplay between international transfer pricing and management 
control systems has recently gained attention in the transfer pricing literature (Cools, 2014; 
Cools et al., 2008; Cools & Slagmulder, 2009; Rossing & Rohde, 2010). These case-based 
studies analyze the consequences of implementing a single-book tax compliant transfer pricing 
system for the design and use of various components of the management control system. 
However, despite its importance for practitioners and academics alike, little empirical evidence 
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exists on how firms address the conflict between management control purposes and tax 
compliance and whether the level of integration of the transfer pricing system into the 
management control system is positively associated with the success of that transfer pricing 
system. Chen and Chen (2015) shed some light on the conflict with regard to the determinants 
and consequences of transfer pricing autonomy for divisional managers. However, to our 
knowledge, only Cools et al. (2008) provide insights into managers’ perceptions of an integrated 
transfer pricing system. While one interviewee highlights the improved tax compliance of the 
integrated transfer pricing system, others criticize its lack of flexibility. Cools et al. (2008, p. 
626) call for future research to further analyze the consequences of integrated transfer pricing
systems. We respond to this call and investigate two related research questions using survey 
data: can (tax compliant) transfer pricing system integration be positively related to transfer 
pricing system success as perceived by the corporate-level authorities responsible for transfer 
pricing, and is the relationship mediated by the use of the tax compliant transfer pricing system 
in terms of repairability, transparency, and flexibility. To shed light on these questions, we 
conduct an empirical study that is characterized by the following aspects. 
First, in contrast to previous studies on transfer pricing (for an overview, see Cools, 2014), this 
study employs a perspective that goes beyond the analysis of transfer pricing methods (e.g., cost 
plus or resale-minus transfer prices) applied in single transactions. In particular, we analyze a 
firm’s transfer pricing system in its entirety. While our approach, to some extent, departs from 
common research ground, it enables us to account for the broad area of transfer price application 
within multinational enterprises because transfer pricing systems in practice often contain a 
variety of different transfer pricing methods for different transactions. Furthermore, taking a 
holistic view of taxpayers’ intercompany transactions is in line with recent OECD 
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developments, such as the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project, and it is a 
consequence of the changing view of tax authorities (Ernst & Young, 2013, p. 29). 
Second, to measure the level of integration between the transfer pricing system and the 
management control system, we use information on how strictly transfer prices enter the budget 
planning, cost accounting, performance evaluation and bonus systems of the responsibility 
centers. All of these parts of the management control system are usually seen as instruments for 
achieving decentralization and coordination in multidivisional and multinational firms (see, for 
example, Horngren et al., 2015, p. 868; Kaplan & Atkinson, 2014; Zimmermann, 2013, pp. 185-
188). Moreover, this type of measurement allows us to build on previous research in the field 
(Cools et al., 2008; Rossing & Rohde, 2010).  
Third, with respect to the use of the transfer pricing system, we rely on Adler and Borys’ (1996) 
concept of an enabling use of bureaucracy. This concept is well established in management 
accounting research (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Free, 2007; Wouters 
& Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008) and is particularly useful for examining the 
simultaneous use of highly structured controls (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004, p. 276), a 
phenomenon that is also prevalent in transfer pricing.  
Results from a partial least squares (PLS) analysis of survey data from 38 multinational 
enterprises indicate that the level of integration of the transfer pricing system into the 
management control system is positively and significantly correlated with the success of the 
transfer pricing system as perceived by the corporate-level authorities responsible for transfer 
pricing. Note that we measure transfer pricing system success based on assessments of the 
satisfaction with the transfer pricing system in terms of the fulfillment of both tax compliance 
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and management control objectives. A considerable part of this correlation is due to the 
mediating variables repair and internal transparency. More precisely, the level of transfer pricing 
system integration is positively associated with the ability to repair the transfer pricing system in 
the event of fundamental problems and with internal transparency, which in turn have positive 
links to transfer pricing system success. To substantiate our survey results in terms of a 
robustness test, we contrast them with findings based on interviews with the corporate-level 
managers responsible for transfer pricing at three multinational enterprises.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study complements analytical 
research (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe & Hyde, 2007; Hyde & Choe, 2005; Smith, 2002a, 
2002b) by analyzing empirical data from a diverse set of firms and providing new insights into 
the question of how multinational enterprises handle the (supposed) trade-off between the tax 
compliance and management control objectives of transfer pricing. Second, prior research on the 
integration between transfer pricing and management control systems is exclusively based on 
case studies (Cools et al., 2008; Rossing & Rohde, 2010). Our cross-sectional analysis and 
additional interviews can help to substantiate these case-based findings and, in addition, provide 
reliable insights into different levels of integration, use and success of transfer pricing systems. 
Third, our perspective on transfer pricing, which is independent of transactions and transfer 
pricing methods, allows us to examine differences in the use of the transfer pricing system. 
Practical implications from our research include recommendations for the strong integration of 
tax compliant transfer prices into the management control system; further, this integration needs 
to be accompanied by internal transparency and the ability to repair the transfer pricing system. 
In other words, successful tax compliant transfer pricing systems are highly integrated into the 
management control system and enable responsibility centers both to deeply understand transfer 
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pricing determination and to initiate revisions of the transfer pricing system if fundamental 
problems occur. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The second section reviews and 
summarizes the related literature. The third section elaborates the formulation of our hypotheses. 
The research design and data are described in the fourth section. The fifth section presents 
descriptive statistics and results from structural equation modeling along with results from 
additional robustness analyses and interview findings. The final section concludes the paper. 
2.2.2. Prior Research and Conceptual Underpinnings 
2.2.2.1. Related Transfer Pricing Literature 
The transfer pricing literature addresses both the management control role and the taxation 
issues of transfer prices. While the internal objectives of transfer pricing have traditionally been 
at the forefront of (analytical) researchers’ thinking,1 more recent transfer pricing studies 
analyze the design of transfer prices with respect to both internal and external (in particular tax-
related) objectives in decentralized organizations (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe & Hyde, 2007; 
Halperin & Srinidhi, 1991; Hyde & Choe, 2005; Narayanan & Smith, 2000). Most of these 
researchers either focus on a single transfer price, which would optimally balance the conflict 
between tax optimization and internal resource allocation (Baldenius et al., 2004), or they 
decouple the internally used transfer price from the “arm’s length price” by using two sets of 
books (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe & Hyde, 2007; Hyde & Choe, 2005). While findings from 
1 The "standard" transfer pricing model was introduced by Hirshleifer (1956). In this model, the transfer price that 
optimally solves the resource allocation objective derives from an optimization program at the corporate level and 
thus falls short in explaining why companies use transfer prices instead of simply assigning optimal production 
volumes to the divisions. Subsequent studies therefore incorporate information asymmetry (e.g., Banker & Datar, 
1992; Ronen & Balachandran, 1988) and incomplete contracting (e.g., Edlin & Reichelstein, 1995). A detailed 
review of the analytical transfer pricing literature is provided by Göx and Schiller (2007). 
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analytical research have advanced our understanding on the trade-offs between different transfer 
pricing objectives, these models are yet not able to account for the complex and dynamic nature 
of both transfer pricing systems and management control systems in practice. In particular, these 
analytical models share the common notion of a static and exogenously given management 
control system, a focus on a particular transaction and a disregard for variation in the level of 
integration between the transfer pricing system and the management control system. Moreover, 
these models do not incorporate how a transfer pricing system is used (in terms of transparency, 
repair, and flexibility).  
Aside from analytical research on transfer pricing, there is a considerable number of empirical 
studies on transfer pricing. In a recent review of the empirical transfer pricing literature, Cools 
(2014, p. 14) distinguishes three research streams: early studies on the management control 
issues of transfer pricing, tax accounting studies and studies on the relationship between tax 
compliant transfer pricing systems and the design and use of management control systems. In 
this literature review, we concentrate on studies that explicitly investigate the relationship 
between transfer pricing and management control systems. These studies typically investigate 
transfer pricing at the subunit level (Boyns, Edwards, & Emmanuel, 1999; Colbert & Spicer, 
1995; Cools et al., 2008; Eccles, 1985; Rossing & Rohde, 2010; Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994; 
Van Helden, Van der Meer-Kooistra, & Scapens, 2001). While early studies primarily 
concentrate on domestic transfer pricing and thus neglect the tax compliance role of 
international transfer pricing (Boyns et al., 1999; Colbert & Spicer, 1995; Van der Meer-
Kooistra, 1994), more recent case-based research has begun to provide in-depth investigations 
into the relationship between a firm’s international transfer pricing and its management control 
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system (Cools et al., 2008; Rossing & Rohde, 2010). These researchers show that a single-book 
tax compliant transfer pricing system interacts with the design and use of various components of 
the management control systems, namely the overhead cost allocation, the budgeting and the 
performance evaluation system.  
More precisely, Cools et al. (2008) find that the implementation of a single-book tax compliant 
transfer pricing system results in a more coercive use of the management control system. While 
a higher level of transparency is achieved under the new transfer pricing system, losses in 
flexibility occur “due to the uniform transfer pricing policy, which need[s] to be consistently 
applied under all circumstances” (Cools et al., 2008, p. 625). Similarly, Rossing and Rohde 
(2010, p. 212) reveal “an increase in the formalization of services and a discontinuation of 
allocations by divisions to business units […] in order to enhance external acceptance of 
overhead cost allocation.” In addition, based on internal accounting data from a large company, 
Bouwens and Steens (2016) show that although the use of (tax compliant) full-cost transfer 
pricing can send upstream production into a death spiral, the retention of the price can serve as a 
credible commitment device to motivate managers to reduce cost. This result again illustrates 
the complexity of transfer pricing systems in practice.  
Taken together, findings from both case studies indicate close interactions between the tax 
compliant transfer pricing system and the management control system. We are therefore 
particularly interested in whether the level of integration of the transfer pricing system into the 
management control system is positively associated with the success of the transfer pricing 
system as perceived by the corporate-level authorities responsible for transfer pricing. In so 
doing, we go beyond the analysis of transfer pricing (methods) in distinct internal transactions 
and concentrate on a general perspective of the integration of the transfer pricing system into the 
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management control system. In addition, we investigate the use of the transfer pricing system – 
enabling versus coercive – which is delineated in the following subsection (section 2.2). 
2.2.2.2. Enabling versus Coercive Use of the Transfer Pricing System 
The distinction between an enabling and a coercive use of bureaucracy was introduced by Adler 
and Borys (1996) and first applied in management accounting research by Ahrens and Chapman 
(2004). Coercive formalization reflects the typical top-down approach, accentuating 
centralization and leaving employees with a limited scope of action. Enabling formalization, in 
contrast, “[…] designs organizational rules that reckon with the intelligence of workers so that 
formal procedures need not be designed to make the work process foolproof […]” (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004, p. 279).  
Adler and Borys (1996) identify four characteristics that foster an enabling approach to 
management control: repair, internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility. Repair 
should ensure that users are able to reconfigure processes and react if unforeseen problems 
occur. With respect to transfer pricing, responsibility centers need to be able to initiate revisions 
of the transfer pricing system if fundamental problems occur. However, whoever uses the 
system needs to deeply understand how the system works.  
Therefore, the second design principle for an enabling use of bureaucracy is internal 
transparency, which guarantees that users truly comprehend the nature of the system. Only if 
employees understand the rationale behind a rule can a deeper understanding be achieved. Such 
an understanding requires a thorough documentation of the transfer pricing system and access to 
all information related to the transfer pricing system.  
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In addition to internal transparency, global transparency is also necessary to foster an enabling 
use of bureaucracy. Global transparency requires a broader understanding of a firm’s actions 
and strategies. Users must understand the achieved internal and external objectives of transfer 
pricing and the effect of their actions not only on their responsibility center but also on the 
company as a whole. It is argued that such an overall perspective can prevent division managers 
from taking actions that could harm the company. In an enabling approach, operators have 
access to extensive information concerning the entire value chain. Therefore, the transfer pricing 
system helps to clarify the value-creation process of the firm and supports optimizing efforts by 
division managers to improve the profits not only of their responsibility centers but also of the 
whole firm.  
The last design principle, flexibility, indicates that a certain degree of flexibility is needed in a 
dynamic environment with developing markets and legal amendments. In contrast to repair, 
which refers to fundamental adaptions and revisions of the transfer pricing system, flexibility in 
our design refers to exceptions from internal transfer pricing guidelines in particular cases. 
However, due to the statutory character of international transfer prices, such exceptions need to 
be carefully justified and documented. 
The Adler and Borys (1996) framework has been applied to various settings in management 
accounting research, such as the study of inter-organizational alliances (Free, 2007), 
performance measurement systems (Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008), 
transfer pricing and the use of management control systems (Cools et al., 2008) and 
information-system integration (Chapman & Kihn, 2009). The design of our study is most 
closely related to Chapman and Kihn’s (2009) investigation of the relationships between 
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information-system integration, enabling control and performance and Cools et al.’s (2008) 
study on transfer pricing.  
2.2.3. Hypotheses Formulation 
We draw on findings from case-based research that reveal a high level of integration of tax 
compliant international transfer pricing into the management control system of a firm (Cools et 
al., 2008; Rossing & Rohde, 2010) and argue that this integration is positively associated with 
the perceived success of the transfer pricing system. Such a positive relationship is opposed to 
the results from analytical research, which typically recommends a decoupling of transfer prices 
(Baldenius et al., 2004). We argue that firms face enough leeway in the use of a transfer pricing 
system to overcome this problem. Based on the Adler and Borys’ (1996) framework, we 
distinguish four characteristics of the transfer pricing system that foster its enabling use: repair, 
internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility. We hypothesize that the relationship 
between the integration of the transfer pricing system into the management control system and 
its success is mediated through an enabling use of the transfer pricing system. Such an enabling 
use is necessary to prevent the failures that could arise if tax compliant transfer prices are rigidly 
applied for management control objectives. Figure 1 displays the structural model underlying 
the paper. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Our reasoning that the level of integration of the transfer pricing system into the management 
control system is directly and indirectly (through the enabling use of the transfer pricing system) 
linked to the perceived success of the transfer pricing system derives from the traditional role of 
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transfer prices as facilitating and influencing internal decision-making. Transfer prices affect 
some of the most important management and coordination processes such as budgeting and 
performance evaluations of division managers, with effects on decision-making and both 
division and overall company profit. These elements of the management control system are 
usually portrayed as instruments for achieving decentralization and coordination in 
multidivisional and multinational firms (see, for example, Horngren et al., 2015, p. 868; Kaplan 
& Atkinson, 2014; Zimmermann, 2013, pp. 185-188). By providing the relevant data, transfer 
prices that are integrated into the management control system enhance the transparency of 
internal decision-making. Compared to decoupled transfer prices, integrated transfer pricing 
systems are often preferred “both for simplicity and in order to avoid […] any disputes with the 
tax authorities” (Baldenius et al., 2004, p. 592). In addition, integrated transfer pricing systems 
are helpful to signal that transfer prices are driven by internal considerations instead of tax 
optimization (Ernst & Young, 2001, 2003). Taken together, based on Adler and Borys’ (1996) 
framework and contrary to the predictions of analytical models, we expect that the level of 
transfer pricing system integration into the management control system is positively associated 
with the perceived success of the transfer pricing system, as formally stated in the first 
hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of integration of the transfer pricing 
system into the management control system and the success of the transfer pricing system as 
perceived by the corporate-level authorities responsible for transfer pricing. 
Drawing on Adler and Borys (1996), we argue that this relationship is partly mediated by an 
enabling use of the transfer pricing system, which is fostered by the four design characteristics: 
repair, internal and global transparency, and flexibility. If tax compliant transfer prices are 
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integrated into the management control system, inconsistencies and failures in the transfer 
pricing system would be detected and repaired through adjustments of the transfer pricing 
system. For instance, a cost plus transfer price that does not provide the supplying division with 
an appropriate profit might reflect inefficiencies in the supplying division or the need for 
adjustments of the transfer price. Either way, managers would become aware of problematic 
transfer pricing through the use of transfer prices in the management control system. A similar 
example is provided by Cools et al. (2008, p. 622). The level of integration is therefore 
positively associated with the ability to repair the transfer pricing system.  
Moreover, if the management control system and thus the decision-making of divisional 
managers are affected by transfer prices, these managers need to understand how transfer prices 
are determined, which in turn requires thorough internal documentation of the transfer pricing 
system and access to the relevant data. Therefore, the level of integration of the transfer pricing 
system into the management control system is positively associated with internal transparency. 
In addition, if transfer prices are relevant for management control purposes, managers need to 
understand not only how the transfer prices are determined but also their role in the broader 
context, i.e., the overall company perspective. Such a comprehensive understanding is fostered 
through the global transparency of the transfer pricing system, and we therefore expect to find a 
positive relationship between the level of integration and global transparency.  
The last enabling characteristic relates to the flexible use of the transfer pricing system. In some 
cases, determining tax compliant and control-relevant transfer prices according to pre-set rules 
and internal policies might not be feasible. Flexibility refers to the ability to disregard these 
internal policies and flexibly handle the determination of transfer prices in particular cases. 
Cools et al. (2008, p. 622) provide an example of such a flexible adjustment of transfer prices 
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due to market pressure. Other exceptions may relate to the pricing of extraordinarily large orders 
or the entry into new markets. Taken together, we argue that the level of integration is positively 
associated with the four design characteristics of repair, internal transparency, global 
transparency, and flexibility. These relationships are formally hypothesized in H2a-H2d: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the level of integration of the transfer pricing 
system into the management control system and the enabling use of the transfer pricing system 
as reflected by the characteristics of (a) repair, (b) internal transparency, (c) global 
transparency, and (d) flexibility. 
Finally, we argue that the enabling use of the transfer pricing system is positively associated 
with the transfer pricing system’s success. If fundamental problems in transfer pricing systems 
cannot be corrected, the transfer prices become useless for management control purposes. 
Therefore, we expect repair to be positively associated with transfer pricing system success. 
Similarly, internal and global transparency is positively associated with transfer pricing system 
success because these characteristics directly support managers in their decision-making 
function. Moreover, global transparency ensures that the implications of local processes are 
visible across the entire company, and thus it fosters the alignment of divisional and corporate 
goals. Finally, a flexible use of transfer pricing systems is necessary to account for exceptions 
and thus to prevent deteriorated divisional stewardship. Taken together, the presence of each of 
the four characteristics is expected to boost the perceived success of the transfer pricing system.  
H3: There is a positive relationship between an enabling use of the transfer pricing system as 
reflected by the characteristics of (a) repair, (b) internal transparency, (c) global transparency, 
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and (d) flexibility and the transfer pricing system’s success as perceived by the corporate-level 
authorities responsible for transfer pricing. 
2.2.4. Research Design and Data 
2.2.4.1. Sample Selection and Survey Design 
We conducted a questionnaire-based survey according to the basic elements of the tailored 
design method by Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2014). During preparation of the survey, a 
pre-test with managerial accounting, transfer pricing and tax experts was conducted and some 
questions were adjusted based on the experts’ suggestions. The survey was sent to all companies 
listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange (SIX) in July 2012, except for companies in the financial 
services sector.2 All of the 158 companies were first contacted by telephone. After a company 
agreed to participate in the survey, a questionnaire was sent to an employee in a corporate 
function with detailed knowledge of the company’s transfer pricing system. We focused on 
employees in corporate functions, as we are interested in the overall approach to transfer 
pricing. In total, we received 38 completed questionnaires, equaling a response rate of 24 
percent. Table 1 presents an overview of our final sample of 38 companies from 9 industry 
groups. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
2 Companies from the financial services sector were excluded because of fundamental differences in the value 
creation process and thus in internal transactions compared with companies from other industries. 
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The average company has 4,718 employees, ranging between 235 and 26,000 employees 
(median 2,084). Net sales average 2.033 billion CHF with a range of 40 million CHF to 13 
billion CHF. The average international portion of net sales equals 65 percent, emphasizing the 
importance of transfer prices with respect to profit allocation among business units. 
2.2.4.2. Variables Measurement  
For the measurement of the four variables reflecting an enabling use of the transfer pricing 
system as well as of the transfer pricing system’s success, we transfer Chapman and Kihn’s 
(2009) measurement approaches into a transfer pricing context. For the measurement of transfer 
pricing system integration, we rely on literature descriptions of the use of transfer prices for 
management control purposes (Horngren et al., 2015; Kaplan & Atkinson, 2014; Zimmermann, 
2013). All variables are designed based on the results of the principal component analysis 
(PCA)3 with oblique Oblimin rotations4 and Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of internal 
consistency and reliability (Cronbach, 1951). To reflect the theoretical constructs, three 
independent PCAs are conducted: first, a PCA including the items measuring transfer pricing 
system integration; second, a PCA addressing the four mediating design characteristics of 
flexibility, global transparency, internal transparency, and repair; and third, a PCA checking the 
factorability of items measuring transfer pricing system success. Items that do not match with 
the theoretical construct are dropped to obtain latent variables that reflect the underlying 
theoretical model.  
----------------------------------- 
3 The Bartlett test of sphericity supports the fit between the model and the correlation matrix for all variables 
(p < 0.000). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure suggests sampling adequacy for all factor analyses with a measure of 
sampling adequacy (MSA) value above 0.588. 
4 Because the underlying theoretical model does not assume that the constructs are uncorrelated, the oblique 
rotation method is the most suitable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Table 2 displays the factor loadings from the three PCAs. All of the factor loadings greater than 
0.45 are highlighted in gray. According to Hair et al. (2010, p. 117), factor loadings above 0.5 
are considered practically significant, and loadings above 0.70 are described as the “goal of any 
factor analysis.” Except for one item (no. 3), all of the factor loadings are above 0.70, and 16 
(out of 19 items) have factor loadings of 0.75 or higher.5 In addition, the cross loadings are 
rather small, with the highest (positive) cross loading equaling only 0.321 (item no. 11).  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
For each of the variables, Table 3 presents the general definitions and measurement items used 
in the questionnaire along with examples from interview data. Based on the results from the 
PCA (Table 2), the variables are calculated as the mean values of the items that are highlighted 
in gray in Table 3. 
Transfer pricing system integration 
We include three of the initial five items to measure the level of integration between the transfer 
pricing system and the management control system (TPS integration). Primarily, a two-
component solution was obtained. Because the first component, which includes the majority of 
5 For a sample size of 50, a 0.05 significance level and an 80 percent power level, factor loadings above 0.75 are 
considered significant (Hair et al., 2010, p. 117). Therefore, the critical value of a factor loading to meet the criteria 
mentioned would be slightly increased for a sample size of 38. However, many of the factor loadings would still be 
above or at least be approximately at the threshold value. 
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the items (including item no. 1, which directly asks for the transfer pricing system integration) 
explains a higher proportion of the variance (0.51) and obtains a higher Cronbach’s alpha (0.51), 
the second component is dropped. The Cronbach’s alpha is rather low, which likely reflects the 
heterogeneous nature of the variable.6 The eigenvalue of the factor TPS integration equals 1.54. 
TPS integration includes an overall judgment of the level of integration of the transfer pricing 
system into the management control system, the degree of integration of transfer prices into 
budgetary planning and the degree of integration of information from cost accounting into the 
determination of transfer prices. 
Characteristics of an enabling use of the transfer pricing system 
Repair is measured by including two of the initial four items in the PCA. These items include 
the ability of those responsibility centers affected by transfer pricing to initiate a revision of the 
transfer pricing in case of fundamental problems and their ability to hold open discussions on 
problems with transfer pricing. Because both items load on the same factor, that factor is 
considered to be repair in the subsequent analysis. Repair has an eigenvalue of 1.40, explains 13 
percent of the variance and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66.  
Measuring internal transparency by including all four items appears to be appropriate because 
they all load on the second factor (called internal transparency in the subsequent analysis). 
Internal transparency means that responsibility centers affected by transfer pricing know and 
understand the determination process, that they have access to the relevant data and to the 
6 Hair et al. (2010, p. 125) suggest a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.60 for exploratory research as the critical value while 
stressing the inflation of Cronbach’s alpha due to an increase in the number of items. Keeping in mind that only 3 
items are used and that a broader range of the sample can further inflate the alpha statistic (Cortina, 1993), an alpha 
statistic of 0.51 is judged to be low but acceptable.  
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documentation of the transfer pricing system and that the company keeps detailed records on the 
transfer pricing system. The eigenvalue of internal transparency equals 3.53, it explains 32 
percent of the variance and its Cronbach’s alpha is 0.84. 
Global transparency is best reflected by two of the initial four items of the questionnaire. These 
items refer first to the suitability of transfer pricing systems for clarifying the value creation of 
each responsibility center and second to the potential for each responsibility center to compare 
its financial performance to that of the others. Global transparency has an eigenvalue of 1.12, 
explains an additional 10 percent of the variance and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.62. 
We include three of the initial four items to measure the degree of flexibility in the transfer 
pricing system. These items relate to the disregard of internal transfer pricing guidelines and the 
flexible handling of transfer prices in particular cases. Moreover, we include a reverse-coded 
item for which no exceptions to the internal guidelines or regulations on transfer pricing are 
allowed. The factor flexibility has an eigenvalue of 2.29, explains an additional 21 percent of the 
variance and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71. 
Taken together, the results from the PCA indicate that the underlying theoretical constructs are 
appropriately reflected by the data. In particular, only five of the initial 16 items were dropped. 
The remaining eleven items clearly identify the four assumed mediating design characteristics of 
an enabling use of the MCS, explaining 76 percent of the total variance. 
Perceived transfer pricing system success  
Perceived transfer pricing system success (TPS success) is measured by five of the initial seven 
items. These items include assessments of the responsibility centers’ overall satisfaction with 
the transfer pricing system, the cost-benefit analysis, the tax compliance of the transfer pricing 
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system and the fulfillment of internal and external objectives. The TPS success factor explains 
63 percent of the variance, has an eigenvalue of 3.13 and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85. It includes 
the overall satisfaction with the transfer pricing system, cost-benefit considerations, the degree 
of compliance of the transfer pricing system with tax regulations and an evaluation of the 
fulfillment of the internal and external purposes of transfer pricing. 
2.2.4.3. Methodological Approach 
Our hypotheses on the relationships between transfer pricing system integration, the four 
characteristics of an enabling use of the transfer pricing system and the success of the transfer 
pricing system are investigated through structural equation analysis by applying the partial least 
squares (PLS) technique. In particular, we rely on the software SmartPLS 3.2.0 for our statistical 
analyses. PLS has recently gained ground in the accounting literature (e.g., Chapman & Kihn, 
2009; Hall, 2008, 2011; Hartmann & Slapničar, 2012; for a review of the use of PLS in 
management accounting research see Nitzl, 2014) because it is particularly useful for analyzing 
complex relationships when prior theoretical knowledge on the relationships is limited and 
sample sizes are rather small. Therefore, it appears to be ideal for estimating the association 
between transfer pricing system integration and transfer pricing system success while 
accounting for the mediating effect of an enabling use of the transfer pricing system. 
Bootstrapping using 5,000 samples with replacement is applied. Following Hair, Hult, Ringle, 
and Sarstedt (2013, p. 252), the number of bootstrap cases is adjusted to the number of 
observations in our sample. 
PLS analysis is comprised of a measurement and a structural model. To ensure the appropriate 
interpretation of the results from the structural model, the validity and reliability of the latent 
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variables (i.e., the measurement model) need to be ensured (Hulland, 1999). As reported in 
Table 2, the factor loadings are above 0.7 for 18 (out of 19) items, and thus internal reliability is 
supported (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). In addition, Table 4 displays common validity and 
reliability measures for the latent variables of the model. Internal consistency reliability is 
ensured because the composite reliability of each latent variable is higher than 0.7 (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). Convergent validity is guaranteed because the average variance extracted 
(AVE) is above 0.5 for all of the variables (Hair et al., 2010). Discriminant validity is confirmed 
because the AVE of each latent variable is higher than its shared variance (squared correlation) 
with any other construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).7 According to Hair et al. (2011), an item’s 
factor loading should additionally be greater than any of its cross loadings; this condition is also 
fulfilled (Table 2). Taken together, all of the latent variables meet the validity and reliability 
criteria.8 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Because both the independent and the dependent variables from the model are obtained from the 
same survey (answered by the same person in the same measurement context), common method 
variance (CMV) may bias the results (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003, p. 885). 
Therefore, we followed several procedures recommended in the literature to avoid CMV as far 
as possible. Ex ante, we tried to reduce CMV by guaranteeing respondents anonymity, using 
7 Table 4 therefore displays the maximum shared variance for each variable. 
8 To check for multicollinearity of the latent variables, the variance inflation factors are calculated. The factors 
range from 1.10 to 1.44 (with a mean of 1.31) and thus do not indicate any problems (threshold values are between 
5 and 10).  
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neutral wording, reducing comprehension problems by wording questions as precisely as 
possible9 (Harrison, McLaughlin, & Coalter, 1996; Lindell & Whitney, 2001) and integrating 
some questions worded with an opposing orientation. Ex post, the mediating role of our design 
characteristics adds complexity to our model, reducing the influencing potential of CMV. 
Moreover, we perform some statistical tests in order to ensure that our findings are not solely 
driven by CMV.  
First, we employ Harman’s single-factor test by performing a PCA (without rotation) including 
all items of our model.10 Following Podsakoff and Organ (1986), a single resulting factor or a 
factor accounting for the majority of covariance between the items would signal the prevalence 
of CMV. However, the PCA reveals six factors with eigenvalues greater than one, and the first 
factor accounts for 32% of total variance only, indicating that CMV is not pervasively affecting 
our results. Second, another promising approach to control for CMV is the use of a marker 
variable (Lindell & Brandt, 2000; Lindell & Whitney, 2001). A marker variable should 
theoretically not be correlated to the other variables (at least to one) used in the model; if there 
are observed correlations between the marker variable and the other variables, these are assumed 
to be caused by CMV. Such a procedure allows researchers to parcel out the effect of CMV 
from observed relationships (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Therefore, using financial performance as 
a marker variable,11 we test the biasing effect of CMV on our results. After controlling for 
CMV, the correlations between TPS integration and TPS success remain in a range between 
9 Therefore, a pretest of the survey was conducted with experts in the topic in order to adjust any questions that may 
have initially been difficult to understand according to their suggestions. 
10 Note that the factor analysis includes all 19 items used to measure TPS integration, repair, internal transparency, 
global transparency, flexibility and TPS success. 
11 Financial Performance is measured by three items and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.95. The items ask for the 
respondents’ assessments of the firm’s return on sales, sales growth and financial performance in comparison to the 
firm’s competitors. 
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0.37 and 0.49, the correlations between repair and TPS success remain in a range between 0.52 
and 0.62, and the correlations between internal transparency and TPS success remain in a range 
between 0.54 and 0.62.12 Considering these stable and highly significant values, we conclude 
that CMV does not primarily drive our results.  
2.2.5. Results 
2.2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for our model variables are presented in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 
gives an overview of the raw data. Variables are calculated as the mean values of the items and 
theoretically range between 1 and 7. On average, the transfer pricing system appears to be well 
integrated, and firms perceive their transfer pricing systems as being rather successful (mean 
values of 5.00 and 5.08, respectively). This finding supports our reasoning that transfer prices 
are indeed (well) integrated into the management control system and not decoupled. Note that 
we only ask for international transfer prices and that the sample companies have, on average, 65 
percent of total sales internationally. In contrast to these rather high mean values for TPS 
integration and TPS success, the mean values of the four design characteristics are lower, 
ranging between 3.84 and 4.76. Within these four variables, we observe the highest mean value 
for repair, indicating that transfer pricing systems are generally repairable. The lowest mean 
value corresponds to global transparency, indicating that the transparency of transfer prices and 
of their effects across different responsibility centers is rather limited. Moreover, the flexible use 
of the transfer pricing system is not widespread, which may reflect concerns regarding potential 
disputes with the tax authorities. 
12 Note that there are different procedures to identify the concrete value of CMV for a correlation, which in turn 
result in different values for the respective correlation coefficients.  
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----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
For further analyses, variables are computed as the average standardized response of all items 
loading above 0.45 on a particular factor (Table 5, Panel B), which is considered to be an 
appropriate critical value for exploratory research (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).13  
Panel C of Table 5 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for these standardized variables. As 
expected, TPS integration is positively and significantly correlated with internal transparency, 
repair and TPS success. Moreover, TPS success is also positively and significantly correlated 
with repair and internal transparency. While there are also significant relationships between our 
four design variables for an enabling use of the transfer pricing system (in particular between 
repair and internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility as well as between global 
transparency and repair), the corresponding variance inflation factors do not indicate 
multicollinearity problems. Overall, the correlation statistics provide univariate evidence that 
supports our expected relationships between TPS integration, an enabling use of the transfer 
pricing system and TPS success. In contrast to our expectations, global transparency is 
negatively correlated with TPS success, but this relationship is not significant. 
2.2.5.2. Results from Structural Equation Modeling  
Our structural equation model tests the hypotheses that transfer pricing system integration is 
positively related to transfer pricing system success (H1), that transfer pricing system 
integration is positively related to an enabling use of the system as reflected by repair, internal 
transparency, global transparency, and flexibility (H2a-H2d) and that an enabling use of the 
13 Even lowering this critical value to 0.35 does not impact our results with respect to the variable compositions. 
54
transfer pricing system as reflected by its four design characteristics is positively related to its 
success (H3a-H3d). Table 6 presents our results on path coefficients, corresponding levels of 
statistical significance, multiple squared correlations (mult. R2) and effect sizes (f2). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------- 
With respect to the first hypothesis H1, the results of the PLS analysis indicate a positive 
association between the integration of the transfer pricing system into the management control 
system and transfer pricing system success (Table 6, Panel A). However, the link is significant 
at the 0.10 level only (one-tailed test). Therefore, we find only weak support for hypothesis 1. 
Nevertheless, the total effect of TPS integration on TPS success – including the indirect 
(mediating) effects through internal transparency, global transparency, repair, and flexibility – is 
substantial and highly significant, thereby emphasizing the overall importance of transfer 
pricing system integration (coefficient of 0.478, p-value of 0.000, untabulated). Thus, as 
assumed by our research design, the association between TPS integration and TPS success 
appears to be mediated through internal transparency, global transparency, repair, and 
flexibility.  
Regarding the second set of hypotheses on the relationship between TPS integration and the four 
characteristics of an enabling use of the transfer pricing system (H2a-H2d), the results of the 
PLS analysis indicate positive and significant associations for three of the four design variables 
(Table 6, Panel A). In particular, TPS integration is positively related to repair (0.336, p<0.05), 
internal transparency (0.388, p<0.01), and global transparency (0.246, p<0.10). These findings 
strongly support hypotheses H2a, H2b and weakly support H2c. While the relationship between 
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TPS integration and flexibility is also positive, it is not significant and thus does not support 
hypothesis H2d (0.183, p>0.10). 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results for the third set of hypotheses (H3a-H3d) along with the 
effect sizes and the multiple squared correlations for TPS success. Consistent with H3a and 
H3b, there are significant positive relationships between repair and TPS success (0.450, p<0.01) 
as well as between internal transparency and TPS success (0.321, p<0.05). However, global 
transparency and flexibility both have a negative (but not significant) association with TPS 
success. Therefore, we find only partial support for our third set of hypotheses. The multiple R2 
for TPS success equals 0.605, indicating that TPS integration and the four variables of an 
enabling use explain 61 percent of the variance of TPS success (adjusted R2 = 0.543). Compared 
with similar studies (e.g., Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Hall, 2008, 2011), this value can be 
considered rather high, thereby indicating a good fit for our model. 
Overall, the results of the PLS analysis partially support our theoretical model. In particular, our 
results provide evidence not only for a direct positive relationship between TPS integration and 
TPS success but especially for indirect positive relationships through the characteristics repair 
(0.163, p=0.065) and internal transparency (0.129, p=0.076). This result is also reflected by a 
Cohen’s effect size f2, equaling 0.133 for TPS integration, 0.360 for repair and 0.181 for internal 
transparency.14 In other words, stronger integration of the transfer pricing system into the 
management control system is associated with the higher success of the transfer pricing system, 
and this relationship is further enhanced through the enabling characteristics repair and internal 
transparency. However, although statistically not significant, we find negative associations 
14 Note that effect sizes of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 are interpreted as small, medium and large according to Cohen
(1988). 
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between global transparency (as well as flexibility) and TPS success. One potential reason could 
be that the increased transparency of the transfer pricing system across different responsibility 
centers generates additional conflicts between the managers of these responsibility centers 
because the value creation of each responsibility center becomes more visible. The insignificant 
result for flexibility might reflect concerns about potential disputes with the tax authorities that 
are associated with a flexible use of the transfer pricing system.15  
2.2.5.3. Robustness Analyses 
We perform several additional analyses to investigate the robustness of our survey-based 
findings. First, we address concerns regarding the computation of our variables and our 
approach of separately calculating the measurement and the structural model. There is a 
controversy in the literature regarding the different methods for estimating factor scores. In our 
analysis, we rely on the common approach of computing the variables as the average 
standardized response of items (see also Chapman & Kihn, 2009). Alternatively, we use 
regression-based factor scores as an initial sensitivity check for our results. Following such a 
procedure means that a factor is no longer described as the average of the standardized items 
with high loadings only but is rather described by each item, while the weight of an item directly 
depends on the size of its respective factor loading (Hair et al., 2010, p. 117). The results 
(untabulated) of the path model analysis based on bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings using 
regression-based factor scores are similar to our initial results. In particular, there are no 
differences with respect to the direction, but there are differences with respect to the magnitude 
for some of the estimated effects, confirming our main findings.  
15 For the negative (and not significant) associations between global transparency (as well as flexibility) and TPS
success, see also our affirmative testimonies from interview data below. 
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Second, we conduct a PLS analysis using the items from the main model before standardization. 
With this procedure, SmartPLS optimizes the complete (i.e., measurement and structural) model 
including the weighting of the single items. Again, the results (untabulated) are similar to our 
main analyses with one exception. The direct relationship between TPS integration and TPS 
success becomes insignificant, and TPS integration is thus positively associated with TPS 
success only through an enabling use of the transfer pricing system.  
Third, our initial step-wise procedure of first performing principal component analyses and 
second testing our hypotheses based on the PLS technique is criticized by some researchers 
(Nitzl & Chin, 2016). Therefore, we next optimize the complete model in SmartPLS including 
the selection of the unstandardized items used to specify the latent variables of our model. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 7. Following such a procedure slightly changes the 
measurement of global transparency and flexibility, but the main results remain robust. In 
particular, TPS success is still positively associated with repair and internal transparency, while 
the total effect of TPS integration on TPS success – including the indirect (mediating) effects – 
remains unchanged (coefficient of 0.478, p-value of 0.000, untabulated). Taken together, results 
from these robustness analyses indicate that neither the computation of our variables nor the 
step-wise procedure substantially impacts our main findings. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Next, one could argue that our results may be biased due to omitted variables, and we therefore 
include two additional control variables that may impact TPS success, namely the number of 
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profit centers (#Profit centers) and the proportion of foreign sales (Foreign sales).16 The number 
of profit centers is a rough proxy for the number of internal transactions, and the proportion of 
foreign sales is a rough proxy for the degree of internationalization of a company. Taken 
together, these variables are a crude indicator of the importance of internal cross-border 
transactions for the whole company. Results from this additional analysis are presented in Table 
8. While there are no substantial differences in the associations between TPS integration, the
characteristics of an enabling use and TPS success, both control variables are positively 
associated with TPS success. One potential reason for this finding could be that the higher 
importance of internal cross-border transactions translates into more sophisticated transfer 
pricing systems, which in turn are associated with higher TPS success.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Next, we re-run our analyses based on an alternative measurement of our dependent variable 
TPS success that captures the perceived conflicts between various transfer pricing objectives. 
Our new variable, TPS conflicts, is based on five of seven initial items that measure the level of 
perceived conflict between transfer pricing objectives. Primarily, a two-component solution was 
obtained. Again, we use the factor that includes the majority of items (including the item that 
directly asks for the overall level of conflict between transfer pricing objects). The factor TPS 
conflicts explains 51 percent of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 2.57 and a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.76. In addition to an overall judgment of conflicts between different transfer pricing 
objectives, it further includes particular assessments of conflicts between coordination and 
16 Note that we include the standardized values of these variables in the PLS analysis. 
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internal profit determination, coordination and tax optimization, internal profit determination 
and tax compliance as well as internal profit determination and tax optimization. The results 
from the PLS analysis based on bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings are displayed in Panel A and 
Panel B of Table 9. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Consistent with our expectations, the path coefficient from TPS integration to TPS conflicts is 
negative but not significant. However, the total effect, including the indirect (mediating) effects, 
becomes significant at the 10 percent level (coefficient of -.255, p-value of 0.065, untabulated). 
The results thus suggest that the integration of the transfer pricing system into the management 
control system is associated with reduced conflict between different transfer pricing objectives. 
Again, similar to our baseline model, the relationship is mediated through the design variables 
of the transfer pricing system. However, the relationship between TPS integration and TPS 
conflicts appears to be much weaker than the relationship between TPS integration and TPS 
success. One reason for this observation might be that we dropped variables related to internal 
profit determination when considering the measurement of TPS integration but included them 
when considering TPS goal conflicts. This could also be an explanation for the much lower 
multiple R2 (0.212) in this new model. Panel B of Table 9 presents the results for the third set of 
hypotheses (H3a-H3d). Surprisingly, the path coefficient between repair and TPS conflicts 
becomes positive. However, the effect is not significant (coefficient of 0.160, p-value of 0.244). 
In contrast, the results suggest that the path between internal transparency and TPS conflicts, 
both in terms of magnitude and significance, is the strongest. This finding is also reflected by 
60
obtaining the highest Cohen’s effect size f2 for internal transparency. Therefore, a higher degree 
of internal transparency appears to be associated with a lower level of conflict between transfer 
pricing objectives. By contrast, global transparency and flexibility appear to be unrelated to TPS 
goal conflicts. Overall, the results are generally consistent with our findings from the main 
model (except for repair). 
Finally, we estimate our model by ordinary least square (OLS) analysis because most 
researchers are more familiar with this technique when it comes to the estimation of 
relationships. To test the structural model of our hypotheses, we run six independent OLS 
analyses. The results are presented in Table 10. Although the estimated coefficients and the t-
statistics differ from our PLS analysis (due to the different estimation model), the results are 
similar to the results from our main model. In particular, we obtain positive and significant 
associations between TPS integration, repair and internal transparency and TPS success. Not 
controlling for the use of the transfer pricing system, the total effect of TPS integration on TPS 
success equals 0.530 and is highly significant (p-value of 0.002). However, only 55 percent 
(0.291/0.530) of this total effect can be explained by the direct effect of TPS integration, while 
45 percent of the total effect can be attributed to the mediating variables. As in our PLS model, 
the indirect effects of TPS integration on TPS success through repair (coefficient of 0.168, p-
value of 0.037) and internal transparency (coefficient of 0.138, p-value of 0.043) remain 
similarly substantial and highly significant. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
----------------------------------- 
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Taken together, the results from these additional analyses unanimously support the robustness of 
our main results.  
2.2.5.4. Affirmative Testimonies from Interview Data 
To further substantiate our findings, we provide additional insights into the transfer pricing 
systems of three multinational enterprises. In particular, we illuminate potential conflicts and 
problems in the use of transfer pricing and the perceived success of the transfer pricing system. 
We use theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989) to identify useful cases for our investigation 
based on the following criteria. First, we limit our potential sample to the manufacturing 
industry to enhance the comparability of our findings. Second, we focus on multinational 
enterprises with a substantial amount of internal cross-border transactions, as only these 
enterprises theoretically face a goal conflict between tax compliance and management control. 
Third, we aim to use enterprises that have implemented a single set of transfer pricing books. 
Again, only in this case does the goal conflict theoretically become evident. Moreover, focusing 
on one set of books enhances the comparability of our findings.  
Within each enterprise, we conducted one interview that lasted, on average, two hours. 
Regarding the interview subjects, we focused on those persons responsible for the transfer 
pricing system at the corporate level. In addition, we interviewed a divisional manager 
(company A) and a corporate controller (company C). The interviews were conducted between 
October and December 2016. The semi-structured interviews were guided by questions based on 
our survey questionnaire and our results. The questions were open enough to allow for 
unexpected findings. For reasons of simplicity, we focused on internal transactions involving 
tangible assets and excluded the licensing of intellectual property (IP) from our analysis. The 
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. 
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Panel A of Table 11 provides an overview of the sample companies A, B, and C with respect to 
the firm size in terms of sales, internationalization, organizational structure, and value chain. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Panel B of Table 11 outlines the transfer pricing systems of the three case companies. The 
organizational structure of company A with its various profit centers is reflected in a 
decentralized approach to transfer pricing. The central guideline on transfer pricing only states 
that transfer prices must comply with the arm’s length principle. Transfer prices are negotiated 
between profit centers (based on price lists or individual prices for customer specific products). 
This approach of internal negotiations on the transfer price reflects the negotiating power and 
the functions and risks of the involved profit centers. The transfer pricing systems of companies 
B and C are rather contrary to the decentralized approach to transfer pricing seen in company A. 
Both companies have comprehensive and detailed transfer pricing policies at the corporate level 
that govern the determination of transfer prices. These guidelines or policies determine the 
transfer pricing method with respect to typical intra-company transactions including the cost 
basis, markups, margins, and handling of currency conversions.  
Next, we provide descriptive evidence for the (enabling) use of a (single) transfer pricing 
system, which must simultaneously fulfill tax compliance and management control purposes. 
Based on the findings from analytical research, which recommends the decoupling of transfer 
prices to avoid conflicts between tax compliance and management control, we directly asked our 
interviewees about the existence of such goal conflicts in their companies. Company A’s 
interviewees observe no direct goal conflict between the two objectives; on the contrary, 
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company A is convinced that tax authorities accept the negotiated transfer prices as being tax 
compliant because they correspond with their decentralized approach to controlling the group. 
Company A’s interviewee stated: “With respect to tax compliance, the total result of the legal 
entity is crucial. If this result is feasible, there are usually no further discussions with the tax 
authorities. […] Moreover, keeping one set of books is a benefit with respect to tax compliance, 
since we can always argue that there are not manipulations for tax optimization purposes.” 
However, the decentralized approach of negotiating transfer prices is accompanied by the high 
potential for conflict between the negotiating parties. If the internal transactions occur within the 
same business unit, the internal conflicts are solved by the business unit manager. If different 
business units are involved, potential conflicts are solved by division or corporate 
representatives. Moreover, there is an arbitration panel that resolves conflicts that occur between 
the involved parties after transfer prices are determined.  
Company B’s interviewee also observes no conflict between tax compliance and management 
control: “Because the transfer pricing system has been designed in accordance with basic 
economic principles and to facilitate decentralized decision-making, it is in accordance with tax 
regulations. … Thus, we assume that if our business decisions are reasonable, then these 
decisions must also be reasonable with respect to tax compliance.” The high integration of the 
transfer pricing system with the management control system in combination with the ability to 
repair the transfer pricing system facilitates internal decision-making and reduces potential 
conflicts between the involved parties. For instance, transfer prices are integrated into the 
budgeting process of the company. If the planning results in a loss for some legal entities due to 
the planned transfer prices, the problem is escalated to a transfer pricing committee, which can 
revise the transfer pricing system accordingly. Due to the integration with the budgetary 
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planning, such problems can be solved in advance. The company also provides insights into the 
practical handling of another problem of transfer pricing: the obfuscation or “swelling” of the 
internal cost structure that results from the use of the cost plus method in multi-stage production 
processes. Such obfuscation is prevented by applying the markup of the transfer price solely to 
the production costs of each production center instead of to the total costs.17  
Last, but not least, company C’s interviewees perceive no conflict between management control 
and tax compliance for two reasons. First, the company’s primary objective with respect to 
transfer pricing is tax compliance. Second, in addition to tax compliance, the main objective of 
the transfer pricing system is “to not distort decentralized decision-making.” To ensure this, 
transfer prices do not affect the performance evaluation of functional center managers because 
they are evaluated based on the business unit’s residual income. The transfer pricing guideline is 
detailed and comprehensive. The low degree of flexibility results in few conflicts between 
functional centers, business units or legal entities. Within each business unit, there are transfer 
pricing officers who are responsible for adherence to the transfer pricing guideline. Problems are 
discussed with the corporate tax department on a monthly basis. In the case of severe conflicts, 
there is an escalation to the management board of the company, which ultimately resolves the 
conflict. 
To gather more insights into the finding that neither global transparency nor flexibility is found 
to significantly mediate the relationship between transfer pricing system integration and transfer 
pricing system success, we directly asked our interviewees about these relationships in their 
enterprises. The results from our interviews reveal differences in the role of flexibility and 
17 The total costs include material and production costs. Material costs in turn include the costs of internal products 
(i.e., the transfer prices paid to the upstream production centers). 
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global transparency between centralized and decentralized transfer pricing systems. As 
expected, the interviewees from the companies with a centralized transfer pricing system 
emphasize that flexibility is detrimental to tax compliance and thus to the perceived success of 
the transfer pricing system. In contrast, in the company taking a decentralized approach, 
flexibility is, by definition, part of the transfer pricing system and thus important for its success. 
However, it must be noted that the central transfer pricing policy of the decentralized company 
only states that transfer prices must comply with the arm’s length principle, which allows for 
much more flexibility than a comprehensive and detailed internal transfer pricing policy. 
Another discrepancy is that, for the two companies with a more centralized approach, both 
internal and global transparency are important for the success of their transfer pricing system. 
For the company with the decentralized approach, only internal (but not global) transparency is 
perceived as being important. Thus, the different level of decentralization seen in the companies 
in our sample might explain the insignificant results for global transparency and flexibility that 
we obtain from the PLS analysis. In none of the case companies did we find severe conflicts 
between management control and tax compliance, which is partly due to the high integration 
between the transfer pricing system and the management control system. 
In sum, there is substantial descriptive evidence supporting the presumed enabling use of a 
transfer pricing system through which firms are able to fulfill tax compliance and management 
control at the same time. However, the short rudimentary descriptions illustrate the complexity 
of transfer pricing systems in practice and of their integration into the management control 
system. All of the interviewees agreed that monitoring and documenting transfer prices on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis is impossible due to the huge number of transactions. Tax audits 
therefore examine the tax compliance of the firms’ transfer pricing systems from an overall 
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perspective and examine the appropriateness of the global profit allocation and of the internal 
transfer pricing policy. 
2.2.6. Conclusions 
This paper examines how the integration of a single-book tax compliant transfer pricing system 
into the management control system affects the perceived success of the transfer pricing system. 
To this end, we focus on the overall transfer pricing system (instead of on transfer pricing 
methods as applied to single transactions) and ask how the integration of the transfer pricing 
system into the management control system is associated with the enabling use of the transfer 
pricing system and how these interrelationships translate into greater perceived success.  
While results from the analytical transfer pricing literature suggest the decoupling of transfer 
prices to overcome conflicts between tax compliance and management control, we draw on the 
theoretical framework of Adler and Borys (1996) and suggest that potential conflicts may be 
overcome by an enabling use of the transfer pricing system. In particular, we hypothesize that 
the level of transfer pricing system integration is positively correlated with its success and that 
this relationship is mediated through an enabling use of the system, which is reflected in the 
characteristics of repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and flexibility.  
Based on a sample of 38 Swiss multinational enterprises, the results from structural equation 
modeling using the PLS technique partly support our reasoning. In particular, transfer pricing 
system integration is indeed positively associated with transfer pricing system success, and this 
relationship is mediated through repair and internal transparency. Both characteristics support an 
enabling use of the transfer pricing system because managers can truly understand how the 
transfer prices are determined and are able to intervene if fundamental problems occur. 
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Obviously, these characteristics help to avoid deteriorated management control in an integrated 
transfer pricing system. However, neither global transparency nor flexibility is found to 
significantly mediate the relationship between transfer pricing system integration and transfer 
pricing system success. In the case of transfer pricing, it thus appears that global transparency, 
due to the enhanced comparability of value creation across responsibility centers, potentially 
fuels conflicts between responsibility centers and thus is negatively related to transfer pricing 
system success. With respect to flexibility, we believe that the disregard of internal transfer 
pricing policies may be detrimental to the purpose of tax compliance and is thus negatively 
associated with transfer pricing system success. Instead firms may aim to generally describe 
exceptions known ex ante in the transfer pricing policies or to adjust the guidelines to formally 
account for deviations.  
Our survey-based findings are substantiated by additional insights into the transfer pricing 
systems of three multinational enterprises. The case companies are multinational companies in 
the manufacturing industry with substantial internal cross-border transactions that use a single 
set of transfer pricing books. One company applies a decentralized approach of negotiated 
transfer prices, while the other two companies apply a centralized approach with detailed 
transfer pricing guidelines that govern the determination of transfer prices. Tax compliance is 
the primary transfer pricing objective for all three firms. As expected, we find internal 
transparency and the potential to repair the transfer pricing system in the case of fundamental 
problems to be important factors in the success of integrated transfer pricing systems. However, 
the benefit of global transparency and of the flexible use of the transfer pricing system might 
depend on the degree of centralization in the approach. Whereas greater global transparency and 
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less flexibility appear to be beneficial for centralized approaches, the opposite may be true for 
decentralized companies.  
Nevertheless, our results should be interpreted cautiously, as our study is subject to several 
limitations, which give rise to future research possibilities. First, all variables of interest are 
latent constructs, and our study thus requires the development of new measurements. Although 
the validity and reliability of our latent variables are generally satisfactory, future research could 
further improve some of our measurements, in particular, that of transfer pricing system 
integration. Moreover, both dependent and independent variables are obtained through the same 
survey, creating the potential for CMV. We investigate this concern in the robustness section of 
this paper (section 5.3) and find no indication that our results are severely biased due to CMV. 
In addition, our questionnaire is addressed to employees at the corporate level, which allows us 
to capture an overall view on transfer pricing. Future research could involve multiple points of 
view from the same company by addressing both managers at the corporate level and profit 
center managers.  
Second, our results are based on a limited number of observations from one country. However, 
because national transfer pricing legislation in Switzerland completely adheres to that of the 
OECD and there is no supplementary transfer pricing legislation, the restriction to one country 
could also enhance the generalizability of our results across countries without specific national 
transfer pricing legislation. Nevertheless, further research could investigate whether our findings 
also hold for companies from other countries.  
Third, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study on transfer pricing that 
applies to the totality of intercompany transactions instead of focusing on single transactions. 
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While such an approach enables us to provide a more holistic picture of transfer pricing in 
practice, we naturally depart from common research ground. Despite this limitation, we are 
confident that our study adds a new and important perspective to the ongoing discussion on 
transfer pricing. Both survey-based and case-based research could build on our model and more 
closely investigate the relationships between transfer pricing system integration and an enabling 
use of the transfer pricing system. Moreover, the results from our interviews indicate that it 
might be particularly fruitful to consider the level of centralization of the transfer pricing system 
when further investigating the integration of the transfer pricing system into the management 
control system.  
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Table 1. Sample distribution by industry group 
By industry N 
Mechanical and plant engineering 8 
Pharma/medical and bio technology 5 
Transport/logistics/public transportation 5 
Building and raw materials/chemistry/synthetics 5 
Consumer goods 4 
Utilities 2 
Electronics 2 
Telecommunications 1 
Other 6 
Total 38 
Table 1 reports the sample distribution by industry group.
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Table 2. Principal component analysis (Oblimin rotated) 
No. Item 
TPS 
Integration Repair 
Internal 
Transparency 
Global 
Transparency Flexibility 
Perceived 
TPS Success 
1 Our transfer pricing system is fully integrated into the management control 
system of our company. 0.765 
2 Transfer prices are incorporated as cost or sales prices into the budgetary 
planning of our profit centers. 0.762 
3 We integrate information from cost accounting into the determination of transfer 
pricing. 0.607 
4 If fundamental problems occur, the responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) 
affected by transfer pricing initiate a revision of the transfer pricing. 0.806 0.125 0.070 0.054 
5 We openly discuss problems with transfer pricing in our company. 0.742 0.197 0.205 -0.053
6 Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing know and 
understand how transfer prices are determined in our company. 0.284 0.799 -0.063 0.032
7 Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing have 
access to the relevant data (e.g., costs) that affect transfer prices. -0.031 0.812 -0.082 0.083
8 Our company keeps detailed records on our transfer pricing system. 0.266 0.750 -0.271 -0.065
9 Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing have 
unlimited access to documentation on our transfer pricing system.  -0.041 0.800 0.219 -0.041
10 Our transfer pricing system helps to clarify the value creation of each 
responsibility center.  0.013 0.124 0.832 0.147
11 Due to our transfer pricing system, we are able to compare the financial 
performance of each responsibility center with that of other centers.  0.321 -0.377 0.778 -0.079
12 In particular cases, we can disregard our internal guidelines on transfer pricing to 
determine transfer prices. -0.337 0.130 0.250 0.808 
13 In particular cases (e.g., major orders), our transfer pricing is flexibly handled. 0.251 0.200 0.041 0.768 
14 There are no exceptions to our internal guidelines/regulations on transfer pricing 
(reverse-coded item). 0.176 -0.448 -0.186 0.791 
15 Overall, we are very satisfied with our transfer pricing system. 0.836 
16 Overall, the benefits of our transfer pricing system outweigh the costs. 0.788 
17 Our transfer pricing system complies completely with tax regulations. 0.717 
18 Overall, our transfer pricing system achieves our internal objectives for transfer 
pricing completely.  0.835 
19 Overall, our transfer pricing system achieves our external objectives for transfer 
pricing completely. 0.774 
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Table 3. Variable definitions 
Variable 
TPS Integration 
General definition: 
The integration of a tax compliant transfer pricing system into the management 
control system in terms of the scope and intensity of using tax compliant 
transfer prices for management control purposes 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Our transfer pricing system is fully integrated into the management
control system of our company.
• Transfer prices are incorporated as cost or sales prices into the budget
planning of our profit centers.
• We integrate information from cost accounting into the determination
of transfer pricing.
• Our transfer prices influence the performance evaluation of our profit
centers.
• Our transfer prices influence (indirectly) the variable compensation of
the management of the responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers).
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• Tax compliant transfer prices are part of cost accounting, the budget
planning of divisions, the profitability measure for the value chain, the
EBIT of a legal entity (Firm A)
• The tax compliant transfer price is part of the OVC (Operating Value
Contribution) (Firm C)
Repair 
General definition: 
Inconsistencies and failures in the transfer pricing system would be detected and 
repaired through adjustments of the transfer pricing system; for instance, a cost 
plus transfer price that does not provide the supplying division with an 
appropriate profit might be adjusted 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Ideas for improvement on transfer pricing by the responsibility centers
(e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing are very welcome.
• If fundamental problems occur, the responsibility centers (e.g., profit
centers) affected by transfer pricing initiate a revision of the transfer
pricing determination.
• If original conditions change, the responsibility centers (e.g., profit
centers) affected by transfer pricing initiate a revision of the transfer
pricing determination.
• We openly discuss problems with transfer pricing in our company.
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• If fundamental problems occur, divisions or business units can initiate a
revision (Firm A)
• Most importantly, the transfer price must enable the sales unit to make
sales, more precisely, the sales they should make (Firm A)
• If there is a problem (or a change in the business model), then it’s
discussed in the TPS working groups and/or in the TPS board. Working
groups have a meeting once a week or monthly depending on the
agenda; the TPS board meets monthly. Decisions may lead to
organizational changes or a change of the TPS policy (Firm B)
• If, in exceptional cases, well-founded deviations from the TPS policy
occur, then the deviation will be discussed in the tax meetings and
usually the deviation will become a standard (Firm C)
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Variable  
Internal Transparency 
General definition: 
The transfer pricing system is comprehensively documented; (decentralized) 
management understands how transfer prices are determined and has access to 
all relevant data 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
know and understand how transfer prices are determined in our 
company. 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
have access to the relevant data (e.g., costs) that affect transfer prices. 
• Our company keeps detailed records on our transfer pricing system. 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
have unlimited access to documentation on our transfer pricing system. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• There is transparency in the plants and the sales units (Firm A) 
• There is transparency in the legal entities (Firm B) 
• Transfer pricing methods and markups are public information within 
the group (Firm B) 
Global Transparency 
General definition: 
(Decentralized) management understand the role of (tax compliant) transfer 
prices in the broader context, i.e., the overall company perspective 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
know and understand the achieved internal objectives of transfer 
pricing in our company. 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
know and understand the achieved external objectives of transfer 
pricing in our company. 
• Our transfer pricing system helps to clarify the value creation of each 
responsibility center. 
• Due to our transfer pricing system, we are able to compare the financial 
performance of the responsibility centers. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• There is no global transparency since the ERP systems are not 
connected. There is no transparency about value chain profitability 
(Firm A) 
• There is global transparency across business sectors and business 
divisions (Firm C) 
Flexibility 
General definition: 
Flexibility refers to the ability to disregard the internal transfer pricing policies 
and to flexibly handle the determination of transfer prices in particular cases 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Our transfer pricing system strictly complies with internal guidelines 
on transfer pricing. 
• In particular cases, we can disregard our internal guidelines on transfer 
pricing to determine transfer prices. 
• In particular cases (e.g., major order), our transfer pricing is flexibly 
handled. 
• There are no exceptions to our internal guidelines/regulations on 
transfer pricing. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• Flexibility is rather low. Only a small minority of internal transactions 
are allowed to deviate from our transfer pricing policy. Such deviations 
must be discussed and agreed upon by the corporate tax department 
(Firm B) 
• There is almost no possibility to deviate from our transfer pricing 
policy; besides, there is a strong tendency over the previous years to 
rule out any deviations from the transfer pricing policy (Firm C) 
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Variable  
Perceived TPS Success 
General definition: 
Perceived transfer pricing system success is the assessment of overall 
satisfaction with the tax compliant transfer pricing system and, in particular, the 
satisfaction with how tax compliant transfer prices fulfill management control 
objectives 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Overall, we are very satisfied with our transfer pricing system. 
• Overall, the benefits of our transfer pricing system outweigh the costs. 
• Our transfer pricing system complies completely with tax regulations. 
• Overall, our transfer pricing system achieves completely our internal 
objectives for transfer pricing. 
• Overall, our transfer pricing system achieves completely our external 
objectives for transfer pricing. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• Success is defined by tax compliance, good decision-making and few 
conflicts (Firm A, B and C) 
• We are fairly pleased with our transfer pricing system since it works: 
there are only few conflicts with tax authorities and at the same time, 
the transfer pricing system doesn’t disturb management control and 
business decision-making (Firm C) 
Table 3 provides (general) definitions, an operationalization (used in the questionnaire) and practical examples 
of all variables. Those items used in the second step of our baseline model (initial step-wise procedure of first 
performing PCA and second, testing our hypotheses based on the PLS technique) are highlighted in gray.  
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Table 4. Validity and reliability measures of variables used in the PLS analysis 
Variable Composite reliability Average variance extracted 
Maximum shared  
variance 
TPS Integration 0.752 0.504 0.229 
Repair 0.855 0.746 0.368 
Internal Transparency 0.895 0.682 0.389 
Global Transparency 0.833 0.716 0.086 
Flexibility 0.724 0.510 0.075 
Perceived TPS Success 0.893 0.626 0.389 
Table 4 reports validity and reliability measures for all of the variables used in the PLS analysis. The first 
column shows the composite reliability, and the second column shows the average variance extracted of a 
variable. Column three shows each variable’s highest shared variance with any of the other variables.  
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the untransformed variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
TPS Integration 38 5.00 1.31 2.00 7.00 
Repair 38 4.76 1.38 2.50 7.00 
Internal Transparency 38 4.53 1.49 1.75 6.75 
Global Transparency 38 3.84 1.42 1.00 7.00 
Flexibility 38 4.18 1.63 1.00 7.00 
Perceived TPS Success 38 5.08 1.12 2.00 6.80 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the standardized variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
TPS Integration 38 0.00 0.71 -1.71 1.08 
Repair 38 0.00 0.84 -2.08 1.59 
Internal Transparency 38 0.00 0.83 -1.62 1.23 
Global Transparency 38 0.00 0.85 -1.72 1.90 
Flexibility 38 0.00 0.80 -1.57 1.39 
Perceived TPS Success 38 0.00 0.79 -2.19 1.23 
 
Panel C: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
1) TPS Integration 1      
2) Internal Transparency 0.388** 1     
3) Flexibility 0.183 0.061 1    
4) Repair 0.336** 0.426***  0.172 1   
5) Global Transparency 0.246 -0.054 0.274* 0.293* 1  
6) Perceived TPS Success 0.478*** 0.624*** 0.033 0.607*** -0.039 1 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the untransformed (Panel A) and the standardized variables (Panel B) 
as well as correlation statistics (Panel C). All statistics are presented for the full sample of 38 firms. Panel C 
reports bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent and 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test of statistical significance, respectively.  
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Table 6. Results of the PLS analysis  
Panel A: Results for hypotheses H1 and H2a-H2d      
Paths to Paths from     
 TPS Integration 
std. 
error t-value p-value mult. R
2 
Repair 0.336** 0.178 1.895 0.029 0.113 
Internal 
Transparency 0.388*** 0.157 2.465 0.007 0.151 
Global 
Transparency 0.246* 0.175 1.408 0.080 0.061 
Flexibility 0.183 0.171 1.068 0.143 0.033 
Perceived 
TPS Success  0.263* 0.170 1.547 0.061  
 
Panel B: Results for hypotheses H3a-H3d      
Paths from Paths to     
 
Perceived 
TPS 
Success 
std. 
error t-value p-value Effect size f
2 
Repair 0.450*** 0.136 3.302 0.000 0.360 
Internal 
Transparency 0.321** 0.160 2.005 0.022 0.181 
Global 
Transparency -0.203 0.178 1.141 0.127 0.082 
Flexibility -0.057 0.113 0.503 0.308 0.007 
TPS 
Integration 0.263* 0.170 1.547 0.061 0.133 
Mult. R2 0.605     
Panel A of Table 6 presents path coefficients and significance levels from the PLS analysis based on 
bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings for the first two sets of hypotheses (H1 and H2a-d). Panel B of Table 6 
presents the results for the third set of hypotheses (H3a-d) and additionally reports the effect size f2.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, for a 
one-tailed test of statistical significance. 
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Table 7. Results of the PLS analysis for the model optimized in SmartPLS 
Panel A: Results for hypotheses H1 and H2a-H2d      
Paths to Paths from     
 TPS Integration 
std. 
error t-value p-value mult. R
2 
Repair 0.351** 0.171 2.056 0.020 0.123 
Internal 
Transparency 0.455*** 0.138 3.301 0.000 0.207 
Global 
Transparency 0.410*** 0.133 3.080 0.001 0.168 
Flexibility 0.311** 0.178 1.748 0.040 0.097 
Perceived 
TPS Success  0.177 0.179 0.990 0.161  
 
Panel B: Results for hypotheses H3a-H3d      
Paths from Paths to     
 
Perceived  
TPS 
success 
std. 
error t-value p-value Effect size f
2 
Repair 0.373*** 0.150 2.489 0.006 0.252 
Internal 
Transparency 0.419*** 0.162 2.590 0.005 0.219 
Global 
Transparency 0.064 0.167 0.382 0.351 0.005 
Flexibility -0.150 0.146 1.033 0.151 0.047 
TPS 
Integration 0.177 0.179 0.990 0.161 0.058 
Mult. R2 0.607     
Panel A of Table 7 presents path coefficients and significance levels for the model optimized in SmartPLS based 
on bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings for the first two sets of hypotheses (H1 and H2a-d). Panel B of Table 7 
presents the results for the third set of hypotheses (H3a-d) and additionally reports the effect size f2. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels for a one-tailed test 
of statistical significance, respectively. 
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Table 8. Results of the PLS analysis including control variables 
Panel A: Results for hypotheses H1 and H2a-H2d      
Paths to Paths from     
 TPS Integration 
std. 
error t-value p-value mult. R
2 
Repair 0.336** 0.172 1.957 0.025 0.113 
Internal 
Transparency 0.388*** 0.157 2.479 0.007 0.151 
Global 
Transparency 0.246* 0.175 1.407 0.080 0.061 
Flexibility 0.183 0.171 1.073 0.142 0.033 
Perceived 
TPS Success  0.226* 0.170 1.330 0.092  
 
Panel B: Results for hypotheses H3a-H3d      
Paths from Paths to     
 
Perceived 
TPS 
Success 
std. 
error t-value p-value Effect size f
2 
Repair 0.443*** 0.137 3.235 0.001 0.390 
Internal 
Transparency 0.257* 0.195 1.318 0.094 0.113 
Global 
Transparency -0.177 0.165 1.072 0.142 0.065 
Flexibility -0.019 0.123 0.154 0.439 0.001 
TPS 
Integration 0.226* 0.166 1.358 0.087 0.107 
# Profit 
centers 0.119* 0.085 1.402 0.080 0.037 
Foreign sales 0.208* 0.141 1.475 0.070 0.088 
Mult. R2 0.648     
Panel A of Table 8 presents path coefficients and significance levels from the PLS analysis based on 
bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings including control variables for the first two sets of hypotheses (H1 and H2a-
d). Panel B of Table 8 presents the results for the third set of hypotheses (H3a-d) and additionally reports the 
effect size f2.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels for a one-tailed test 
of statistical significance, respectively. 
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Table 9. Results of the PLS analysis including control variables 
Panel A: Results for hypotheses H1 and H2a-H2d      
Paths to Paths from     
 TPS Integration 
std. 
error t-value p-value mult. R
2 
Repair 0.336** 0.177 1.904 0.028 0.113 
Internal 
Transparency 0.388*** 0.155 2.507 0.006 0.151 
Global 
Transparency 0.246* 0.172 1.429 0.077 0.061 
Flexibility 0.183 0.169 1.080 0.140 0.033 
TPS Conflicts  -0.129 0.221 0.584 0.280  
 
Panel B: Results for hypotheses H3a-H3d      
Paths from Paths to     
 TPS Conflicts 
std. 
error t-value p-value Effect size f
2 
Repair 0.160 0.231 0.694 0.244 0.023 
Internal 
Transparency 
-
0.434*** 0.207 2.092 0.018 0.166 
Global 
Transparency 0.016 0.273 0.057 0.477 0.000 
Flexibility -0.082 0.163 0.501 0.308 0.008 
TPS 
Integration -0.129 0.221 0.584 0.280  
Mult. R2 0.212     
Panel A of Table 9 presents path coefficients and significance levels from the PLS analysis based on 
bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings (H1 and H2a-d). Panel B of Table 9 presents the results for the third set of 
hypotheses (H3a-d) and additionally reports the effect size f2.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels for a one-tailed test 
of statistical significance, respectively. 
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Table 10. Results of the OLS regression 
(1) coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.291** 0.139 2.090 0.044 
Repair 0.411*** 0.119 3.450 0.002 
Internal_transparency 0.306** 0.125 2.440 0.020 
Global_transparency -0.188 0.115 -1.640 0.109 
Flexibility -0.056 0.114 -0.490 0.625 
Mult. R2 0.605    
     
(2) coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.530*** 0.160 3.310 0.002 
Mult. R2 0.229    
  
(3) coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.407** 0.188 2.170 0.036 
Mult. R2 0.113    
 
(4) coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.451** 0.176 2.560 0.015 
Mult. R2 0.151    
 
(5) coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.294 0.190 1.550 0.130 
Mult. R2 0.061    
 
(6) coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.205 0.181 1.130 0.265 
Mult. R2 0.034    
Table 10 reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-values, p-values and significance 
levels for equations (1) – (6). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test of statistical significance. Coefficient estimates in Table 10 are 
specified by the following equations:  
(1) TPS_success = β1*TPS_integration + β2*Repair+ β3*Internal_transparency + β4*Global_transparency 
+ β5*Flexibility + ε 
(2) TPS_success = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
(3) Repair = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
(4) Internal_transparency = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
(5) Global_transparency = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
(6) Flexibility = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
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Table 11. Overview of the sample companies 
Panel A: Overview of the sample companies by organizational structure 
 A B C 
Firm size (sales in 
2015) 
Approx. 35 billion USD Approx. 3 billion EUR Approx. 70 billion EUR 
Internationalization • Revenues in various 
jurisdictions and 
currencies 
• Approx. 70 percent of 
sales generated in 
foreign countries 
• Revenues in various 
jurisdictions and 
currencies 
• Approx. 80 percent of 
sales generated in 
foreign countries 
• Revenues in various 
jurisdictions and 
currencies 
• Approx. 80 percent of 
sales generated in 
foreign countries 
Organizational 
structure of the 
firm 
• 4 global divisions 
• Each division is 
comprised of various 
business units (BU) 
• Each BU is comprised 
of various functional 
centers 
• Product selling and 
system selling 
• 2 global divisions 
• No division managers, 
divisions are managed 
by the board 
• Each division is 
comprised of various 
functional centers 
• 4 global divisions  
• Each business sector is 
comprised of various 
business units (BU) 
• Each business unit is 
comprised of various 
functional centers 
Organizational 
structure of the 
value chain 
• Production centers, 
sales and distribution 
centers, service centers 
• Production center, 
service center, product 
center, sales center 
• Entrepreneur, contract 
manufacturer, service 
provider, distributor  
Panel B: Overview of the sample companies by transfer pricing system 
 A B C 
Transfer pricing 
guidelines 
• Transfer pricing 
guidelines that require 
compliance with the 
arm’s length principle 
• Detailed and 
comprehensive transfer 
pricing guidelines 
• Detailed and 
comprehensive transfer 
pricing guidelines 
Transfer pricing 
objective 
• Tax compliance as most 
important objective 
• Enhance decentralized 
decision-making 
• Tax compliance as most 
important objective  
• Facilitate decentralized 
decision-making  
• Tax compliance as most 
important objective  
• No distortion of 
decentralized decision-
making  
Basic structure • Transfer prices are 
negotiated between the 
profit centers 
• Product selling: transfer 
prices are primarily 
determined by the 
production center 
• System selling: transfer 
prices are primarily 
determined by the sales 
center 
• Transfer prices for the 
production centers are 
determined based on 
standard costs plus a 
markup 
• Transfer prices for the 
sales centers are 
determined based on the 
resale price minus a 
margin 
• The residual across the 
supply chain is allocated 
to the product center  
• Transfer prices for the 
contract manufacturers 
and service providers 
are determined based on 
standard costs plus a 
markup 
• Transfer prices for the 
distributors are 
determined based on the 
resale price minus a 
margin 
• The residual across the 
supply chain is allocated 
to the entrepreneur 
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Figure 1: Structural equation model  
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an explanation for the previously mixed findings on the relationship 
between corporate sustainability performance (CSP) and corporate tax avoidance by 
disentangling sustainability performance into operational and management sustainability 
performance. The results from multivariate regression analyses for a sample of 4,449 U.S. 
firm-year observations reveal a positive relationship between management sustainability 
performance and tax avoidance and a negative relationship between operational sustainability 
performance and tax avoidance. The results are robust across the environmental and social 
dimensions of sustainability and various measures of tax avoidance. Overall, the study 
provides novel insights into the association between CSP and corporate tax avoidance. 
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2.3.1. Introduction 
The relationship between corporate sustainability performance (CSP) and corporate tax 
avoidance is currently both theoretically and empirically ambiguous. From a theoretical 
perspective, traditional economic theories suggest that firms engage in tax avoidance and 
attempt to increase their sustainability performance to maximize shareholder value. 
Minimizing the corporate tax liability increases shareholder value, which is limited by 
reputational risks and the probability of detection and punishment. In this setting, firms focus 
on sustainability performance to build up a positive reputation, which serves as a form of risk 
management against corporate crises and mitigates the negative consequences of corporate 
crises. Therefore, traditional economic theories suggest a positive relationship between 
sustainability performance and corporate tax avoidance. By contrast, political theories 
including stakeholder theory and the corporate culture perspective suggest a negative 
relationship between sustainability performance and corporate tax avoidance. According to 
stakeholder theory, firms are responsible for a broad group of stakeholders, such as 
employees, the environment and society. Firms take on this responsibility by both minimizing 
their environmental and social externalities and paying their fair share of taxes. Similarly, the 
corporate culture perspective (Hill and Jones, 2001) suggests that people and groups within an 
organization share the same values and norms, which influence their behavior toward external 
stakeholders. Based on this understanding, sustainability performance and corporate tax 
payments complement a strong corporate culture of sustainability. Tax avoidance is thus 
incompatible with a high level of sustainability performance. 
Taken together, the two theoretical concepts yield opposing predictions regarding the 
relationship between sustainability performance and corporate tax avoidance, and the few 
empirical studies to examine this relationship have not yet been able to clarify it. On the one 
hand, Davis et al. (2016) provide large-sample evidence of a positive relationship between 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate tax avoidance, thereby supporting 
traditional economic theories. On the other hand, Lanis and Richardson (2015) and Hoi et al. 
(2013) provide evidence of a negative relationship, which supports the applicability of 
political theories and the corporate culture perspective. 
Trumpp et al. (2015) provide a potential explanation for these inconsistent findings. Based on 
a thorough review of the literature and a factor analysis of 706 firm-year observations, they 
develop a framework of environmental performance that distinguishes between a management 
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dimension and an operational dimension. The authors invite researchers to “incorporate both 
dimensions separately and avoid conflations” in order to derive unbiased estimations (Trumpp 
et al., 2015). We apply this framework to the measurement of sustainability performance and 
investigate the relationships between corporate tax avoidance and the management and 
operational dimensions separately.  
The management dimension typically refers to the strategic level of sustainability 
performance, namely, policies, structures and processes, while the operational dimension 
focuses on the quantifiable environmental and social impacts of a firm. Prior research has 
revealed a negative relationship between operational environmental performance and a firm’s 
environmental reputation (Cho et al., 2012), thereby suggesting that operational performance 
is ineffective for reputation-building and risk-management purposes. Potential reasons for 
such ineffectiveness may be that external stakeholders cannot easily assess a firm’s 
operational performance because such assessments require a deeper understanding of the 
topic and benchmarking with a peer group. Therefore, we argue that only firms with a strong 
corporate culture of sustainability strive for superior operational sustainability performance, 
as improving the operational sustainability performance implies additional costs but not direct 
benefits. Consequently, we expect firms with superior operational sustainability performance 
to pay their fair share of taxes; thus, we also expect to find a negative relationship between 
operational sustainability performance and corporate tax avoidance. In addition, the 
management dimension of sustainability performance is more visible for a broad group of 
stakeholders, particularly because the management dimension also includes philanthropic 
activities and community engagement (Wood, 1991). Therefore, management sustainability 
performance is more suitable for reputation-building and risk-management purposes. 
Therefore, we expect traditional economic theories to be particularly applicable to 
management sustainability performance. Firms strive to improve their management 
sustainability performance based on cost-benefit considerations; thus, we expect to find a 
positive relationship between management sustainability performance and corporate tax 
avoidance. 
The results from multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with clustered standard 
errors at the industry-year level for a sample of 4,449 U.S. firm-year observations strongly 
support our reasoning. For various measures of corporate tax avoidance, namely, effective tax 
rates (ETRs) and discretionary book-tax differences, the results reveal a positive (negative) 
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relationship between management (operational) sustainability performance and corporate tax 
avoidance. These results hold for sustainability in general but also for the environmental and 
social dimensions of sustainability separately. Moreover, the results remain robust for 
different sample specifications and alternative measurements of tax avoidance. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this study is the first to provide a 
theoretical explanation that reconciles the ambiguous findings from prior empirical studies on 
the relationship between sustainability performance and corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, 
this study contributes to the empirical tax avoidance literature by providing evidence 
regarding potential determinants of corporate tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
Our findings suggest the integration of both management and operational sustainability 
performance into the models that predict corporate tax avoidance. Second, our findings also 
speak to the literature on CSR and sustainability (Carroll, 2015). In particular, our findings 
point toward the importance of distinguishing between the strategic management dimension 
and the outcome-oriented operational dimension of CSP, which has been previously 
emphasized by several researchers (Jung et al., 2001; Trumpp et al., 2015; Wood, 1991; Xie 
and Hayase, 2007). Our measurement of management and operational sustainability 
performance is closely related to the framework of Trumpp et al. (2015) and the operational 
sustainability performance indicators introduced by (Hummel and Schlick, 2016). While the 
framework of Trumpp et al. (2015) was originally been developed for environmental 
sustainability only, we translate this concept to overall sustainability. We thereby add to the 
literature on sustainability performance by providing an easily replicable measurement 
approach. Moreover, a separate analysis of the environmental and social dimensions of 
sustainability responds to several researchers’ calls to study the individual sustainability 
dimensions separately (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Laguir et al., 2015; Rehbein et al., 2004). 
Third, our results show that management sustainability performance is positively and 
operational sustainability performance is negatively related to tax avoidance. This finding is 
not only statistically but also economically significant. According to our estimations, the most 
tax-aggressive group of firms has ETRs that are, on average, 3.5% lower than those of other 
firms. Each firm in this group pays, on average, $35.48 million less in annual taxes. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Based on a discussion of the theoretical 
background and the related literature, we develop the hypotheses in the next section. Section 
three presents the research design, particularly the measurement of tax avoidance, the 
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measurement of management and operational sustainability performance, and our empirical 
model. In section four, we present and discuss the descriptive findings and results from 
multivariate regression models and additional robustness analyses. The final section 
concludes the paper. 
2.3.2. Theoretical background 
2.3.2.1. Disentangling operational and management sustainability performance 
According to the triple bottom line approach, CSP is a multi-dimensional construct that 
comprises economic, environmental and social responsibilities (Elkington, 1997). This paper 
focuses on the environmental and social dimensions of sustainability. With respect to the 
measurement of sustainability performance, the literature agrees that sustainability 
performance consists of a management dimension and an operational dimension (Hummel 
and Schlick, 2016; Trumpp et al., 2015; Wood, 1991). On the one hand, management 
sustainability performance typically refers to the strategic level and concerns principles, 
policies, programs, structures and processes of sustainability (Trumpp et al., 2015; Wood, 
1991). According to Wood (1991), these policies and programs include philanthropic 
activities and community engagement. On the other hand, operational sustainability 
performance typically focuses on the quantifiable outcomes of sustainability performance, 
such as the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and waste with respect to the 
environment and employee turnover and injury rates with respect to the social dimension of 
sustainability (Hummel and Schlick, 2016; Trumpp et al., 2015). Based on factor analyses, 
Trumpp et al. (2015) show for the environmental dimension of sustainability that operational 
and management performance are distinct constructs that represent separate dimensions. 
Consequently, the authors caution researchers to not mix up the operational and management 
dimensions. Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual approach for disentangling CSP. Specifically, 
we distinguish between management and operational sustainability performance and between 
environmental and social performance. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
2.3.2.2. Traditional economic theories 
Traditional economic theories suggest that firms engage in tax avoidance and attempt to 
increase their sustainability performance to the extent that doing so maximizes shareholder 
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value. With respect to tax avoidance, minimizing the amount of tax expenditures increases the 
firm’s net income and net cash flow, which is only limited by reputational risks and the 
probability of detection and punishment. With respect to sustainability performance, an 
important mechanism through which sustainability performance enhances shareholder value 
is reputation and risk management. According to the risk-management argument, firms focus 
on sustainability performance to develop a positive sustainability reputation, which can 
provide “a cushion of goodwill when crises hit” (Fombrun, 1996). In other words, a high level 
of sustainability performance can reduce the probability of negative sustainability events and 
mitigate the damages that a firm encounters when negative corporate events occur (Godfrey et 
al., 2009; Hoi et al., 2013). Christensen (2016) provides empirical evidence of the positive 
role of sustainability disclosure in mitigating downside risk. In this context, CSP plays an 
insurance-like role against potential punishments from various stakeholders if corporate 
misconduct occurs. Therefore, traditional economic theories suggest a positive relationship 
between sustainability performance and corporate tax avoidance. Another potential 
explanation for a positive relationship between sustainability performance and corporate tax 
avoidance relates to the reasoning that corporations might be able to solve societal problems 
more efficiently than governments. Based on this understanding, high tax rates hamper 
innovation, job growth and economic development and thereby prevent firms from 
contributing to social welfare. Moreover, the capacity of investing in sustainability 
performance is higher when avoiding taxes, i.e., social welfare can be increased much more 
through investments in infrastructure or research and development rather than through the 
payment of corporate taxes. 
We argue that the reasoning of traditional economic theories particularly applies to the 
management dimension of sustainability performance. Specifically, we argue that 
management sustainability performance is more visible to external stakeholders and thus 
more suitable for developing a positive reputation. This higher visibility stems from external 
stakeholders’ ability to more easily assess the management sustainability performance of a 
firm relative to its operational sustainability performance. While the mere existence of 
sustainability policies, structures and processes indicates superior management sustainability 
performance, the assessment of operational sustainability indicators is more complicated and 
requires a deeper understanding of the topic and benchmarking with a peer group. Thus, firms 
can more easily develop a positive reputation through high management sustainability 
performance, which serves as insurance if corporate crises occur. This reasoning is further 
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supported by a study on a reputation survey provided by Shell (Bebbington et al., 2008). The 
authors highlight that the Shell report links reputational elements with the management 
dimension of sustainability (Bebbington et al., 2008). In addition, the existence of 
sustainability policies, structures and processes is more likely to prevent the occurrence of 
corporate crises than high operational sustainability performance. Philanthropic activities and 
community engagement are also more visible to a broad group of stakeholders and are thus 
more suitable for reputation building. 
Therefore, we expect to find a positive relationship between management sustainability 
performance and corporate tax avoidance, which is formally stated in hypothesis H1a. In 
addition, we hypothesize that this positive relationship applies to both environmental (H1b) 
and social (H1c) sustainability performance. 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between management sustainability performance and 
corporate tax avoidance. 
H1b: There is a positive relationship between environmental management sustainability 
performance and corporate tax avoidance. 
H1c: There is a positive relationship between social management sustainability performance 
and corporate tax avoidance. 
2.3.2.3. Stakeholder theory and the corporate culture perspective 
In contrast to traditional economic theories, stakeholder theory and the corporate culture 
perspective generally suggest a negative relationship between CSP and corporate tax 
avoidance. According to stakeholder theory, firms are responsible to a broad group of 
stakeholders, including employees, the environment and society (Freeman, 1984). By paying 
their fair share of taxes, firms act responsibly toward society, but they may simultaneously 
neglect part of the shareholder value maxim. This reasoning is in line with the existence of a 
“corporate culture of sustainability.” According to Hill and Jones (2001), corporate culture 
refers to “the values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization and 
that control the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the 
organization.” Consequently, a strong corporate culture of sustainability is reflected by 
sustainable behavior toward all stakeholders. Tax avoidance is thus incompatible with a high 
level of sustainability performance. In this case, CSP and tax payments complement a strong 
culture of sustainability. 
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We argue that the corporate culture perspective particularly applies to the operational 
dimension of sustainability performance. Prior research has shown that operational 
environmental performance is negatively related to a firm’s perceived environmental 
reputation (Cho et al., 2012).1 Therefore, superior operational sustainability performance 
appears to be not suitable for developing a positive reputation, as “[operational] performance 
might not always be reflected in perceptions of corporate reputation” (Cho et al., 2012). 
External stakeholders cannot easily assess a firm’s operational sustainability performance. 
Specifically, the assessment of quantifiable performance indicators, such as the amount of 
GHG emissions, energy consumption or injury rates, requires a deeper understanding of the 
topic and benchmarking with a peer group. Therefore, superior operational sustainability 
performance does not translate into a good corporate reputation. In addition, outperforming 
peers in terms of operational sustainability performance can be very costly. We thus argue 
that only firms with a strong corporate culture of sustainability invest in reducing their 
environmental and social impacts to levels below the common industry standards, as these 
reductions imply additional costs but no direct benefits. Consequently, we expect to find a 
negative relationship between operational sustainability performance and corporate tax 
avoidance, which is formally stated in hypothesis H2a. Again, we also argue that this 
relationship pertains to the environmental (H2b) and social (H2c) dimensions of 
sustainability. 
H2a: There is a negative relationship between operational sustainability performance and 
corporate tax avoidance. 
H2b: There is a negative relationship between environmental operational sustainability 
performance and corporate tax avoidance. 
H2c: There is a negative relationship between social operational sustainability performance 
and corporate tax avoidance. 
2.3.2.4. Empirical evidence 
Our reasoning for disentangling management and operational sustainability performance 
might explain the inconsistent findings of prior studies regarding the relationship between 
sustainability performance and tax avoidance. While Davis et al. (2016) and Laguir et al. 
(2015) provide empirical evidence of a positive relationship between CSP and corporate tax 
avoidance, thereby supporting the reasoning of traditional economic theories, Hoi et al. 
1 Cho et al. (2012) measure operational environmental performance based on quantifiable indicators, “including 
greenhouse gas emissions, water use, solid waste disposal, acid rain emissions, and toxic waste emissions.” 
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(2013) and Lanis and Richardson (2015) provide evidence of a negative relationship, which 
is in line with the corporate culture perspective.2 
Based on a sample of 5,588 firm-year observations, Davis et al. (2016) reveal a negative 
(positive) relationship between firms’ levels of CSR activities and tax payments (tax lobbying 
expenses). The level of CSR activities is measured based on data provided by the MSCI 
(formerly KLD) database.3 Remarkably, this result is particularly driven by firms with high 
CSR levels. Similarly, Laguir et al. (2015) reveal for a sample of 83 firm-year observations a 
negative relationship between firms’ levels of economic sustainability and their ETRs (as well 
as a positive relationship between firms’ levels of social sustainability and their ETRs). Hoi et 
al. (2013) investigate a sample of U.S. firms that comprise between 4,191 and 9,147 firm-year 
observations.4 Similar to Davis et al. (2016), the authors refer to the MSCI (KLD) database to 
construct a measure of CSR performance. However, the authors concentrate on “excessive 
irresponsible CSR activities” and thus include only the CSR concerns in their overall CSR 
measure (Hoi et al., 2013). Likewise, the authors focus on “extremely aggressive tax 
avoidance practices” with respect to firms’ tax aggressiveness (Hoi et al., 2013). The study 
provides evidence for a negative and significant relationship between CSR and tax avoidance. 
The results are particularly applicable for a subset of firms with particularly low CSR 
performance, which are particularly tax aggressive. Lanis and Richardson (2015) investigate a 
matched sample of 434 U.S. firm-year observations. They measure tax aggressiveness as a 
binary variable based on self-reported tax disputes (as provided in the MSCI database). 
Again, the level of CSR performance is measured based on the net value of CSR strengths 
minus CSR concerns, as provided by the MSCI (KLD) database. The results reveal a negative 
and significant relationship between CSR performance and the likelihood of tax disputes. 
Additional separate analyses for the CSR categories indicate that this relationship particularly 
pertains to community relations, diversity, human rights, and product responsibility. 
Taken together, except for Laguir et al. (2015), the previous empirical studies rely on data 
provided by the MSCI (formerly KLD) database for the measurement of CSP. The database 
provides binary assessments (i.e., presence versus absence) of strengths and weaknesses in 
2 Note that this paper focuses on CSP, whereas prior studies typically focus on CSR. However, the differences 
between the two concepts are negligible (Carroll, 2015). 
3 More precisely, the authors construct a CSR index based on the net value of CSR strengths minus CSR 
concerns. CSR strengths and concerns are measured in the areas of community relations, diversity, employee 
relations, the environment and products. 
4 The sample size varies depending on the tax avoidance measure. 
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sustainability-related areas, such as the environment, employee relations, and the community. 
However, it does not distinguish between management and operational sustainability 
performance. Therefore, the inconsistent findings of prior studies might relate to the mixture 
of management and operational sustainability performance. 
2.3.3. Research design 
2.3.3.1. Measuring tax avoidance 
We follow Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and broadly define corporate tax avoidance as the 
“reduction of explicit taxes.” Note that this broad understanding of tax avoidance does not 
distinguish between the measures used to minimize taxes. Moreover, this broad definition 
captures a continuum of tax strategies that range from rather modest and legal tax planning 
activities to illegal tax evasion.5 Consistent with prior research, we measure tax avoidance 
based on accounting data. Specifically, we rely on ETR measures, which are calculated by 
dividing an estimate of tax liability by a measure of before-tax profits. Notably, all measures 
of tax avoidance have their own limitations (for an overview see Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010). We choose ETR measures because they account for the entire continuum of tax 
avoidance strategies and thus allow us to gauge the degree of tax avoidance.6 Moreover, prior 
studies on the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance have also used ETR measures, 
which makes our results comparable to the findings of prior studies (Davis et al., 2016; Hoi et 
al., 2013; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). Lanis and Richardson (2012) argue that ETRs are the 
most frequently used and validated proxies for tax aggressiveness in the literature and that the 
Australian Taxation Office considers them key indicators of tax aggressiveness. 
We use a long-run cash ETR (CASH_ETR) and a GAAP ETR (GAAP_ETR) for our baseline 
regression models. While the numerator in the GAAP_ETR is accounting earnings, the 
numerator in the CASH_ETR is cash taxes paid. Each measure is affected by different tax 
planning strategies7; therefore, using both measures captures a broader spectrum of tax 
planning. Following Dyreng et al. (2008) and Davis et al. (2016), we apply a five-year 
horizon (from t to t-4) when measuring the long-run cash ETR. This type of long-run 
computation reduces volatility compared with year-to-year measures and eliminates a large 
5 We do not differentiate between legal and illegal tax avoidance, as determining the legality of tax avoidance 
based on accounting data is difficult (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
6 By contrast, the identification of firms engaged in tax shelter activities focuses on extremely aggressive tax 
activities at one end of the continuum. 
7 On the one hand, the GAAP ETR is affected by changes in the tax accounting accruals but not by tax deferral 
strategies. On the other hand, the Cash ETR is affected by tax deferral strategies but not by changes in the tax 
accounting accruals (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
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portion of the mismatch between earnings and tax payments (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
CASH_ETRi,t is measured as the five-year average of cash taxes paid divided by pretax book 
income less special items for firm i in year t. Consistent with the literature, we set 
CASH_ETR=1 if it exceeds one or if the denominator is negative and cash taxes paid are 
positive, and we set CASH_ETR=0 if cash taxes paid are negative. GAAP_ETRi,t is measured 
as the total income taxes divided by the pretax income of firm i in year t. Again, we set 
GAAP_ETR=1 if it exceeds one or if the pretax income is negative and the total income taxes 
are positive, and we set GAAP_ETR=0 if the total income taxes are negative. Note that a 
lower ETR reflects a higher level of corporate tax avoidance. Therefore, measuring corporate 
tax avoidance based on ETRs reverses the direction of our hypotheses. 
2.3.3.2. Measuring operational and management sustainability performance 
To measure a firm’s CSP, we use data from the ASSET4 database. The ASSET4 database 
provides firm-level data on environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) ratings for 
more than 4,300 companies worldwide (Thomson Reuters, 2012).8 In contrast to the MSCI 
(KLD) database, the ASSET4 database provides not only the aggregated scoring of a firm’s 
sustainability performance but also indicator-level information. Such granular data are 
necessary for the distinction between operational sustainability performance and management 
sustainability performance, which is an integral part of our research design. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the measurement of CSP along the management and 
operational dimensions as well as along the environmental and social dimensions. Our main 
variables of interest are management sustainability performance (MP), environmental 
management performance (EMP) and social management performance (SMP) with respect to 
hypotheses H1a–H1c, and operational sustainability performance (OP), environmental 
operational performance (EOP) and social operational performance (SOP) with respect to 
hypotheses H2a–H2c. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
8 Data from the ASSET4 database have been increasingly used by researchers, for instance Trumpp et al. (2015), 
Cheng et al. (2014), and Ziegler et al. (2011). 
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As discussed in section 2.1, CSP is measured based on the environmental and social 
dimensions of sustainability. Specifically, CSP is calculated as the mean of the environmental 
pillar score (ENVP) and the social pillar score (SOCP), as provided by the ASSET4 database. 
The pillar scores reflect a firm’s aggregate environmental and social performance and range 
between zero and 100, with lower values indicating poorer performance. The environmental 
pillar “examines factors including resource usage and reduction; emissions and emissions 
reductions; environmental activism and initiative and product or process innovation” 
(Thomson Reuters, 2013). The social pillar “examines factors including employment quality, 
health and safety issues, training, diversity, human rights, community involvement and 
product responsibility” (Thomson Reuters, 2013). Our distinction between operational and 
management sustainability follows Trumpp et al. (2015). More precisely, EOP and SOP are 
each measured based on an aggregation of four distinct operational performance indicators. 
OP is then measured as the arithmetic mean of EOP and SOP. MP (EMP and SMP) is 
measured as the residual from a regression of CSP (ENVP and SOCP) on OP (EOP and SOP) 
to capture the portion of CSP (ENVP and SOCP) that is not explained by OP (EOP and SOP). 
Further details on the measurement of the variables are presented below. 
With respect to the operational performance dimension, EOP is calculated as the mean value 
of four indicators—energy consumption (EOP1), water withdrawal (EOP2), GHG (GHG) 
emissions (EOP3) and the weight of waste (EOP4)—scaled by total sales. These indicators 
are consistent with Trumpp et al. (2015) and Hummel and Schlick (2016).9 Table 1 provides a 
detailed description of the environmental and social operational performance indicators. All 
EOP indicators are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level for each year, and they are 
standardized by industry10 to ensure the comparability of the performance scores across 
different industries and to allow for the aggregation of performance indicators into an overall 
score.11 Next, the EOP indicators are rescaled by multiplying them by (-1) so that higher 
values correspond with better environmental performance. EOP is then calculated as the 
arithmetic mean of the standardized items. Thus, positive (negative) values of EOP can be 
interpreted as better (worse) than average industry performance. 
9 In contrast to Trumpp et al. (2015), we do not include hazardous waste due to the poor reporting quality of this 
performance indicator. 
10 For instance, GHG emissions (normalized by total sales) equal, on average, 512 for the transportation industry 
and 28 for the media industry. This huge discrepancy highlights the necessity of rescaling the performance data 
on an industry level to adequately capture the firm’s environmental performance. 
11 Missing values are replaced by the mean values after standardization, i.e., by zero (mean replacement). 
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Similar to our procedure for measuring EOP, SOP is calculated based on the following items: 
employee turnover (SOP1), employee training (SOP2), the injury rate (SOP3), and the 
percentage of women employees (SOP4). These items are consistent with the approach of 
Hummel and Schlick (2016) for measuring the social dimension of sustainability 
performance. For interpretative reasons, we rescale employee turnover and the injury rate by 
multiplying them by (-1). Again, to allow for comparison across different industries, we 
standardize SOP3 (the injury rate) and SOP4 (the percentage of women employees) by 
industry and SOP1 and SOP2 on the overall level.12 SOP is then calculated as the arithmetic 
mean of the four standardized SOP indicators, and OP is calculated as the arithmetic mean of 
EOP and SOP. 
Trumpp et al. (2015) provide a detailed framework for measuring not only EOP but also 
EMP. However, our approach for measuring the management performance dimension differs 
from Trumpp et al. (2015) procedure for two reasons. First, the literature provides no guide 
for the selection of distinct management performance items for the social dimension of 
sustainability, and the EMP items provided by Trumpp et al. (2015) cannot be directly 
transferred into corresponding SMP items. Therefore, the selection of SMP indicators will 
suffer from considerable subjectivity. Such a potentially biased selection of SMP indicators 
will hamper the comparability of our results across the environmental, social and overall 
sustainability dimensions. Therefore, we utilize a different procedure for the measurement of 
management performance, which enables us to consistently derive the measures for MP, EMP 
and SMP. To measure MP, we regress CSP on OP according to equation (1). We then use the 
residuals from this regression to proxy for MP. 𝐶𝑆𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑂𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!,         (1) 
12 The summary statistics of the average indicator values per industry (untabulated) support the feasibility of this 
approach. Again, missing values are set to 0 after standardization. 
104
Similarly, to measure EMP (SMP), we regress the environmental (social) pillar scores on the 
EOP (SOP) measures, as described in equations (2) and (3), respectively, and we use the 
residuals from this regression as a proxy for EMP (SMP). 𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑂𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, (2) 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, (3) 
In the robustness section of this paper (section 4.3), we further investigate the overlap 
between our measurement of EMP and the measurement of EMP according to Trumpp et al. 
(2015), and we use the latter as alternative measure for EMP in our regressions. 
2.3.3.3. Empirical model and sample selection 
The relationship between operational (management) sustainability performance and tax 
avoidance is analyzed based on the following regression model: 𝑇𝐴  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑃!,! + 𝛽!𝑂𝑃!,! + ∑𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!,! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑦! + 𝜖!,!  (4) 
The variables are summarized in Table I in the appendix. TA measurei,t proxies for our tax 
avoidance measures CASH_ETR and GAAP_ETR, which are described in further detail in 
section 3.1. MPi,t (OPi,t) captures a firm’s management (operational) sustainability 
performance as described in the previous section. Note that we estimate separate regressions 
for the overall sustainability dimension (i.e., including MPi,t and OPi,t), the environmental 
dimension of sustainability (i.e., including EMPi,t and EOPi,t instead of MPi,t and OPi,t), and 
the social dimension of sustainability (i.e., including SMPi,t and SOPi,t instead of MPi,t and 
OPi,t). 
Consistent with the literature on tax avoidance, we include a number of additional variables 
(Controlsi,t) to control for their potential influence on a firm’s tax avoidance (Davis et al., 
2016; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Hoi et al., 2013). Specifically, we control for a firm’s cash 
holdings (CASH), profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV), change in net operating losses (Delta 
NOL), portion of foreign income (FI), property, plant and equipment (PPE), intangible assets 
(INTANG), equity income in earnings (EQINC), research and development expenditures 
(R&D), size (SIZE), changes in sales (Delta Sales), the market-to-book ratio (MB) and selling 
general and administrative costs (SG&A). Detailed descriptions of our control variables are 
provided in Table I in the appendix. We winsorize all control variables at the top and bottom 
1% level to minimize the influence of outliers. Whenever the dependent variable is the long-
105
run cash ETR, we use five-year average values not only for the measurement of CASH_ETR 
but also for MP, OP and the control variables. Additionally, we include year- and industry-
fixed effects to control for time and industry-specific variance in our data.13 The t-statistics 
are calculated based on standard errors clustered by industry-year. 
For separate regressions on the environmental and social dimensions of sustainability, we 
include an additional control variable—CSP_wo_ENVP for the environmental dimension and 
CSP_wo_SOCP for the social dimension—to prevent omitted variable bias from excluding 
the other dimension of sustainability.14 The variables are calculated as the residuals from the 
following regressions and thus capture the fractions of CSP that are not attributable to ENVP 
and SOCP, respectively: 𝐶𝑆𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, (5) 𝐶𝑆𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, (6) 
To test our empirical model, we use data from two different databases. Data on sustainability 
performance are obtained from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG database, while data on 
accounting information are drawn from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. Table 2 
displays the sample selection process for Panel A (CASH_ETR as a tax avoidance measure) 
and Panel B (GAAP_ETR as a tax avoidance measure). We start with the universe of U.S. 
firms with available environmental and social pillar scores (i.e., ENVP and SOCP) in the 
ASSET4 database for the years 2008–2015. For Panel A, variables are calculated as the five-
year averages (from t to t-4). This results in 8,078 observations for Panel A and 7,283 
observations for Panel B.15 In line with prior tax avoidance research (Hoi et al., 2013; Lanis 
and Richardson, 2012), we exclude firms from the financial industry (GICS industry codes 
4010, 4020 and 4030) and the utility industry (GICS industry code 5510). We also exclude 
observations with missing values for the dependent and independent variables. Our final 
samples consist of 4,449 firm-year observations for Panel A (CASH_ETR) and 4,427 firm-
year observations for Panel B (GAAP_ETR). 
---------------------------------------------- 
13 Industry classifications are based on three-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes. 
14 We do not include SOCP and ENVP as control variables due to multicollinearity. 
15 Note that we require items to be available for only three of the five years to calculate the long-run average 
ENVP and SOCP variables for Panel A, which results in a larger sample for Panel A relative to Panel B. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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2.3.4. Empirical results 
2.3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for our regression variables. On average, the ETR is 
29% for the CASH_ETR and 31% for the GAAP_ETR, which falls within the range found in 
prior studies using U.S. data (Chen et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2016; Dyreng et al., 2008; Hoi et 
al., 2013; Rego, 2003). The operational sustainability performance measures (OP, EOP and 
SOP) have mean values of zero due to the standardization of the indicators. The management 
sustainability performance measures (MP, EMP and SMP) have mean values of zero due to 
their measurement as residuals. The median values for OP, EOP and SOP are equal to the 
mean values; those for MP, EMP and SMP are slightly negative; and those for CSP_wo_EP 
and CSP_wo_SP are slightly positive. As expected, the management sustainability 
performance measures (MP, EMP and SMP), as well as CSP_wo_EP and CSP_wo_SP, range 
between approximately -50 and +50, which reflects the calculation of these variables as 
residuals from their respective regressions. The summary statistics for the control variables 
are comparable to those found in prior studies (Davis et al., 2016; Hoi et al., 2013), thereby 
indicating no specific sample selection bias. Moreover, the summary statistics are similar 
across the two samples (Panel A and Panel B). 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients and their respective p-values (in 
parentheses) for Panel A (except for the correlations between GAAP_ETR and other 
variables). As expected, our two measures of tax avoidance, CASH_ETR and GAAP_ETR, are 
significantly positively correlated. With regard to our sustainability performance variables 
(i.e., variables 3–10), we obtain three important findings. First, every operational 
sustainability performance measure (OP, EOP and SOP) has a correlation of zero with its 
respective management sustainability performance measure (MP, EMP and SMP), which 
reflects the construction of the management performance variables as residuals from the 
regressions (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Second, the operational performance measures (OP, 
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EOP, and SOP) and the management performance measures (MP, EMP, and SMP) are 
significantly positively associated with one another at a statistical significance level of 0.000. 
Further, we find a positive relation between EOP and SOP (at a significance level of 0.000), 
indicating that EOP and SOP are positively associated. In other words, firms with good SOP 
tend to also outperform their benchmark group in terms of EOP. Thus, our approach of 
aggregating SOP and EOP into an overall operational sustainability performance measure 
appears reasonable. With respect to our hypotheses, we find that both ETR measures are 
significantly negatively associated with management sustainability performance measures 
(MP, EMP and SMP), while the correlations between the ETR measures and the operational 
sustainability performance measures (OP, EOP and SOP) are positive and mostly significant. 
Although we do not control for potential confounding effects from the other independent 
variables, these findings provide some preliminary evidence in support of our hypotheses. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
2.3.4.2. Findings from regression analyses 
Table 5 reports the results from OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the 
industry-year level for equation (4). Columns (1) to (3) display the results for CASH_ETR as 
the dependent variable (Panel A), and columns (4) to (6) display the results for GAAP_ETR as 
the dependent variable (Panel B). Moreover, columns (1) and (4) present the results for the 
overall dimension of sustainability; columns (2) and (5) present those for the environmental 
dimension of sustainability; and columns (3) and (6) present those for the social dimension of 
sustainability. Note that lower ETRs correspond with higher tax avoidance. 
With respect to the first set of hypotheses (H1a to H1c), the results reveal negative and 
significant coefficients for MP, EMP, and SMP for both ETR measures. These findings 
support hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c, indicating a substitutive relationship between 
management sustainability performance (EMP and SMP) and corporate tax payments. 
Therefore, firms with higher management sustainability performance (EMP and SMP) have 
significantly lower ETRs and are thus more tax avoidant. This finding supports the reasoning 
of traditional economic theories that firms aim to increase their sustainability performance 
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and engage in tax avoidance based on cost-benefit considerations. Specifically, firms with 
high sustainability management performance build up a positive sustainability reputation that 
acts as insurance if negative corporate events occur. This positive sustainability reputation 
might protect them from the downside risk in cases of critical public tax debates; therefore, 
firms might avoid corporate taxes more aggressively. This reasoning is further enhanced, as 
the measure also entails corporate philanthropic activities, which are particularly useful for 
developing a positive reputation, to some extent. The magnitude of the coefficient for MP (-
0.0008) indicates that a 1-unit increase (e.g., from 4 to 5) in management sustainability 
performance is associated with a 0.8 percentage point decrease in the long-run cash ETR (e.g., 
from 0.320 to 0.312). 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
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With respect to the second set of hypotheses (H2a to H2c), the results reveal positive and 
significant coefficients for OP, EOP, and SOP for both ETR measures. Firms with higher 
operational sustainability performance have higher ETRs and are less tax avoidant. This 
finding supports hypotheses H2a to H2c and thus the reasoning derived from stakeholder 
theory and the corporate culture perspective of the firm. Firms with a strong corporate culture 
of sustainability act more responsibly toward all stakeholders. These firms have lower 
environmental and social externalities and pay higher taxes. In contrast to management 
sustainability performance, the operational sustainability performance is less visible to 
external stakeholders and is thus more likely to reflect the genuine sustainability culture of the 
firm. Because the operational performance indicators are standardized, the magnitude of the 
coefficients cannot be reasonably interpreted. 
Our findings on the control variables are mostly consistent with Davis et al. (2016) and Hoi et 
al. (2013). Specifically, we find that larger and more profitable firms have lower ETRs, 
probably due to more resources in tax planning and access to a broader scope of tax planning 
activities. In addition, foreign income and intangibles are negatively associated with the ETR 
measures, which supports the reasoning that firms can reduce their tax payments through 
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foreign activities and intangibles. We find a positive relationship between leverage and the 
ETR, which suggests that firms with more debt have higher tax rates. 
Next, we are interested in the economic relevance of our results. Therefore, we replace MP 
with a dummy variable pos_MP, which equals 1 if a firm has a positive MP and 0 otherwise. 
We re-run the regressions according to equation (4) with pos_MP instead of MP as our main 
variable of interest. The results are displayed in Table 6. The statistically significant 
coefficient on pos_MP equals -0.0187, which indicates that the cash ETR of firms with 
positive management sustainability performance is, on average, 1.9% lower than that of firms 
with negative management sustainability performance. We apply the same procedure for OP 
by introducing a dummy variable for negative operational performance, which equals 1 if OP 
is negative and 0 otherwise. The significantly negative coefficient of -0.0200 on neg_OP 
(regression 2) indicates that the long-run cash ETR of firms with negative operational 
sustainability performance is, on average, 2% lower (compared with that of firms with non-
negative operational sustainability performance). Given these results, we create the interaction 
term pos_MP x neg_OP to capture firms that we expect to participate in the most tax 
avoidance in given years. The statistically significant negative coefficient on pos_MP x 
neg_OP (regression 3) of -0.0347 indicates that the cash ETR of firms with both positive 
management sustainability performance and negative operational sustainability performance 
is, on average, 3.5% lower. In dollars, the ETR difference between the two groups equals, on 
average, $35.48 million in taxes paid annually (calculated based on a mean pretax income of 
$1.023 billion), which is higher than the tax savings reported by Hoi et al. (2013) for firms 
with highly negative CSR activities. Note that both the magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
and the average pretax income are higher in our study. This finding suggests that 
outperforming the benchmark group in terms of management sustainability performance and 
having lower operational sustainability performance than the benchmark average will lead to 
economically relevant lower tax payments. 
---------------------------------------------- 
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2.3.4.3. Robustness 
We perform a number of additional analyses to test the robustness of our main findings. First, 
we investigate whether our results are driven by the sample selection, particularly the 
exclusion of firms from the financial or utilities industry. This procedure results in 5,024 
observations for Panel A and 4,951 observations for Panel B. All variables are calculated 
according to the procedures described in the research design section. The results from the 
multivariate OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the industry-year are similar to 
our baseline specifications (untabulated). In particular, we again obtain negative and 
significant coefficients for MP, EMP and SMP and positive and significant coefficients for 
OP, EOP and SOP. However, the coefficients for EOP and SMP become insignificant in 
Panel A. Next, we investigate whether the handling of loss observations drives our main 
findings. In the baseline model, we include loss observations, which affect the measurement 
of our dependent variables (which take a value of 1 if the pretax book income is negative and 
income taxes are positive) and our control variables, particularly ROA and FI. Therefore, we 
exclude firm-year observations with negative pretax book income, which results in a reduced 
sample of 3,847 observations for Panel A (CASH_ETR) and 3,834 observations for Panel B 
(GAAP_ETR). The results (untabulated) primarily remain unchanged. In particular, the 
coefficients for OP, MP, EMP, EOP and SOP are similar to our main findings with respect to 
sign, magnitude and statistical significance. The coefficients for SMP remain negative, but 
they become insignificant at common significance levels. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that our results are not predominantly driven by sample selection. Next, one could 
argue that our results may be biased due to omitted variables, particularly corporate 
governance characteristics. Specifically, prior studies report empirical evidence of a link 
between corporate governance characteristics and tax avoidance (Armstrong et al., 2014; 
Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Gaertner, 2014). Therefore, we include an additional control 
variable that proxies for the economic and corporate governance dimensions of sustainability 
(similar to Davis et al., 2016). The construction of this variable is similar to the construction 
of CSP_wo_ENVP and CSP_wo_SOCP (equations (5) and (6), respectively). However, we 
now regress the ASSET4 aggregate score that captures a firm’s sustainability performance in 
the economic, environmental, social and corporate governance dimensions on CSP, ENVP, 
and SOCP and use the residuals from these regressions. ESG_wo_CSP, ESG_wo_ENVP, and 
ESG_wo_SOCP thus capture the portion of the ESG rating that is not driven by CSP, ENVP, 
and SOCP. We re-run our baseline regressions and include these additional control variables, 
i.e., ESG_wo_CSP for the overall sustainability dimension, ESG_wo_ENVP for the
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environmental dimension, and ESG_wo_SOCP for the social dimension. The untabulated 
results for our main variables of interest (MP, OP, EMP, EOP, SMP and SOP) remain 
unchanged in terms of sign, magnitude and significance. The new control variables are 
negative and significant for Panel A (CASH_ETR) and negative and insignificant for Panel B 
(GAAP_ETR). Taken together, the findings of this additional analysis reveal that our results 
are not mainly driven by omitted variable bias. 
Second, we account for the rich literature on tax avoidance, which provides a variety of 
measures for tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). In our baseline model, we choose 
ETRs as measures of tax avoidance because they focus on the entire continuum of tax 
avoidance strategies and because they are widely used measures in the literature on tax 
avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Another approach for measuring tax avoidance 
follows the traditional approaches for measuring earnings management (e.g., Jones, 1991) and 
estimates the “discretionary” or “abnormal” portion of book-tax differences. Compared with 
the traditional ETR measures, such a measure can “capture items that alter, and in particular 
reduce, the firm’s GAAP effective tax rate which then raises bottom-line earnings, all else 
constant” (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Therefore, we follow Frank et al. (2009) and use the 
discretionary portion of the permanent book-tax difference (DTAX) as an alternative measure 
of tax avoidance. The permanent book-tax difference (PERMDIFF) is the difference between 
the effective and statutory tax rates multiplied by pretax income. PERMDIFF is regressed on 
typical determinants such as the amount of intangible assets or the change in the tax loss 
carryforward (see Table I in the appendix for details). The residuals from this regression are 
used to proxy for DTAX. In contrast to the traditional ETR measures, DTAX aims at removing 
“unintended” tax avoidance and capturing the portion of truly intentional tax avoidance. The 
results from our regression models with DTAX as an alternative measure of tax avoidance are 
displayed in Panel A of Table 7.16 Note that higher DTAX values reflect a higher portion of 
discretionary book-tax differences and thus a higher level of tax avoidance. The signs of the 
coefficients for MP and OP are thus reversed compared with the results in Table 5. Similar to 
our baseline results, the findings unanimously support our hypotheses. Firms with higher 
management sustainability performance have higher discretionary book-tax differences, while 
firms with higher operational sustainability performance have lower discretionary book-tax 
differences. Taken together, these findings provide evidence that our results are not solely 
driven by the measurement of corporate tax avoidance. 
16 Similar to Hoi et al. (2013), we include the lagged DTAX as an additional control variable in our regressions. 
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Third, another concern with our main findings relates to the measurement of our sustainability 
performance variables. Specifically, only the measurements of EOP and SOP reflect those 
used in the literature (Hummel and Schlick, 2016; Trumpp et al., 2015), whereas our approach 
to measuring MP, EMP and SMP is unique in this research context. First, we alternatively 
measure MPmean as the mean of EMP and SMP and re-run our baseline regressions with 
MPmean instead of MP. The results remain robust for both the CASH_ETR and GAAP_ETR 
(untabulated). Next, because Trumpp et al. (2015) provide a theoretically sound and 
empirically assessed framework for the measurement of EMP, we alternatively measure EMP 
according to this framework (EMPTR). Depending on the samples used (Panel A or Panel B, 
respectively), the correlations between EMP and EMPTR range between 0.88 and 0.90 (p-
values of 0.0000), thereby indicating very high correlations between the two measures. 
Therefore, the two measures are likely to measure similar aspects of sustainability 
performance. Finally, we re-run our baseline regressions for the environmental dimension of 
sustainability with EMPTR instead of EMP and the dependent variables CASH_ETR, 
GAAP_ETR, and DTAX. The results are displayed in Panel B of Table 7. Except for the 
coefficient for EOP in regression (4), the results remain robust for both EOP and EMP. The 
results from this additional analysis help validate our measurements of MP, EMP, and SMP 
and show that our results are not particularly driven by our measurement approach. 
Taken together, the results from these additional analyses indicate that our results are robust 
to different sample specifications, measures of corporate tax avoidance, and CSP measures. 
2.3.5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the relationship between CSP and corporate tax avoidance by 
distinguishing between management and operational sustainability performance. The 
management dimension refers to a firm’s principles, policies, programs, structures and 
processes of sustainability performance, whereas the operational dimension refers to a firm’s 
environmental and social impacts. Consistent with traditional economic theories, we 
hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between management sustainability 
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performance and corporate tax avoidance. By contrast, in line with stakeholder theory and the 
corporate culture perspective, we expect to find a negative relationship between operational 
sustainability performance and corporate tax avoidance. The results from the OLS regressions 
of a sample of 4,449 U.S. firm-year observations support this reasoning. The results are robust 
to different measures of corporate tax avoidance, namely, a long-run cash ETR, a GAAP 
ETR, and a discretionary book-tax difference, and they pertain to both overall sustainability 
and the environmental and social dimensions separately. 
The practical implications of this research relate to two areas. First, considering the 
significant relationships between CSP and tax avoidance, stakeholders need additional 
information about a firm’s tax payments and corporate tax strategy to derive a balanced 
picture of its behavior toward society. Therefore, a first step may be to integrate this 
information into common sustainability disclosure guidelines, such as the GRI guidelines and 
the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC). Second, our findings reveal that the 
relationship between CSP and corporate tax avoidance depends on whether the management 
dimension or the operational dimension of sustainability is considered. Stakeholders need to 
be aware of these differences when assessing a firm’s CSP. 
As with all papers, the results of this paper are also subject to certain limitations. First, the 
generalizability of our findings depends on our sample. In particular, this study focuses solely 
on U.S. firms. While the focus on U.S. firms might enhance the comparability of our findings 
because most prior studies examine U.S. samples, the results may not hold in a European 
context. In fact, Matten and Moon (2008) argue that the understanding of CSR differs 
significantly between coordinated (i.e., European) and liberal (i.e., U.S.) economies. Second, 
our measures of corporate tax avoidance are obtained from accounting data, which may yield 
erroneous estimations of taxable income. While the use of tax returns enables researchers to 
more accurately estimate the firm’s taxable income, these data are seldom publicly available, 
and they are often difficult to match with financial statement data (Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010). We thus rely on multiple measures that are commonly used in the literature to capture 
tax avoidance. The robustness of our findings across these different measures dispels potential 
concerns regarding the validity of our measures. A third caveat of this study relates to the 
measurement of operational and management sustainability performance. While we closely 
follow the existing literature in constructing our operational performance measure, the 
literature on the measurement of the management dimension is limited; therefore, we develop 
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our own measurement approach. The substantial overlap between our variable EMP and the 
variable EMPTR, which is calculated according to Trumpp et al. (2015), provides contributes 
to the validity of our measurement approach. 
These limitations provide opportunities for future research. First, additional studies could 
investigate whether our findings hold in a European context, where a more implicit 
understanding of CSR persists. Second, future research could empirically validate our 
measures of management sustainability performance and social management performance or 
develop and validate alternative measures based on the data items drawn from the ASSET4 
database. In addition, as our results indicate that management sustainability performance is 
more related to a traditional economic understanding of corporate sustainability while 
operational sustainability performance is more related to the corporate culture of a firm, 
researchers might be interested in determining whether these differences also hold for other 
areas of research. Third, our results reveal significant relationships between CSP and 
corporate tax avoidance. While Davis et al. (2016) provide some anecdotal evidence of how 
firms discuss tax payments in their sustainability reports, further research is needed to 
complement our findings from a corporate sustainability disclosure perspective. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual approach to measuring corporate sustainability performance 
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Figure 2: Measurement of operational and management sustainability performance 
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Table 1: Measurement of environmental and social operational performance 
Code ASSET4 item Performance indicator Measurement 
Environmental dimension 
EOP1 ENRRDP033 Energy consumption (Total direct and indirect energy consumption)/total sales 
EOP2 ENRRDP054 Water withdrawal (Total water withdrawal in cubic meters)/total sales 
EOP3 ENERDP023 Greenhouse gas emissions (Total CO2 and CO2 equivalent emissions in tonnes)/total sales 
EOP4 ENERDP045 Total weight of waste (Total amount of waste produced in tonnes)/total sales 
Social dimension 
SOP1 SOEQDP034 Turnover Percentage of employee turnover 
SOP2 SOHSDP024 Injury rate Total number of injuries and fatalities including no-lost-time injuries relative to one million hours worked 
SOP3 SOTDDP018 Training Average hours of training per year per employee 
SOP4 SODODP017 Female employees Percentage of female employees 
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Table 2. Sample selection 
 Panel A:  CASH_ETR  
Panel B:  
GAAP_ETR  
Firm-year observations with available ENVP and SOCP scores 
(ASSET4 ESG Database) 
8,078 7,283 
  -Financial or utility companies -1,450 -1,422 
  -Missing values for dependent variable  -1,607 -184 
  -Missing values for independent variables -572 -1,250 
Resulting firm-year observations  4,449 4,427 
This table reports the sample selection for the baseline regression models. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
Panel A: CASH_ETR Panel B: GAAP_ETR 
Variable n Mean SD Min P50 Max n Mean SD Min P50 Max 
Dependent variables 
CASH_ETR 4,449 0.29 0.23 0.00 0.25 1.00 
GAAP_ETR 4,427 0.31 0.23 0.00 0.30 1.00 
Main variables of interest 
MP 4,449 0.00 22.61 -46.66 -3.15 47.03 4,427 0.00 24.36 -49.05 -1.65 47.91
OP 4,449 0.00 0.14 -1.61 0.00 0.62 4,427 0.00 0.20 -1.75 0.00 0.78
EOP 4,449 0.00 0.26 -3.05 0.00 0.92 4,427 0.00 0.33 -3.29 0.00 1.02
EMP 4,449 0.00 29.58 -34.91 -8.14 53.43 4,427 0.00 32.03 -38.81 -6.58 48.20
SOP 4,449 0.00 0.12 -1.04 0.00 0.85 4,427 0.00 0.20 -2.00 0.00 1.20
SMP 4,449 0.00 26.23 -42.71 -2.80 52.15 4,427 0.00 27.68 -46.21 -1.44 57.47
Control variables 
CSP_wo_EP 4,449 0.00 14.07 -47.17 0.66 41.58 4,427 0.00 16.45 -57.67 1.27 55.07 
CSP_wo_SP 4,449 0.00 8.62 -29.35 0.07 27.21 4,427 0.00 11.04 -33.68 0.85 32.94 
CASH 4,449 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.87 4,427 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.84 
ROA 4,449 0.10 0.10 -0.17 0.09 0.44 4,427 0.09 0.11 -0.29 0.09 0.46
LEV 4,449 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.21 0.99 4,427 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.22 1.14 
Delta NOL 4,449 0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.15 4,427 0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.00 0.24
FI 4,449 0.38 1.17 -2.75 0.13 8.75 4,427 0.30 0.86 -3.07 0.11 5.11
PPE 4,449 0.30 0.25 0.01 0.22 1.10 4,427 0.29 0.25 0.00 0.21 1.08 
INTANG 4,449 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.20 0.95 4,427 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.19 1.17 
EQINC 4,449 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 4,427 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03
R&D 4,449 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.26 4,427 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.25 
SIZE 4,449 8.53 1.16 5.99 8.43 11.61 4,427 8.66 1.17 6.17 8.54 11.96 
Delta SALE 4,449 0.08 0.12 -0.17 0.05 0.59 4,427 0.05 0.17 -0.55 0.04 0.67
MB 4,449 3.55 5.51 -19.31 2.69 35.98 4,427 3.40 4.92 -16.04 2.50 31.02 
SG&A 4,449 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.85 4,427 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.16 0.81 
This table reports summary statistics for the regression variables for the sample used in the baseline regression 
model. The values reported in Panel A are the mean values over a five-year period. All control variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level (except for binary variables). 
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 Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 19) 20) 21) 22) 23) 
1) CASH_ETR 1.000
2) GAAP_ETR   0.146   1.000 
 
(0.000) 
3) MP -0.185  -0.071   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
4) OP   0.020   0.060   0.000   1.000 
(0.190) (0.000) (1.000) 
5) EOP   0.006   0.040 -0.023   0.862   1.000
 
(0.691) (0.008) (0.122) (0.000) 
6) EMP -0.101  -0.062   0.782   0.016   0.000   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.299) (1.000) 
7) SOP   0.025   0.041   0.041   0.521   0.086   0.029   1.000 
(0.095) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) 
8) SMP -0.114  -0.062   0.924  -0.038  -0.046   0.831   0.000   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.002) (0.000) (1.000) 
9) CSP_wo_EP -0.170  -0.034   0.622   0.030   0.019   0.001   0.036   0.438   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.046) (0.205) (0.957) (0.016) (0.000) 
10) CSP_wo_SP -0.212  -0.041   0.381   0.042   0.048   0.037   0.004  -0.000   0.569   1.000
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.015) (0.808) (0.991) (0.000) 
11) CASH   0.030 -0.050  -0.142   0.077   0.079  -0.119   0.027  -0.136  -0.074  -0.045   1.000
 
(0.044) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
12) ROA -0.294  -0.028   0.150   0.073   0.071  -0.034   0.028   0.040   0.287   0.293   0.165   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.059) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
13) LEV   0.122   0.037 -0.177  -0.028  -0.023  -0.089  -0.018  -0.106  -0.174  -0.205  -0.288  -0.193   1.000
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.059) (0.125) (0.000) (0.239) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
14) Delta_NOL   0.218   0.078 -0.079   0.014   0.008  -0.018   0.020  -0.042  -0.104  -0.107   0.146  -0.204   0.063   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.347) (0.579) (0.241) (0.185) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
15) FI -0.092  -0.058   0.155  -0.004  -0.013   0.135   0.020   0.132   0.079   0.084   0.052   0.027  -0.065  -0.012   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.789) (0.385) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.068) (0.000) (0.406) 
16) PPE   0.079 -0.006  -0.035  -0.142  -0.147  -0.043  -0.026  -0.047  -0.011   0.023  -0.286  -0.050   0.201   0.034  -0.060   1.000
(0.000) (0.707) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.086) (0.002) (0.480) (0.128) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) 
17) INTANG -0.061   0.052  -0.006   0.059   0.065  -0.049  -0.003  -0.030   0.055   0.056  -0.156  -0.072   0.186   0.017   0.012  -0.428   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.671) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.851) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.264) (0.420) (0.000) 
18) EQINC -0.069  -0.019   0.144  -0.022  -0.063   0.142   0.080   0.133   0.050   0.047  -0.127   0.031   0.013  -0.055   0.007   0.073  -0.031   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.209) (0.000) (0.142) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.039) (0.387) (0.000) (0.650) (0.000) (0.041) 
19) R&D   0.028 -0.047   0.023   0.071   0.059   0.062   0.047   0.039  -0.037  -0.039   0.604  -0.072  -0.207   0.152   0.079  -0.289   0.024  -0.086   1.000
(0.060) (0.002) (0.129) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.000) 
20) SIZE -0.070  -0.053   0.493   0.001  -0.014   0.511   0.029   0.524   0.148   0.019  -0.325  -0.161   0.104  -0.050   0.047   0.099   0.087   0.167  -0.193   1.000
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.965) (0.346) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
21) Delta_SALE -0.052   0.078  -0.087   0.044   0.055  -0.180  -0.002  -0.153   0.089   0.142   0.267   0.358  -0.095   0.061   0.033   0.033   0.053  -0.058   0.069  -0.197   1.000
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.912) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
22) MB -0.036  -0.002   0.042   0.056   0.046   0.031   0.038   0.032   0.031   0.028   0.191   0.184  -0.060   0.023   0.007  -0.052  -0.043  -0.012   0.137  -0.069   0.160   1.000
(0.015) (0.894) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.037) (0.011) (0.033) (0.042) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.655) (0.001) (0.004) (0.433) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
23) SG&A   0.032   0.086   0.025   0.057   0.078 -0.020  -0.020  -0.004   0.070   0.078   0.302   0.267  -0.234   0.046   0.002  -0.267  -0.018  -0.163   0.260  -0.333   0.294   0.180   1.000
(0.035) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.176) (0.192) (0.775) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.888) (0.000) (0.219) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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 This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the regression variables. p-values (for a two-tailed test of statistical significance) are reported in brackets. The correlations among independent 
variables are calculated for Panel A; the correlations between independent variables and the CASH_ETR are calculated based on Panel A; and the correlations between independent variables and 
GAAP_ETR are calculated based on Panel B. 
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Table 5. Multivariate regressions 
 Panel A Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables CASH_ETR CASH_ETR CASH_ETR GAAP_ETR GAAP_ETR GAAP_ETR 
       
MP -0.0008***   -0.0005***   
 (-4.0081)   (-3.1667)   
OP 0.0692***   0.0657***   
 (3.7183)   (3.6854)   
EMP  -0.0005**   -0.0003*  
  (-2.5894)   (-1.9541)  
EOP  0.0204*   0.0289***  
  (1.7400)   (2.7179)  
SMP   -0.0003*   -0.0003** 
   (-1.7050)   (-2.0469) 
SOP   0.0737***   0.0484*** 
   (3.2545)   (2.9521) 
CSP_wo_ENVP  -0.0009***   -0.0005**  
  (-3.7772)   (-2.4594)  
CSP_wo_SOCP   -0.0028***   -0.0012*** 
   (-6.5848)   (-3.2343) 
CASH 0.1174*** 0.1171*** 0.1166*** -0.1142*** -0.1144*** -0.1099*** 
 (3.0815) (3.0850) (3.1666) (-3.8214) (-3.8235) (-3.6879) 
ROA -0.6675*** -0.6618*** -0.6295*** -0.0964 -0.0933 -0.0760 
 (-10.4570) (-10.5335) (-10.4383) (-1.4302) (-1.3996) (-1.1273) 
LEV 0.0856*** 0.0859*** 0.0747*** 0.0199 0.0202 0.0171 
 (3.6497) (3.6699) (3.2473) (0.9304) (0.9496) (0.7984) 
Delta NOL 1.2492*** 1.2518*** 1.2172*** 0.1962 0.1974 0.1904 
 (6.7025) (6.6854) (6.4951) (1.3457) (1.3562) (1.3037) 
FI -0.0126*** -0.0127*** -0.0123*** -0.0175*** -0.0173*** -0.0176*** 
 (-4.1353) (-4.1710) (-4.0018) (-2.8875) (-2.8425) (-2.9186) 
PPE 0.0186 0.0128 0.0219 -0.0200 -0.0243 -0.0259 
 (0.5402) (0.3707) (0.6534) (-0.8376) (-1.0292) (-1.0938) 
INTANG -0.0681*** -0.0678*** -0.0513** 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0077 
 (-2.7461) (-2.7193) (-2.0260) (0.0176) (-0.0263) (0.3646) 
EQINC -1.6982** -1.6910** -1.8829** -0.2022 -0.1387 -0.3220 
 (-2.2836) (-2.3198) (-2.5459) (-0.3003) (-0.2031) (-0.4720) 
R&D -0.1761 -0.1698 -0.1842 0.0494 0.0564 0.0544 
 (-1.4663) (-1.4047) (-1.5286) (0.3286) (0.3728) (0.3613) 
SIZE -0.0075* -0.0078* -0.0111*** -0.0073* -0.0071* -0.0082** 
 (-1.9537) (-1.8840) (-2.7090) (-1.8003) (-1.6597) (-2.0110) 
Delta SALE -0.0349 -0.0329 -0.0248 0.0478* 0.0478* 0.0522* 
 (-1.0284) (-0.9762) (-0.7503) (1.7575) (1.7424) (1.9109) 
MB -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (-0.7834) (-0.7129) (-0.8737) (-0.9099) (-0.8529) (-0.8529) 
SG&A 0.1192*** 0.1190*** 0.1156*** 0.0909*** 0.0912*** 0.0908*** 
 (4.0784) (4.0629) (4.1654) (3.3180) (3.2783) (3.2578) 
Constant 0.4283*** 0.4313*** 0.4634*** 0.4555*** 0.4538*** 0.4581*** 
 (9.2307) (9.0522) (9.8926) (8.5762) (8.3390) (8.6158) 
       
Observations 4,449 4,449 4,449 4,427 4,427 4,427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1719 0.1706 0.1773 0.0521 0.0503 0.0517 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F 26.287 24.803 20.647 7.4318 7.0768 7.2186 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard errors clustered by industry-year. 
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Table 6. Economic Relevance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables CASH_ETR CASH_ETR CASH_ETR 
    
pos_MP -0.0187**   
 (-2.5840)   
neg_OP  -0.0200**  
  (-2.3172)  
pos_MP x neg_OP   -0.0347*** 
   (-3.4955) 
OP 0.0722***   
 (3.7732)   
MP  -0.0008***  
  (-3.7298)  
CASH 0.1293*** 0.1181*** 0.1338*** 
 (3.4416) (3.0993) (3.6196) 
ROA -0.6951*** -0.6682*** -0.7004*** 
 (-11.1478) (-10.5801) (-11.2682) 
LEV 0.0949*** 0.0867*** 0.0988*** 
 (4.2025) (3.6948) (4.4000) 
Delta NOL 1.2472*** 1.2533*** 1.2515*** 
 (6.6818) (6.7285) (6.7150) 
FI -0.0136*** -0.0128*** -0.0141*** 
 (-4.4689) (-4.2393) (-4.6914) 
PPE 0.0169 0.0159 0.0137 
 (0.4907) (0.4518) (0.3928) 
INTANG -0.0663*** -0.0682*** -0.0653*** 
 (-2.6627) (-2.7509) (-2.6365) 
EQINC -1.7951** -1.7296** -1.8299** 
 (-2.4064) (-2.3260) (-2.4228) 
R&D -0.2026* -0.1808 -0.2131* 
 (-1.6672) (-1.5159) (-1.7576) 
SIZE -0.0129*** -0.0067* -0.0138*** 
 (-3.8432) (-1.7485) (-4.4228) 
Delta SALE -0.0290 -0.0374 -0.0304 
 (-0.8484) (-1.0971) (-0.8907) 
MB -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (-0.7372) (-0.6614) (-0.6208) 
SG&A 0.1075*** 0.1225*** 0.1072*** 
 (3.5414) (4.2183) (3.4855) 
Constant 0.4891*** 0.4264*** 0.4939*** 
 (10.7159) (9.1901) (10.4053) 
    
Observations 4,449 4,449 4,449 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1695 0.1714 0.1694 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
F 25.701 24.978 25.389 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard errors clustered by industry-year. 
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Table 7. Robustness analysis 
Panel A: Panel B: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DTAX DTAX DTAX CASH_ET
R 
GAAP_ETR DTAX 
MP 0.0003** 
(2.3120) 
OP -0.0264***
(-2.6458)
EOP -0.0125** 0.0172 0.0282*** -0.0116*
(-2.1159) (1.4678) (2.6503) (-1.9124) 
EMP 0.0002*** -0.0488* -0.0425** 0.0264** 
(3.0703) (-1.9506) (-2.1620) (2.3012) 
SOP -0.0171*
(-1.7945)
SMP 0.0002*
(1.8610)
CSRP without EP 0.0001 
(0.8095) 
CSRP without SP 0.0004** 
(2.0983) 
CSR residual -0.0010*** -0.0005** 0.0002 
(-4.2997) (-2.3376) (1.4343) 
Observations 2,678 2,678 2,678 4,449 4,427 2,678 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4744 0.4746 0.4733 0.1709 0.0503 0.4736 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
F 29.171 28.028 27.653 25.099 7.1989 27.909 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard errors clustered by industry-year.
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Appendix 
Table I. Variables description 
Variable Definition Source 
Measures of tax avoidance:  
CASH_ ETR The five-year cash effective tax rate for firm i in year t, which is defined as the five-year 
average of cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by the pretax book income (PI) less special items 
(SPI).  
The CASH_ETR takes a value of 1 if it exceeds the value of 1 or if the denominator is 
negative and cash taxes paid are positive. The CASH_ETR takes a value of 0 if cash taxes 
paid are negative. 
Compustat 
GAAP_ETR The GAAP effective tax rate for firm i in year t, which is defined as total income taxes (TXT) 
divided by pretax income (PI). 
The GAAP_ETR takes a value of 1 if it exceeds 1 or if the pretax income is negative and total 
income taxes are positive. The GAAP ETR takes a value of 0 if total income taxes are negative. 
Compustat 
   
Measures of CSP:  
MP Management performance for firm i in year t, which is measured as the residuals from the 
following regression: 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑂𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,! ,where   
CSRP is a firm’s overall corporate sustainability performance (CSP), measured as the average 
of its environmental (ENVSCORE) and social performance (SOCSCORE). 
OP is a firm’s operational sustainability performance. 
Asset 4 
OP Operational performance for firm i in year t, which is measured as the mean of a firm’s 
environmental operational performance (EOP) and social operational performance (SOP). 
Asset 4 
EOP Environmental operational performance for firm i in year t, which is measured as the mean of 
energy consumption (ENRRDP033), water withdrawal (ENRRDP054), CO2 emissions 
(ENERDP023) and waste produced (ENERDP045). All items are negatively scaled, 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level by year, and standardized by three-digit GICS 
industry codes. 
Asset 4 
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EMP Environmental management performance for firm i in year t, which is measured as the 
residuals from the following regression: 𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑂𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,! ,where 
ENVP is a firm’s overall environmental performance (ENVSCORE), and EOP is a firm’s 
environmental operational performance. 
Asset 4 
SOP Social operational performance for firm i in year t, which is measured as the mean of turnover 
(SOEQDP034, negatively scaled), the injury rate (SOHSDP024, negatively scaled), the 
average yearly training hours per employee (SOTDDP018) and the percentage of female 
employees (SODODP017). 
The injury rate and the percentage of female employees are standardized by three-digit GICS 
industry codes, turnover and training hours at an overall level. 
Asset 4 
SMP Social management performance for firm i in year t, which is measured as the residuals from 
the following regression: 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,! ,where 
SOCP is a firm’s overall social performance (SOCSCORE), and SOP is a firm’s social 
operational performance (SOP). 
Asset 4 
CSP_wo_ENVP CSP that is not attributable to environmental performance for firm i in year t, which is 
measured as the residuals from the following regression: 𝐶𝑆𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, where 
CSP is a firm’s overall CSP, i.e., (ENVSCORE+SOCSCORE)/2, and ENVP is a firm’s 
environmental performance (ENVSCORE). 
Asset 4 
CSP_wo_SOCP CSP that is not attributable to social performance for firm i in year t, which is measured as the 
residuals from the following regression: 𝐶𝑆𝑃!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, where 
CSP is a firm’s overall CSP, i.e., (ENVSCORE+SOCSCORE)/2, and SOCP is a firm’s social 
performance (SOCSCORE). 
Asset 4 
Control variables: 
CASH The cash holdings of firm i in year t, which are defined as cash and marketable securities 
(CHE) divided by the lagged total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
ROA The profitability of firm i in year t, which is defined as pretax income (PI) less extraordinary 
items (XI) divided by the lagged total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
LEV The leverage of firm i in year t, which is defined as the total long-term debt (DLTT) divided 
by the lagged total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
Delta NOL The change in the tax loss carryforward of firm i in year t, which is defined as the tax loss 
carryforward (TLCF) less the lagged tax loss carryforward (TLCF) divided by the loss 
carryforward (AT). If missing, TLCF is set to 0. 
Compustat 
FI Foreign income for firm i in year t, which is defined foreign pretax income (PIFO) divided by Compustat 
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the total pretax income (PI). If missing, PIFO is set to 0. 
PPE Property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t, which is defined as property, plant and 
equipment (PPENT) divided by the lagged total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
INTANG The intangibles of firm i in year t, which are defined as intangible assets (INTAN) divided by 
the lagged total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
EQINC Equity income in earnings of firm i in year t, which is defined as equity income in earnings 
(ESUB) divided by the lagged total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
R&D Research and development expenses for firm i in year t, which is defined as the research and 
development expenses (XRD) divided by the lagged total assets (AT). If missing, R&D is set 
to 0. 
Compustat 
SIZE The size of firm i in year t, which is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (AT).  Compustat 
Delta SALE The change in sales for firm i in year t, which is defined as sales turnover net(SALE) less the 
net lagged sales turnover (SALE) divided by the lagged total assets (AT). 
Compustat 
MB The market-to-book ratio for firm i in year t, which is defined as the lagged value of shares 
outstanding (CSHO) times the lagged closing share price at the fiscal year-end (PRCC_F) 
divided by the lagged book value of equity (CEQ). 
Compustat 
SG&A Selling, general and administrative expenses for firm i in year t, which is defined as selling, 
general and administrative expenses (XSG&A) divided by the lagged total assets (TA). 
Compustat 
Robustness:   
DTAX The discretionary permanent book-tax difference (Frank et al., 2009) for firm i in year t, which 
is defined as the residuals from the following regression estimated by industry-year (the 
industry classification is based on two-digit GICS codes), where all variables (including the 
intercept) are scaled by the lagged total assets (ATt-1): 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹!,! =     𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁!,! + 𝛽!𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁!,!+ 𝛽!𝑀𝐼!,! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐸!,! + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎  𝑁𝑂𝐿!,! + 𝛽!𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹!,!!! + 𝜖!,! ,  
where 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹!,! = 𝐵𝐼!,! −    𝐶𝐹𝑇𝐸!,! + 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅!,! /𝑆𝑇𝑅!,! − 𝐷𝑇𝐸!,!/𝑆𝑇𝑅!,! 
BI is a firm’s pretax income (PI), 
CFTE is a firm’s current federal tax expenses (TXFED), 
CFOR is a firm’s current foreign tax expenses (TXFO), 
DTE is a firm’s deferred tax expenses (TXDI), 
STR is the statutory tax rate, 
INTAN is a firm’s intangible assets (INTAN), 
UNCON is the income reported under the equity method (ESUB), 
MI is the minority interest income (MII), 
CSTE is the current state income tax expenses (TXS), and 
Delta NOL is the change in the tax loss carryforward (TLCF). 
Compustat 
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We treat missing values as Frank et al. (2009) and Hoi et al. (2013) do.  
EMPTR Environmental management performance of firm i in year t, which is measured according to 
Trumpp et al. (2015). 
ESG_wo_CSP ESG performance that is not attributable to the corporate sustainability performance of firm i 
in year t, which is measured as the residuals from the following regression: 𝐸𝑆𝐺!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, where 
ESG is a firm’s overall ESG performance (A4IR), and CSP is a firm’s corporate sustainability 
performance. 
Asset4 
ESG_wo_ENVP ESG performance that is not attributable to environmental performance for firm i in year t, 
which is measured as the residuals from the following regression: 𝐸𝑆𝐺!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, where 
ESG is a firm’s overall ESG performance (A4IR), and ENVP is a firm’s environmental 
performance (ENVSCORE). 
Asset4 
ESG_wo_SOCP ESG performance that is not attributable to the social performance of firm i in year t, which is 
measured as the residuals from the following regression: 𝐸𝑆𝐺!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑃!,! + 𝜖!,!, where 
ESG is a firm’s overall ESG performance (A4IR), and SP is a firm’s social performance 
(SOCSCORE). 
Asset4 
For regressions with the long-run cash ETR as the dependent variable, we use mean values over a five-year period for all independent variables. Values for continuous control 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. 
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